Macros, on 29 January 2023 - 10:03 PM, said:
My fact checker just exploded
The article is correct in the point that there is unease in Kyiv, Washington DC and other capitals if Russia can be ejected from the remaining territory it has taken in a reasonable timeframe, and that window of opportunity closes probably before the midpoint of this year, beyond which it becomes extremely hard without being able to supply Ukraine with hardware on a scale currently beyond that of western powers to produce (the ~200 MBTs that Ukraine should gain in the next couple of months is enough for a limited counter-offensive, but not a wider, take-back-the-whole-country effort). There are also concerns that a localised Russian counter-offensive could prove successful if launched at a judiciously weak point of the Ukrainian line. There is however, no major belief that Russia is now capable of inflicting a permanent defeat on Ukraine.
In almost every other respect the article is either parroting nonsense from Russian-sympathetic sources or using bizarrely outdated material. It notes Ukraine was losing up to 200 troops a day, which is correct during the heaviest fighting for the twin cities back in the summer of last year for a period of around a month. However, that was for a very narrow period of time; casualties prior to that window and since have been dramatically less. Casualty losses for Russia, however, have increased significantly, reaching just under 1,000 a day during the assault on Svatove just a few weeks ago. The estimate of 150,000 Ukrainian military losses, which is simply not credible, assumes that 200 a day loss expanded across a period of two years, which given the way has so far raged for eleven months is not compatible with reality. It ignores that estimates of Ukrainian losses of up to 150,000 (at the very high end) are for combined Ukrainian military and civilian casualties, with civilians making up the overwhelming majority.
Russia's artillery, missile and drone stocks have collapsed precipitously in recent months since their height during the twin cities assault. Satellite FIRMS analysis of the battle front has shown that Russian fires have dropped from 60,000 a day during the summer to ~10,000 more recently and a lot less on non-Donbas fronts. On some occasions, Ukrainian artillery fire has outnumbered that of Russian. The reason for the Russian reduction is well-known: Russia is suffering from acute shortages of PGMs, cruise missiles and drones. It is sending newly-assembled PGMs and CMs to the front and to the Black Sea Fleet ASAP but this is amounting to a couple of dozen a month. To launch barrages of 50+ cruise missiles, it is dipping into its emergency stocks currently held in reserve for warfare with NATO in Europe. This is not sustainable. Dumb-fire shells are in more plentiful supply, but estimates have that Russia has fired up to 50% of its total reserve of shells and is only now just getting into full production. More problematic are artillery barrels, which they are burning through faster than can easily be replaced. Russia has resorted to using tanks in indirect fire mode as short-range artillery, which is deeply stupid because all that achieves is burning through their barrels (which cannot sustain the same fire rate). The logic is presumably they have more recoverable T-class barrels in reserve than artillery barrels.
Russia is also increasingly dependent on allies for resupply, but North Korea has proven reluctant to divert stocks to Russia (for which Putin literally removed Kim Jong-un from his Christmas goodwill list) because its own production capabilities are limited. Iran did send significant supplies of drones to Russia, but in recent weeks it seems to have reduced output, possibly as part of politicking over the nuclear deal (Israel hitting one of its military supply centres today will not help, although it was not a major strike).
On a more prosaic level, sanctions on Russia are proving effective: PGM and cruise missile production has dropped since they are reliant on western parts, around 30% of Russian rail freight is currently inoperable due to relying on Japanese components and both military and civilian aircraft have been told to use their breaks less for landing because replacement components are now very hard to come by.
The signs of internal dissent within Russia are also rising: Wagner is now a private army belonging to a warlord who has expended his once-tiny mercenary force to a an army of 40,000 and is keen to use prisoners to die instead of his soldiers, whom he is shepherding for future use, almost certainly more on Russian soil than on Ukrainian. He is also keen on an alliance with the leader of Chechnya, who has also gone to immense lengths to preserve his own troops' lives so they can be kept intact as his private army. There is an informal alliance between these two figures which is causing consternation in the Kremlin between other factions. Simultaneously, violent crime in Russia has exploded since the removal of Putin's own police forces to fight in Ukraine, with explosives and heavy automatic weapons now being used on the streets of major Russian cities since they have somehow gone missing from the front. There is greater political and criminal instability within Russia than at any time since 1990. However, it is correct in that a wholesale collapse is not imminent. Nor is it unthinkable.
The suggestion that NATO is not prepared for a war with Russia is also ludicrous. NATO possesses overwhelming superiority of aircraft, cruise missiles and naval vessels. If conflict were to erupt, NATO would prevail within a matter of weeks. It is true that Germany's military preparedness is poor, but as part of the wider alliance this is less of a concern: Britain, France, Poland, Spain, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Netherlands and the Baltic States also possess quite powerful military forces (batting highly above their weight in some cases) that form the backbone of NATO's European forces. Germany is also more than willing to contribute numbers and boots on the ground to such a conflict even if their heavier equipment is currently lacking. Germany, France, Poland and Britain by themselves are capable of defeating Russia if it came to a conventional conflict (and France and Britain also possess nuclear deterrents even if the United States chose to sit out such a conflict).
This is why Russia has gone to extreme lengths to avoid a war with NATO. It would lose such a war, either conventionally or by attempting a nuclear exchange which, regardless of the impact on NATO countries, would end with Russia's destruction. That is why Russia is not risking such a conflict, even moreso because in the current situation they have placed Russian troops in a third country where they could be destroyed without triggering Russia's own nuclear red lines. In fact, and some Russian sources have already advocated for this, the only reason for Russia to trigger such a war would be to "lose with credibility," namely that Russia losing a war with Ukraine would be humiliating and ridiculous, but losing a war against NATO, who acted "dishonourably" to weaken Russia in Ukraine first, could be seen as acceptable.
This post has been edited by Werthead: 29 January 2023 - 11:11 PM