Some reports that Russian forces are withdrawing from the Kinburn Spit. 337th Regiment units on the spit have been without food, fuel or ammunition for weeks and are withdrawing whilst they are still physically able. Very interesting to see if Ukraine tries to seize the ground behind them. They've made several attempts to do so as a successful Ukrainian assault via the spit into the rear of Russian forces in Kherson Oblast has been a nightmare scenario for the Russians since late 2022*. This also likely means Russian light artillery pieces that can (almost) reach Odesa, and drone units that certainly can, may have been withdrawn as well. How far they withdraw is also interesting as it may mean the complete removal of all Russian forces from Mykolaiv Oblast.
Russian civilian rail connections to Crimea were halted overnight after heavy attacks on Russian rail infrastructure.
A French aircraft engaged and destroyed a drone that crossed into Latvian airspace. Unclear if this was a Russian or Ukrainian drone.
ISW now assesses the war has moved into a new strategic phase, possibly the first shift since the move from maneuver warfare and large-scale troop movements in 2022 to grinding conflict with an increasingly heavy drone component in 2023-25. Their view is that the Ukrainian interdiction of Russian GLOCs (ground lines of communication) will make any large-scale Russian troop movements difficult to untenable. However, it remains to be seen if Ukraine can now translate its mid-range dominance to retaking territory. They assess that Ukraine has begun using its own aircraft and armoured vehicles (and robots for that matter) to support battlefield advances in a way we haven't seen Russia able to do, but so far only on a limited scale.
Unconfirmed reports, mostly limited to the more excitable bloggers, of a Ukrainian breakthrough near Bolshemykhailivka, heaving south towards Sosnivka and Berezove. Not seeing much confirmation of that at the moment.
Perun's latest video on the mid-range strike campaign is, as usual, excellent.
Abyss, on 08 June 2026 - 01:49 PM, said:
Correct me if i'm wrong, but the endgame here seems to come down to only two possiblities,
1) a massive concession by Ukraine so Putin can claim 'victory'; or
2) Putin 'ascends' and whoever takes over in Russia blames everything on him.
Am i missing a realistic third option? Military victory by either side seems impossible because Ukrainian tech/training = Russian numbers, and no foreign influence is going to pressure either side into anything,
Military victory is certainly more possible than it was for Ukraine a few months ago.
A potential Ukrainian strategy is total dominance of mid-range and long-range resupply routes, starving units on the front until they have no choice but to withdraw, surrender in extremis, rendering them totally combat-ineffectual. Ukrainian unmanned systems can then storm front line positions and secure for a Ukrainian infantry or mechanised assault, hopefully with limited or no casualties. Then roll forwards and rinse and repeat. Ukrainian mine-clearance systems are now hugely superior to what they had in 2023, they have tens of thousands of ground-combat robots, and obviously millions of aerial drones, along with increasing conventional air dominance as well (allowing for the mass-use of glide bombs on Russian positions).
The front is huge, though, so it's unclear if Ukraine can deliver such operations on a large scale. But what they could to is target a weak point in the lines where they do not risk being outflanked and try to break through there. The Kinburn Spit is a possible location*, as from there they could make Russian positions along the Dnipro mouth untenable. Once Russian forces have pulled back from there, Ukrainian forces can cross the river mouth and resupply into the land corridor itself. Russian units would have to fall back to Crimea or north-westwards, allowing Ukrainian forces to reach the Sea of Azov and totally cut off Crimea from Russian mainland control. Russian defences in the area are questionable, with perhaps limited good options for Russian defenses all the way back to Melitopol and Mariupol, at which point the Russian line could start to unravel.
It's probably unrealistic that can happen quickly. A lot of it may depend on psychology; we're already seeing chaos in Dontesk because truck drivers are refusing to go on supply runs not because it's likely they'll be hit by drones, but just because the stories of drone strikes are so incredibly common and scary, they're just refusing to comply. Once the narrative takes hold that it's game over, Russian units might just say F-this and leave. And, based on Russian history, they might not stop until they've reached the Kremlin.
*The Kinburn Spit is marshy and not really suitable for large-scale mechanised assaults, so an invading force would have to use drones and infantry to fight onto the Kinburn Peninsula itself, secure resupply routes (difficult in the face of Russian dug-in defences) and then advance again, so not easy, but perhaps doable if the Russian forces in the area are in retreat due to lack of supplies).
This post has been edited by Werthead: 08 June 2026 - 06:06 PM