Strong analysis by the Institute for the Study of War which identifies inherent weaknesses in the Russian war effort that make long-term success doubtful. Previous analyses had suggested that Russia favoured a long war to bring its perceived superior ability to withstand attrition (via a larger population and industrial base) to bear. However, several of the bases for Russia's strategy are now in doubt: Ukraine has weathered its assaults so far, Russian precision targeting and bombing success of military targets has been extremely poor (hence the Ukrainian Air Force remaining in operation two years into the war), Russia has failed to gain air superiority and Ukraine, allied with anti-Putin Russian partisans, has been able to inflict considerable damage on Russian soil, particularly to Russia's oil industry, weakening its key area of economic superiority. Ukraine has also gained technological superiority on the battlefield in several key areas (drones, electronic warfare, anti-drone, anti-air and long-range precision fires) that Russia was not expecting.
In particular, NATO and non-NATO support for Ukraine has proven far more robust than expected and Ukraine has made excellent use of resources to stymie or even reverse Russian gains in key areas; Russia remains in control of significantly less of the territories than it initially seized in February-April 2022, although the areas it has held onto the longest are now formidably defended.
The ISW analysis notes a concerted redoubling of efforts by Russia to instead win the information and propaganda war, focusing especially on the United States, noting its success in delaying packages of aid to Ukraine. The ISW overall analysis is that the United States, by itself, could effectively win the war and defeat Russia without firing a single American shot in anger or mobilising a single American soldier, but simply redirecting 5% of its defence spending to aid Ukraine (currently-assigned resources in 2022 and 2023 totalled significantly less than 0.5%). Coupled with European and other allied spending, Russia essentially has no viable path to victory whilst support remains in place.
Russia's strategy for success now hinges on detaching US support for Ukraine, and perhaps splitting the US from NATO via a Trump victory in the election. However, Russians themselves note (via milbloggers and even some mainstream statements) that the situation is more complex, and Trump is far more unpredictable than Biden and might blunder into a massive escalatory act by accident. Some note that he almost did this in North Korea and a surprised Kim Jong Un backed down in the face of his rhetoric; Putin is less likely to do so (without endangering his own position to the hardliners). Ergo the best strategy for Russia might be encouraging Republican victories in the House and Senate whilst trying to keep Biden in the White House, to continue the gridlock (possibly also on the calculus that Biden dying in office in his second term is a reasonable likelihood, with a corresponding political crisis in the United States that might distract from Russian activities in Ukraine).
This ties in with other analyses that suggest the greatest moment of danger for Ukraine in the war might be in the next few months. If Ukraine can weather a renewed summer offensive from Russia this year and if there is a positive outcome in the US Presidential Election, then Ukraine's prospects for victory increase significantly in 2025 and dramatically in 2026 (as renewed US and European arms production outstrips that of Russia), probably forcing Russia to a negotiated settlement along the lines of the Zelensky plan (which has been tentatively approved even by Russia-friendly countries like India). If Ukraine collapses in the coming months due to a lack of support, then Ukraine being overrun and forced to surrender becomes likely, and Russia moving on to target the Baltic States and possibly Poland (thus starting World War III) a year or two later becomes more likely.
This post has been edited by Werthead: 30 March 2024 - 10:09 PM