Reputation: 1547
Has Done Shameful Things for Rep
- Group:
- High House Mafia
- Active Posts:
- 19,221 (2.73 per day)
- Most Active In:
- MAFIA (4934 posts)
- Joined:
- 06-June 07
- Profile Views:
- 105,284
- Last Active:
Today, 06:50 PM- Currently:
- Offline
My Information
- Member Title:
- Martyr of High House Mafia
- Age:
- 38 years old
- Birthday:
- October 10, 1987
- Location:
- 'sauga/GTA, City of the Lion
- Interests:
- Soccer, Chess, swimming, books, misc
Contact Information
- E-mail:
- Click here to e-mail me
- MSN:
-
pavlotver@gmail.com
- Website URL:
-
http://
- Skype:
-
pavlo.tvedokhlib
Previous Fields
- Whatever extra comment you want:
- Junior Mafia Mod
Latest Reputation
Current Reputation
-
Post
-
Post
-
Post
-
Post
-
Post
Latest Visitors
-
Tsundoku 
07 Dec 2025 - 00:09 -
Lady Bliss 
08 Apr 2025 - 01:29 -
Abyss 
09 Jan 2025 - 08:10 -
Garak 
14 Feb 2024 - 22:53 -
Avatar 
11 Aug 2023 - 16:33 -
Maark Abbott 
21 Feb 2023 - 16:19 -
Werthead 
04 Feb 2023 - 20:44 -
Aptorian 
28 Apr 2022 - 03:38 -
Nicodimas 
06 Mar 2022 - 20:21 -
Grief 
26 Feb 2022 - 01:14
Posts I've Made
-
In Topic: The Russia Politics and War in Ukraine Thread
Today, 06:52 PM
Cause, on 21 September 2026 - 04:09 PM, said:
Mentalist, on 21 September 2026 - 01:38 AM, said:
Cause, on 20 September 2026 - 10:32 PM, said:Russia can’t handle the war they have. I’m not Alexander the Great but this strategy seems to have no benefits. They can always retreat behind the shield wall of nuclear power but that will only stop them losing ground. They can’t win ground that way or the capitulation would never end. So I’m skeptical. Even as some kind of negotiating tactic it seems more suited to harden Europe against Putin then deliver relief.
We are unsure what their impression of NATO's readiness for a colelctive response is at this point.
If they believe that NATO will try to avoid escalation, prevaricate, and some NATO members might straight-up refuse to contribute to collective defense, then they will continue to gradually escalate their hybrid intrusions, hoping to prompt the crisis response that will demonstrate that NATO's collective security promise is insubstantial.
If they believe that the NATO states will be willing to reply with force, then that would serve as the best deterrence.
NATO can smell the weakness too though. A small response now will stave off decades of problems and dealign with Russia now is easier and cheaper then ever because of how much Ukraine is sucking up their wealth, manpower, military and covert resources too.
Honestly if they try this and NATO doesnt smack it down like gods own wrath, well you cant fix stupid.
Considering the stupid that's currently in charge of NATO's top contributor, it gets hard to blame Moscow for trying.
edit: oh, incidentally, the "elections" are done. United Russia was assigned about 56% of the popular vote (out of the 225 PR seats), but combined with the individual district FPTP seats, they net 355 out of the 450, meaning they have constitutional majority and then some. -
In Topic: The Russia Politics and War in Ukraine Thread
Today, 01:38 AM
Cause, on 20 September 2026 - 10:32 PM, said:Russia can’t handle the war they have. I’m not Alexander the Great but this strategy seems to have no benefits. They can always retreat behind the shield wall of nuclear power but that will only stop them losing ground. They can’t win ground that way or the capitulation would never end. So I’m skeptical. Even as some kind of negotiating tactic it seems more suited to harden Europe against Putin then deliver relief.
We are unsure what their impression of NATO's readiness for a colelctive response is at this point.
If they believe that NATO will try to avoid escalation, prevaricate, and some NATO members might straight-up refuse to contribute to collective defense, then they will continue to gradually escalate their hybrid intrusions, hoping to prompt the crisis response that will demonstrate that NATO's collective security promise is insubstantial.
If they believe that the NATO states will be willing to reply with force, then that would serve as the best deterrence. -
In Topic: The Russia Politics and War in Ukraine Thread
17 September 2026 - 10:54 PM
Nothing is gonna happen until people in Moscow get the tally from the so-called "elections" and figure out how much they have to cook the numbers to give United Russia 73% of the Duma seats.
If they need to be adding above 25%, they're going to hesitate before doing anything too crazy. -
In Topic: The Russia Politics and War in Ukraine Thread
17 September 2026 - 06:17 PM
Tsundoku, on 17 September 2026 - 10:29 AM, said:
HQ assigns bonuses and equipment to units based on footage and intel (such as comms intercepts) confirming claimed casualties inflicted.
Since they are subject to oversight, they have to keep their figures fairly plausible.
With the shift to most casualties being inflicted either by drones (or artillery that is being spotted for by drones), most things are documented with video footage.
We are seeing the impact of enemy manpower shortages in the fact that UA's been making gradual counter-pushes on multiple axes since spring (in the south, both along the Dnipro and in the SE on the Olexandrivka axis; N of Kup'yans'k along the Oskil; N of Lyman). The suggestion that UAF is inflicting casualties at a higher rate than they are replenished by recruitment is also consistent with this.
In and of itself it does not mean we are about to see a breaking point. But we're inching up to 2k/day. I continue saying that if we get to this rate, and it can be maintained for a few months, then we could see critical breakdowns.
Which is why second wave of mobilization feels inevitable to continue prolonging the war at its current pace. -
In Topic: The Russia Politics and War in Ukraine Thread
15 September 2026 - 02:50 PM
Werthead, on 14 September 2026 - 09:35 PM, said:
Apologies for a Twitter-link, but this is the best summary of the current order of battle I've seen for the entire front.
This is actually pretty startling, Russia has been forced to concentrate a colossal amount of its total firepower in the Ukrainian theatre on a front about 30 miles wide. Meanwhile, the rest of the roughly 750-800-mile long front is covered by considerably fewer troops-per-mile. This would be more encouraging if Ukraine did not have to focus the majority of its strength in the same way (or risk the entire centre collapsing). Still, Ukraine has managed to achieve its moderate breakthrough (so far) north of Lyman and is focusing on exploiting that advantage whilst Russia is struggling to fully mobilise against it.
Certainly on the Russian side, they have very limited reserves, what you see is what you get, so whenever Ukraine pressures elsewhere on the line, Russia has to dip into the middle for reinforcements, which weakens the middle. This is why Russia is considering the risks of mobilisation because they need fresh bodies but not civil society descending into chaos at the same time.
Girkin was correct, Russia should have switched from attack to defence in 2026, remaining on the offensive has seriously damaged their ability to hold geographically unfavourable sectors of the front and any secondary or tertiary fronts where Ukraine can establish local superiority can be compromised. Fortunately, nobody listened to him.
The main problem here remains Ukraine being unable to convert local and tactical successes into more widespread strategic ones, but with their manpower situation (though improved over 2025) still strained it's hard to see where they can do that. One small possibility, but some Russian commentators have panicked over it, is that Ukraine can exploit the Lyman breakthrough into a larger-scaled breach into the Russian rear, where the impressive array of fortifications and dug-outs the Russians left some time ago are empty, and they haven't even laid substantial minefields. That could trigger a massive problem leaving the Russian centre vulnerable to a sweeping flanking attack. I consider that highly improbable at the moment.
The USA has just put massive sanctions on VTB Bank for doing business with Iran, that could be huge. VTB is not doing well anyway. US analysis that Russian diesel exports have just dropped to 0.
Ukraine has captured five Colombian POWs. Apparently they were hired by the Russians to operate in rear-echelon areas but within days had been moved to the front. The first Colombian POW convinced the others to surrender, saying none had an urge to die for Russia.
Russian forces have pressed closer to Orikhiv on the Zaporizhzhia front, that could be a critical blow if the town is taken.
That speculation about a "massive flanking attack" is pure hopium, b/c the Lyman axis is isolated from the main theater (Slov'yans'k to Dobropillya) by the Donets' river.
The absolute best you could hope for would be to push to Kreminna, and (maybe, if things go extremely well) Rubizhne, but without applying more pressure northward toWard Svatove, you'd just create an extremely vulnerable salient. And if you focus the effort to the NE, you may collapse the offense that's trying to take Kup'yansk and Borova E of the Oskil, but eventually you hit a dead end, unless you push past the border to seize Valuyki to isolate the whole axis along both banks of the Oskil.And that'd take you over 100 km north from the main theater.
Trying to retake the Northern half of Luhans'k Oblast by pushing E out of Svatove (if you can get past the Krasna river) is inherently risky, b/c you're clearing territory into a huge salient, with the official border to the N and E, and pre-2022 LNR south of the Donet's.
Granted, if you do make that eastward push to Kreminna-Rubizhne, you can use the flank beyond the river to set up drone teams (back in Serebryansky forest) to harass logistics between Alchev'sk and Bakhmut, isolating the main axis from further supply; but the river would prevent you from doing personnel infiltrations in any meaningful numbers, so I dunno if it could be a good exchange. And Lysychansk would still be the dominant height in your way.
I get the need to collapse the salient from Zherebets to Nitrius, b/c it threatened to envelop Lyman; but moving E of the Zherebets too far can also be risky, unless you can achieve enough width to make it meaningful.

Help
Find My Content
Display name history
Comments
Tsundoku
09 Oct 2025 - 19:57Tsundoku
02 Dec 2024 - 09:25Tsundoku
09 Oct 2023 - 20:46Tsundoku
09 Oct 2022 - 20:38Tsundoku
10 Oct 2021 - 02:00Tsundoku
10 Oct 2020 - 01:51Tsundoku
09 Oct 2019 - 19:51Tsundoku
09 Oct 2018 - 19:56Shpetim
12 Feb 2015 - 21:30Terez
18 Dec 2014 - 15:32Raraku
31 Oct 2009 - 04:10HoosierDaddy
05 Mar 2009 - 19:06HoosierDaddy
05 Mar 2009 - 05:00frookenhauer
03 Nov 2008 - 21:41Lisheo
10 Oct 2008 - 09:15