For a broad overview of the current conflict, it appears that Russia's efforts in Sumy may have crested, with Russian forces now in trouble across most of the salient. Russian forces reported to be withdrawing from Oleksiivka and Ukrainian forces are now attacking on the Bezsalivka and Yunakivka axes.
Ukraine has vectored in reinforcements to drive back the Russian forces into Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian forces continue to remain on the attack in Kursk itself, with attacks continuing around Tetkino.
Russian forces seem to have resumed minor operations around the Vovchansk front (on the Kharkiv-Belgorod Oblast border), with no signs of success at the moment.
Russia has reinforced its offensive efforts on the Luhasnk-Kharkiv border, in particular driving around Kupyansk to the north and north-west. Some Russian recon groups may have reached the outskirts of Kupyansk itself before being driven back. This is significant as Kupyansk has been contested for close to eighteen months with little success (at one point late last year Russia literally ran out of troops on this front and was driven back more than five miles in a day, and has spent months slowly grinding back to where they were before). Russia appears to have established bridgheads across the Oskil River and held them against furious counter-attacks.
Further south, some of the heaviest fighting we've seen in Kharkiv Oblast has been raging between Kreminna and Lyman. Russian forces have smashed themselves bloody on Ukrainian defences, with some units claiming a 66-1 kill ratio, which would easily be the highest ratio of the entire war (possibly by 400-500%). Russia has advanced some metres to dozens of metres in places, but the cost is terrifying, and may be the highest loss-for-land ratio of the conflict to date.
The main front in Donetsk Oblast is seeing some very heavy fighting, with Russian forces finally regaining control over most of Toretsk (again, after taking the whole town and then losing most of it in an afternoon counter-attack and then struggling to get back to where it was again months and months later), but Ukrainian forces may remain on the western edge of the town. The main Russian effort here is aimed at Kostyantynivka but they are experiencing massive problems advancing towards the town due to heavy resistance. Russian forces remain stymied outside Pokrovsk, despite regaining territory around the town (re-retaking Kotylne this week months after losing it to Ukraine). In particular, Ukraine has successfully mounted counter-attacks along the front and driven into the centre of the Russian lines east of Pokrovsk. This position does not appear tenable without massive reinforcements (it's a bit of a Leeroy Jenkins move), so this may be more of a raid in force to try to destroy Russian troops and lines of supply before withdrawing.
Despite Ukrainian resistance, some Russian front lines now appear to have (just) crossed the border of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, though not significantly so far. The main Russian effort here seems to be held up in heavy fighting near Oleksiivka, Donetsk Oblast and along the Vovcha River.
Minor Russian advances along the Dnipro, reaching the southern outskirts of Stepnohirsk, but not with sufficient force to take the settlement yet.
Russian forces continue to attack the islands in the Dnipro River mouth near Kherson, to little avail.
The big picture is that Russia is failing to reinforce one front as their main effort, instead spreading their forces wide. This is forcing Ukraine to also spread themselves wide in response, but also giving them the opportunity to attack in force on the Sumy front, where they are making significant progress. But arguably this may be a distraction from the main front in Donetsk. The argument for both sides on where to focus attacks and defensive forces remains debateable.
A good broad-spectrum economic analysis.
The summary is that the Russian economy has run out of room in just about every area of the economy to operate. "Kicking the can down the road" isn't cutting it any more. Recent economic moves (including cutting interest rates this week) are transitioning from mid-termism (at the expense of long-term stability) to short-termism (at the expensive of mid-term stability), creating major problems that will come good within months, not years.
For the first time Russian officials are basically admitting how badly things are totally screwed, even Putin saying the military budget needs to start coming down, but nobody seems to have worked out how to get out of the situation (since Putin turned down Trump's absurdly generous peace deal).
This video has a good analysis of the collapse of Russian policing.
Urgh. A possible new record in the war: a Russian recruit signed his contract on 7 April 2025 and was killed in action on 13 April.
This post has been edited by Werthead: 28 July 2025 - 09:58 PM