[Macros]

It's the 5th prominent business man to die since Jan, dangerous time to be rich it seems

[Tsundoku]

Defenestration: The #1 cause of oligarch deaths, closely followed by Novichok ...

[Werthead]

Polohy is an interesting axis to attack along. It would give Ukraine advancement options towards Mariupol, Melitopol or Berdyansk, all of which would be significant targets to recapture. Melitopol must be particularly tempting, as Ukrainian partisans and specops seem to have had, by far, their greatest successes fighting around and even in the town. However, Ukraine may lack the strength needed to advance on Melitopol whilst also holding off what is a relatively speedy area for the Russians to reinforce (from Rostov). Creating the threat of such an advance, which would effectively crush the entire Russian force in all of Kherson Oblast from both east and west, might be enough to panic the Russians and bog them down.

The 3AC is definitely being prepped for offensive operations, but it's unclear where. They seem to be understrength, but still around 20-25,000 men which is no joke. They also have a small but fairly solid armoured formation attached, including short-range, mobile AA and what appears to be most of the T-80s and T-90s Russia has assigned to the theatre (although that's not that impressive, the 80s and 90s are effectively no better-protected against Ukrainian AT weapons than 72s). That might be an attempt to adjust to losing so many S300 and S400 batteries. The 3AC does seem to have limited artillery support. I've seen some suggestions they might go across the border in the Belgorod sector and threaten Kharkiv again to try to relieve the pressure elsewhere. If they hook up with Russian forces in Belgorod they could increase their strength significantly, and there is more Russian artillery in that area. The problem is that their supply stores in Belgorod have also been hit hard and the Ukrainian defenders around Kharkiv are now massively dug in (and weren't any slouches in the first place). The UK MoD analysis is also that the 3AC has had maybe a fifth to a quarter of the training and equipping time you'd ideally want before sending them into battle. They weren't expecting them to be deployed until the spring, so sending them in now seems ill-advised.

On top of this, the Ukrainians seem to be enjoying significant success with "raid" tactics around Izium and Donetsk city, preventing Russian breakouts, painting targets for HIMARS, hitting supplies and creating merry hell whilst also occasionally achieving breakthrough successes and retaking a village or two. There was even a heavy attack on Donetsk Airport last week and the Russians had to rush in mobile reserves to stop the airport being captured. As I said, the Russians seem to have stripped so many forces from Donbas to send to Kherson, they are now in danger of losing some of the territory they gained in the summer offensive (also some reports of partisan activity around Severodonetsk and Lysychansk causing a low but steady stream of casualties). In particular, the Belarusian units fighting for Ukraine seem to be having a whale of the time causing mayhem.

This post has been edited by Werthead: 02 September 2022 - 12:24 PM

[Mentalist]

Werthead, on 02 September 2022 - 12:23 PM, said:

Polohy is an interesting axis to attack along. It would give Ukraine advancement options towards Mariupol, Melitopol or Berdyansk, all of which would be significant targets to recapture. Melitopol must be particularly tempting, as Ukrainian partisans and specops seem to have had, by far, their greatest successes fighting around and even in the town. However, Ukraine may lack the strength needed to advance on Melitopol whilst also holding off what is a relatively speedy area for the Russians to reinforce (from Rostov). Creating the threat of such an advance, which would effectively crush the entire Russian force in all of Kherson Oblast from both east and west, might be enough to panic the Russians and bog them down.

The 3AC is definitely being prepped for offensive operations, but it's unclear where. They seem to be understrength, but still around 20-25,000 men which is no joke. They also have a small but fairly solid armoured formation attached, including short-range, mobile AA and what appears to be most of the T-80s and T-90s Russia has assigned to the theatre (although that's not that impressive, the 80s and 90s are effectively no better-protected against Ukrainian AT weapons than 72s). That might be an attempt to adjust to losing so many S300 and S400 batteries. The 3AC does seem to have limited artillery support. I've seen some suggestions they might go across the border in the Belgorod sector and threaten Kharkiv again to try to relieve the pressure elsewhere. If they hook up with Russian forces in Belgorod they could increase their strength significantly, and there is more Russian artillery in that area. The problem is that their supply stores in Belgorod have also been hit hard and the Ukrainian defenders around Kharkiv are now massively dug in (and weren't any slouches in the first place). The UK MoD analysis is also that the 3AC has had maybe a fifth to a quarter of the training and equipping time you'd ideally want before sending them into battle. They weren't expecting them to be deployed until the spring, so sending them in now seems ill-advised.

On top of this, the Ukrainians seem to be enjoying significant success with "raid" tactics around Izium and Donetsk city, preventing Russian breakouts, painting targets for HIMARS, hitting supplies and creating merry hell whilst also occasionally achieving breakthrough successes and retaking a village or two. There was even a heavy attack on Donetsk Airport last week and the Russians had to rush in mobile reserves to stop the airport being captured. As I said, the Russians seem to have stripped so many forces from Donbas to send to Kherson, they are now in danger of losing some of the territory they gained in the summer offensive (also some reports of partisan activity around Severodonetsk and Lysychansk causing a low but steady stream of casualties). In particular, the Belarusian units fighting for Ukraine seem to be having a whale of the time causing mayhem.

I've been seeing reports that 3rd AC is severely under-staffed, closer to 10-15k. Unsure how reliable that is though.

There's chatter about increased intensity of fighting in Kharkiv Oblast, but unclear where or how.

The UAF HQ briefs are starting to hint at some advancements on the Right Bank- with the operational goals seemingly to isolate the strongpoints of Vysokopillya (the northernmost advance point towards Kryvyj Rih) and Snihurivka (the only town of significance the orcs still hold in Mykolayiv Oblast, directly N of the city of Kherson). In the case of the former, the UAF seem to have retaken a cluster of villages connecting Vysokopillya to the coastal highway along the Dnipro, deepening their envelopment from the SW; while in the case of the latter, they've pushed the orcs roughly half-way towards the P-81 highway connecting Snihurivka with Kherson.

Nothing earth-shattering, but let's see how the rest of it goes.

[Werthead]

Mentalist, on 02 September 2022 - 04:22 PM, said:

I've been seeing reports that 3rd AC is severely under-staffed, closer to 10-15k. Unsure how reliable that is though.

There's chatter about increased intensity of fighting in Kharkiv Oblast, but unclear where or how.

The UAF HQ briefs are starting to hint at some advancements on the Right Bank- with the operational goals seemingly to isolate the strongpoints of Vysokopillya (the northernmost advance point towards Kryvyj Rih) and Snihurivka (the only town of significance the orcs still hold in Mykolayiv Oblast, directly N of the city of Kherson). In the case of the former, the UAF seem to have retaken a cluster of villages connecting Vysokopillya to the coastal highway along the Dnipro, deepening their envelopment from the SW; while in the case of the latter, they've pushed the orcs roughly half-way towards the P-81 highway connecting Snihurivka with Kherson.

Nothing earth-shattering, but let's see how the rest of it goes.

The 3AC is looking in a pretty ropy state to even be thinking of sending it into combat. And if it's really only 15,000 strong, 10k less than just the reinforcements they sent into Kherson who have done nothing, then good luck with that.

Apparently Putin has ordered the military to complete the capture of the administrative borders of Donetsk by 15 September, or 13 days from now. That is highly unlikely to happen, to put it mildly. Maybe if the 13AC links up with a large formation already in the vicinity and tries to punch right through the middle of the line they could make some progress, but with most of the artillery depots in Donbas in flames, how the hell they plan to achieve that is unclear. There are Ukrainian forces fighting on the outskirts of Donetsk, the regional capital, right now, and attempts to break out towards Slovyansk and Kramatorsk have been repeatedly crushed, not to mention the degree to which both cities have been fortified is impressive. Taking either city in two weeks, let alone both, seems improbable.

It looks like there's heavy Ukrainian artillery strikes going on in Tokmak (Zaporizhia) and Kozats'ke (Kherson). The heavy strike on Tokmak is very interesting, right in the middle of the Russian line in Zaporizhia Oblast.

[Mentalist]

Werthead, on 02 September 2022 - 10:43 PM, said:

Mentalist, on 02 September 2022 - 04:22 PM, said:

I've been seeing reports that 3rd AC is severely under-staffed, closer to 10-15k. Unsure how reliable that is though.

There's chatter about increased intensity of fighting in Kharkiv Oblast, but unclear where or how.

The UAF HQ briefs are starting to hint at some advancements on the Right Bank- with the operational goals seemingly to isolate the strongpoints of Vysokopillya (the northernmost advance point towards Kryvyj Rih) and Snihurivka (the only town of significance the orcs still hold in Mykolayiv Oblast, directly N of the city of Kherson). In the case of the former, the UAF seem to have retaken a cluster of villages connecting Vysokopillya to the coastal highway along the Dnipro, deepening their envelopment from the SW; while in the case of the latter, they've pushed the orcs roughly half-way towards the P-81 highway connecting Snihurivka with Kherson.

Nothing earth-shattering, but let's see how the rest of it goes.

The 3AC is looking in a pretty ropy state to even be thinking of sending it into combat. And if it's really only 15,000 strong, 10k less than just the reinforcements they sent into Kherson who have done nothing, then good luck with that.

Apparently Putin has ordered the military to complete the capture of the administrative borders of Donetsk by 15 September, or 13 days from now. That is highly unlikely to happen, to put it mildly. Maybe if the 13AC links up with a large formation already in the vicinity and tries to punch right through the middle of the line they could make some progress, but with most of the artillery depots in Donbas in flames, how the hell they plan to achieve that is unclear. There are Ukrainian forces fighting on the outskirts of Donetsk, the regional capital, right now, and attempts to break out towards Slovyansk and Kramatorsk have been repeatedly crushed, not to mention the degree to which both cities have been fortified is impressive. Taking either city in two weeks, let alone both, seems improbable.

It looks like there's heavy Ukrainian artillery strikes going on in Tokmak (Zaporizhia) and Kozats'ke (Kherson). The heavy strike on Tokmak is very interesting, right in the middle of the Russian line in Zaporizhia Oblast.

Polohy-Tokmak-Vasylivka is their main defensive line in Zaporizhya- protecting Enerhodar, Melitopol, and the roads to Berdyans'k and the Azov Sea coast.. from this line, they are (occasionally) trying to break the Hulyaipole-Orikhiv-Kam'yans'ke line which the UAF has mirroring theirs (with a further eastward expansion towards Velyka Novosilka on the Donets'k side of the border b/w the 2 oblasts)

Progress in takingthe remainder of Donet'sk Oblast has been grounded largely to a halt since they've captured the Vuhlehirs'k Thermal power plant and evened out the frontline along the axis Sivers'k-Soledar-Bakhmut. The attempts of the best of their PMC and DNR assault infantry to break out of Horlivka towards Bakhmut from the S has been rather unsuccessful. I'm really not sure how much the 3rd Corps will be able to tip the scales here.

[Werthead]

Interesting reports that Buryat and Chechen soldiers in Vasylivka got into a massive argument and ended up shooting at one another. Not clear what happened but it looks like the Buryats, who'd led the assault on the town, were "unhappy" with Chechens sweeping in months afterwards and trying to take charge and boss them around and take their supplies.

Vasylivka is quite close to the nuclear power plant, so I wonder if the strain of occupying that spot is getting to them.

Also, a frankly surreal message by Kadyrov today suggesting he's going to step down, which seems...bizarre. No idea what's going on there, but very little Kadyrov does makes sense.

[Tsundoku]

Another thing I thought was real, but probably blown out of proportion because surely no military organisation could be that stupid and corrupt.

Nope, even worse.

https://www.news.com...e9543dd982eb107

Billions stolen by Vladimir Putin’s hopelessly corrupt army
Vladimir Putin’s generals are siphoning off “billions” from the army while soldiers flog stolen gear and vehicles on Russia’s version of eBay.

This post has been edited by Tsundoku: 04 September 2022 - 02:27 AM

[Werthead]

Vysokopillya has fallen. The Ukrainians have a fantastic image of their flag being hoisted over the hospital in the town. The Russians have fallen back southwards and attacks along the Kherson line have intensified. The Russian ferry they set up to replace the Antonivskyi Bridge appears to have been sunk, the pontoon bridge on the other side appears to no longer be operational. The Nova Kakhovka dam-bridge has also finally collapsed and the neighbouring railway bridge is no longer operational.

Russia's position north and west of the Dnipro no longer appears remotely viable.

In addition it now looks like a secondary counter-offensive has developed in Zaporizhzhia, with heavy attacks all al along the line, as well as the repulsing of a helicopter assault on Huliapole.

[Werthead]

The Ukrainians have broken through the Russian lines south of Davydiv Brid, pushing the Russians back to Chkaove. The Russian forces to the north and east are looking increasingly pressurised, and Davydiv Brid, which is the most important strongpoint in the area, is getting increasingly hammered. It looks like there may have been additional advances south and east of Vysokopillya.

[Tiste Simeon]

Do you think that the Russian command has kind of given up but has to maintain the appearance of trying?

[Werthead]

The Ukrainians have launched a small-scale counter-offensive in Donbas, retaking the town of Ozerne on the north bank of the Donets. This is interesting, as it's the first offensive in Donbas (as opposed to a raid) by the Ukrainian side. They have secured a bridgehead on the northern side of the Donets and seem to be looking to exploit understrength Russian forces in the area, which have been denuded of troops to reinforce Kherson.

Tiste Simeon, on 05 September 2022 - 03:30 PM, said:

Do you think that the Russian command has kind of given up but has to maintain the appearance of trying?

I think the Russian command is completely powerless to know how to proceed at this point. The Russian military doctrine perfected in World War II is fire a titanic number of artillery shells, advance with rapid-moving mechanised forces, secure, dig in, bring up the artillery, repeat, protected against counter-battery fire by air power. Ukraine has completely thrown this strategy out of the window: Russian artillery is old and not great at armour penetration, and Ukraine has had 8 years to build reinforced bunkers and strongpoints across a third of the country, if not more, so the artillery is not as effective as it should be. The rapid-moving mechanised forces are simply being overwhelmed by overpowered AT weapons (at one point the Ukrainian command reportedly had to tell its soldiers to stop using Javelins on infantry vehicles, as it was massively expensive overkill when standard weapons would do the job as well). Digging is now ineffective thanks to drone-led artillery strikes, and even just drone strikes. And Russia can't use its airpower because Ukraine's AA coverage has remained intact over the course of the whole war and its small airforce remains in the fight. And HIMARS has changed everything, allowing the Ukrainians to hit Russian supplies, artillery and AA from far, far outside Russia's own range. Russia's own AA batteries are now being systematically destroyed by HIMARS, its radars are being obliterated by HARMS and it is outnumbered on the ground by combat-capable troops.

In order to win the war Russia would really need now to go back in time and start again with five times as many troops as it started with, thousands more tanks and maybe a massive rush from Belarus down the western border of Ukraine to cut off the supply routes from the west.

I think what Putin is trying to do now is to hold referendums in the occupied territories so they can "legally" join Russia, declare victory and assume Ukraine would never dare attack "Russian soil," which given Ukraine has been happy to bomb Crimea nonstop for the last few weeks, and the Belgorod region for the last few months, I don't think is really going to fly.

Even if Russia declared partial mobilisation right now and brought up another 300,000 troops, they don't have enough weapons to equip them with, and they'd need to spend months and months training them, by which time the Ukrainians could have well retaken all of Kherson and pushed back the entire line quite significantly.

[Werthead]

The situation at the northern end of the Kherson salient is very fluid, but it looks like a partial collapse has taken place along the Russian lines south-east of Vysokopillya. The entire line has been pushed back en masse almost as far as Novovoskresens'ke, and then running up to the Dnipro at Zolota Balka. The northern-most part of the line is still Arkhangelsk, but it's starting to almost look like a salient which the Ukrainians can start putting pressure on. Heavy artillery bombardments at Novovoskresens'ke.

Something that started a couple of hours ago was what appeared to be a significant push by the Ukrainians on Ternovi Pody, Zelenyi Hai and Kyselivka. That's the Kherson front directly opposite Mykolaiv. What appears to be gains of up to several kilometres here. A Russian reinforcement convoy was hit and destroyed, the survivors reporting up 200 Russian soldiers dead in a single strike (there's a very graphic video running around on OSINT Twitter which I strongly recommend you don't click on).

What the OSINT, US and UK sources seem to be genuinely staggered by is the scale of the Ukrainian counter-attack along the entire front. It's not a shock-and-awe counter-thrust with massive armored advances and rapid gains of territory, but a systemic, surgical series of strikes designed to destroy command and control nodes, obliterate reinforcement route and neutralise stockpiles of ammunition, food and water. In particular the Ukrainians seem to be identifying food and water caches and destroying them. Soldiers can't fight if they don't have ammo, but they are going to panic much, much faster if you deny them food, water and medicine. The Ukrainians are then following up with localised infantry assaults designed to dislodge enemy forces and even encourage them to withdraw a mile at a time to shore up their lines.

[Mentalist]

Rolling up the Ruscist defensive line along the Inhulets appears to be the goal here- which makes sense, since (esp in the N) the Right Bank is fairly featureless steppe, and the Inhulets is the only real barrier they can rely on.

The morning HQ brief did not mention ANY shelling SE of Vysokopillya-Potemkine. Like, at all. Leads me to believe things are moving pretty swiftly there, the frontline might be routed all the way to Beryslav, and the 128th Mountain isn't keeping up in advancing. *shrug*. or maybe they (the enemy) are out of ammo and their comms are down, who knows? But it's pretty safe to say the orcs aren't having a good time there.

I'm very worried about assaulting Kyselivka down the Mykolayiv-Kherson highway. Same as with the coastal towns cluster, that area's been back and forth for months since they were initially driven out of Mykolayiv outskirts in late March.
I'd much rather see the UAF capture Snihurivka and drive towards Antonivka from the N, bypassing the city of Kherson from the E to cut its (already limited) supply routes. I think the salient S of Davydiv Brid might be aimed at that, since its outer prong at Bezimenne (supposedly) is only 20 km away from Vasylivka, which is on the opposite bank of Inhulets from Snihurivka, and there's a bridge there leading to the latter's eastern outskirts.

There's next to 0 info as to what's happening on the Zaporizhya front, except for occasional cryptic "progress is being made" comments.

Donbas front is curious, b/c there's both new units (L'viv TDF brigade was involved in that Ozerne capture/raid (?), and there was info about Yampil', but it got swiftly taken down). Not sure how much is happening on the L bank of the Donets, but the ultimate goal would be to clean up Lyman, Svyatohirsk and drive back W to Oskil to cut Izyum's supply line to Kup'yansk, rather than launching an assault towards Kreminna/Rubizhne Severodonets'k again. I would *think*

You've also got the 93rd "Cold Ravine" Mech brigade being transferred to Soledar-Bakhmut frontline from the forests SE of Izyum. They're arguably the most capable UAF brigade, fielding probably about 2 companies' worth of trophy tanks- after starting the war raiding enemy supply columns in Sumy before demolishing the prized Kantemirovskaya Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army at Trostyanets. Reportedly they've pushed the orcs back from positions NE of Soledar, pushing them out of Spirne, and towards the border b/w Donetsk and Luhans'k Oblasts. The "grey zone" in that area keeps growing, but the mere absence of progress towards UAF's defensive lines here is success in its own right, since it forces them to burn excessively more resources to try to push for political expediency- though their "take all of Donets'k Oblast by Sept 15th" attitude feels like a mathematical impossibility RN.

And as I'm typing this HQ reported that the number of dead orcs officially crossed the 50k mark.

[Cause]

What’s the latest updates on how Russian citizens are seeing this war. Clearly Ukraine has a reason to overestimate Russian casualties and russia has reason to lowball. However it’s clear that Russia is losing thousands of men, hundreds of tanks, transports, artillery etc.

The Russian people have to know, they also have to see that this war is gaining them no tangible benefits and it’s hurting their pockets too. Do they just accept this is bussiness as usual? Are we seeing signs of strain?

[Macros]

Not to sound snarky, the Russian people, by and large, know what the Russian government tell them.

[Azath Vitr (D'ivers]

Cause, on 06 September 2022 - 07:25 AM, said:

What's the latest updates on how Russian citizens are seeing this war. Clearly Ukraine has a reason to overestimate Russian casualties and russia has reason to lowball. However it's clear that Russia is losing thousands of men, hundreds of tanks, transports, artillery etc.

The Russian people have to know, they also have to see that this war is gaining them no tangible benefits and it's hurting their pockets too. Do they just accept this is bussiness as usual? Are we seeing signs of strain?

'Kremlin Says 2022 Is "Year of Unity"as 419,000 Flee From Russia

[...] Kremlin [...] offered perhaps its most delusional take yet on the state of Russia [...] claiming the country is more united than ever[...]

“Different points of view always live and collide in society. To say that there has been some kind of special polarization [is not true]. On the contrary, I would say that 2022 is the year of unity in our society,” [...]

[...] “confidential” report prepared for the Russian government to assess the projected damage of sanctions “paints a far more dire picture” than Moscow has publicly acknowledged[...] fallout from sanctions will only intensify'

Kremlin Says 2022 Is ‘Year of Unity’ as 419K Russians Flee the Country

[Werthead]

Cause, on 06 September 2022 - 07:25 AM, said:

What’s the latest updates on how Russian citizens are seeing this war. Clearly Ukraine has a reason to overestimate Russian casualties and russia has reason to lowball. However it’s clear that Russia is losing thousands of men, hundreds of tanks, transports, artillery etc.

The Russian people have to know, they also have to see that this war is gaining them no tangible benefits and it’s hurting their pockets too. Do they just accept this is bussiness as usual? Are we seeing signs of strain?

There are several distinct groups in Russian society. There's a very large number who have been trained from school/college (if not birth) to be apolitical. Work, make money for yourself and the state, but don't get too involved in politics. Even celebrating in favour of the regime is frowned upon. People who showed up in Red Square to demonstrate *in favour* of the war were arrested and bundled away as quickly as those turning up to protest. The Kremlin thinks that the people who get excited and will cheer for you today could turn on you tomorrow, and this is a country where history looms large and nothing looms larger than 1917. These people see state TV, probably don't believe half of it but are still likely swayed by the propaganda to some extent.

The younger, more tech-savvy people are more likely to disbelieve state media and instead get their news from YouTube and Telegram. Telegram in particular is a huge thing, Russian soldiers are posting news about their defeats almost in real-time and none of it is censored. The Russian state doesn't seem to care too much because the people reading Telegram and then trying to talk to their older family members about what's really going on will likely bounce off either antipathy or disbelief.

It also helps that Russia has been canny in recruiting fresh troops from the provinces rather than the cities. Moscow has had very few soldiers serving, let alone being killed, whilst republics like Buryatia, Tatarstan and Dagestan have taken huge losses. Chechnya has sent a lot of troops but kept them in the rear echelons to avoid casualties (which could make Chechnya blow up like a fusion bomb). During the Afghan War in 1979-89, massive protests took place in the big cities because lots of Russians from Moscow or St. Petersburg were killed and their families could get together easily and organise. When the casualties are from Nowhereseville, the people in the cities don't give much of a toss. That's also why Putin chose not to undertake any kind of large-scale mobilisation, as he knew either the mobilisation or the resulting casualties from the cities would cause immense blowback on him.

Even as it stands right now, the Russian Federation's unity is looking ropier than it has been since 1991. Tatarstan is still fuming over losing its special exemption from various Russian laws five years ago, Dagestan and Chechnya are still religiously divided (and Chechnya's unity under Kadyrov has been shaky, and reliant on Kadyrov's personal relationship with Putin which, he has made it clear, extends solely to Putin and not to Moscow) and even Buryatia is start to see a lot of anger over the number of dead soldiers there (Buryats and Chechens have reportedly clashed on multiple occasions on the ground in Ukraine as well). Fear of the Russian military keeps them in line, but if that military collapses, and especially if the internal transport network falls apart under the sanctions regime, they might find themselves in a much more advantageous position to take advantage of Putin's weakness. You can see that already in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and even former yes-states like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan who have been happy to not support Putin at all in this conflict, and take advantage of Moscow's distractions to forge closer ties with Beijing or Ankara.

This post has been edited by Werthead: 06 September 2022 - 02:18 PM

[Werthead]

Mentalist, on 06 September 2022 - 06:08 AM, said:

Rolling up the Ruscist defensive line along the Inhulets appears to be the goal here- which makes sense, since (esp in the N) the Right Bank is fairly featureless steppe, and the Inhulets is the only real barrier they can rely on.

The morning HQ brief did not mention ANY shelling SE of Vysokopillya-Potemkine. Like, at all. Leads me to believe things are moving pretty swiftly there, the frontline might be routed all the way to Beryslav, and the 128th Mountain isn't keeping up in advancing. *shrug*. or maybe they (the enemy) are out of ammo and their comms are down, who knows? But it's pretty safe to say the orcs aren't having a good time there.

Looks like a Ukrainian armoured thrust through Kostromka at the tip of the salient in the middle of the Kherson line, just S of Davydiv Brid. That's the first time I've seen footage of Ukrainian tanks operating on the offensive on a large scale, with close infantry support. I've also seen more talk about Beryslav as well, making me think they might be exploring the idea of slicing the Kherson oblast in two NW of the Dnipro. That would trap a lot of Russians with zero chance of rescue. They'll have to swim the Dnipro, surrender or die.

Lots of panicked reports on Russian Telegram. Apparently the Ukrainians have launched a surprise assault on Balakliya and launched a series of raids and assaults along the lines SE towards Izium (which has been a shaky front since almost the moment the Russians captured it). The entire Kharkiv front seems to be in a state of confusion at the moment.

If that's true, that means significant Ukrainian gains on all three of the theatre's fronts in just a few hours.

[Mentalist]

Werthead, on 06 September 2022 - 02:43 PM, said:

Mentalist, on 06 September 2022 - 06:08 AM, said:

Rolling up the Ruscist defensive line along the Inhulets appears to be the goal here- which makes sense, since (esp in the N) the Right Bank is fairly featureless steppe, and the Inhulets is the only real barrier they can rely on.

The morning HQ brief did not mention ANY shelling SE of Vysokopillya-Potemkine. Like, at all. Leads me to believe things are moving pretty swiftly there, the frontline might be routed all the way to Beryslav, and the 128th Mountain isn't keeping up in advancing. *shrug*. or maybe they (the enemy) are out of ammo and their comms are down, who knows? But it's pretty safe to say the orcs aren't having a good time there.

Looks like a Ukrainian armoured thrust through Kostromka at the tip of the salient in the middle of the Kherson line, just S of Davydiv Brid. That's the first time I've seen footage of Ukrainian tanks operating on the offensive on a large scale, with close infantry support. I've also seen more talk about Beryslav as well, making me think they might be exploring the idea of slicing the Kherson oblast in two NW of the Dnipro. That would trap a lot of Russians with zero chance of rescue. They'll have to swim the Dnipro, surrender or die.

Lots of panicked reports on Russian Telegram. Apparently the Ukrainians have launched a surprise assault on Balakliya and launched a series of raids and assaults along the lines SE towards Izium (which has been a shaky front since almost the moment the Russians captured it). The entire Kharkiv front seems to be in a state of confusion at the moment.

If that's true, that means significant Ukrainian gains on all three of the theatre's fronts in just a few hours.

Most of what I'm seeing is obviously Balakliya (the settlement in the W of it totally taken, the large ammo depot N of the city (Arsenal) taken, and the orcs blowing the bridges in the S, yielding their positions to the S and SW of the city--but street fighting ongoing in the E of the city and unclear if the city centre has been recaptured), and some mentions of a push further N (between Balakliya and Chuhuyiv) towards the M03 highway.
Not much info about the Izyum-Slov'yans'k front, although the evening brief from the HQ did mention that the orcs are shelling Dovhen'ke again- which is a heavily contested piece of high ground that opens the way towards the souther outskirts of izyum (Kam'yans'ke and Donets'ke some 11 km down the road.

This isn't the first time in the past 30 days UAF (apparently) had control over Dovhen'ke, so I would be cautious about hype just yet. Izyum salient is very difficult terrain, and there's been a non-stop back and forth here for good 5 months now. Until UAF can converge on the city suburbs (or at least advance up the Donets past the Oskil estuary) I wouldn't speak of a "breakthrough towards Izyum" from the SE.
Besides, a drive towards Kup'yans'k to secure the R bank of the Oskil would be a more effective way of bottling up the Izyum group from the N, anyway.

Edit: also, continuous silence from Zaporizhya. With a few vids of orcs taken prisoner, but 0 elaborations.

This post has been edited by Mentalist: 06 September 2022 - 05:03 PM