Malazan Empire: Werthead - Viewing Profile - Malazan Empire

ISW runs the numbers on Russia's options for a Narva operation.

They don't seem convinced, noting that even a limited incursion would trigger a massive NATO response, even if the likes of the USA and Slovaka decided to sit it out, and Russia would have limited options for success whilst the bulk of its ground forces remain committed in Ukraine. One possibility is that Russia would try to secure Narva quickly and dig into the town, forcing NATO forces to street-by-street fighting within Russian drone operator range and limited counter-drone options.

Interestingly, the ISW does not take into account that Ukrainian anti-drone brigades (particularly those on inactive fronts) could redeploy from Ukraine to the Baltics to aid NATO forces with not-insubstantial drone forces of their own. Perhaps they calculate that Ukraine would be reluctant to remove anti-drone forces from Ukraine whilst the war is ongoing, but I suspect, given the tremendous aid given to Ukraine by the Baltic States, that Ukraine would do so.

Also left unassessed is that if Russia and NATO get into a shooting conflict over Narva, even if Russia immediately backs down, then NATO may choose to intervene further in Ukraine in the form of limited reprisals, using F-35s to target Russian forces that are currently out of reach for Ukrainian forces due to Russian air defences.

Macros, on 21 September 2026 - 06:04 AM, said:

Netanyahu might end up out of office and in jail in a few weeks, so that might not be a problem.

Putin is clearly rattled by how this is all going, and the more he appears rattled and vulnerable, the more likely someone is to take him out. Even if Putin is succeeded by a hardliner, the hardliner can still end the war because it's not their war in the way it is Putin's, rebuild and then try something else down the line. It's clear the current situation is untenable in the long or even medium term.

Current analysis from reading the different mood music:

The less-restrained OSINT sources and political accounts who basically never talk about the Ukraine conflict until there's some juice in a story are all predicting a Russian invasion of NATO territory in the next vaguely-indeterminate time period (ranging from tomorrow to four years from now). The evidence for this is in places contradictory: the 20,000 extra beds for wounded soldiers are actually going to the NW regions bordering Finland rather than the oblasts bordering Estonia, Latvia and Belarus-near-Lithuania and Poland, as you might expect. Even Kaliningrad is not receiving extra beds or medical attention, which you'd expect since the Russian expectation for a conventional hot war with NATO is that Kaliningrad would be attacked and probably captured in the opening days to weeks of the conflict.

There is also  no large-scale Russian military build-up along the NATO border beyond the standard troop deployments. One suggestion is the fact that standard deployments have more or less returned rather than every available soldier being sent to Ukraine could itself be masking an attack. There's also the 9,000 extra troops in Belarus for defence drills with Russia. However, 9,000 troops are not enough to make a serious impression on the Suwalki Gap (which is over 100km long, considerably longer than any advance Russia has made in Ukraine in over four years, all within massive and overwhelming NATO air cover). One suggestion is these troops, whose exercises have now wound up, could rapid-deploy to St. Petersburg and then across the border to cover an annexation of Narva, which could be accomplished by a relatively small number of troops fast. A limited annexation of Narva, backed by threats of escalation, could spook and divide the alliance whilst a full-scale invasion of the Baltics would unite it.

It is worth noting that there has been no leaks, discussions, mood music or discussions coming out of the USA. Even assuming Trump would prevaricate over a response to either a limited annexation or even a full-scale invasion, you'd still have some intelligence discussions and emergency meetings on the subject, and none of that seems to be happening. The focus remains on Iran. The UK has also stayed relatively tight-lipped on what's going on, which is in stark contrast to what's happened in other countries, and UK military forces are directly in harm's way at the moment in eastern Europe.

Still, it is undeniable that something has spooked some leaders, on all sides of the spectrum. Even Fico in Slovakia seems concerned, and even Le Pen and Bardella in France have issued some of their strongest criticisms of Putin since the war started (some people have called this "Melonisation," which is unfair to Meloni, who has been relatively consistent on her stance). The current threat analysis seems to be more towards what happens if Russia tries another drone attack at a crowded airport that causes civilian casualties that Russia denies, and NATO's response is direct military action on Russian territory, or even against Russian forces in Ukraine, that Russia then uses as a pretext for military action in the Baltics.

The Guardian is also the first major media outlet to report on the panicking stories running around on social media (and mostly on Twitter, other services relying more on steadier reporters are nowhere near as downbeat) and cast it through the lens of Russian psy-ops, suggesting the panicked response is useful to the Kremlin even if literally now nothing else happens.

We should not rule out the Narva operation and certainly not hybrid drone strikes.

Russia has declared a curfew along the Estonian border, but some indication it is preparing similar declarations for all its external borders. This might be an attempt to halt Russian men fleeing across the nearest border when conscription is announced.

Ukraine hit the Moscow region hard overnight, with multiple systems hitting Russian refineries and military targets around the capital. Multiple missiles and drones were shot down, some impacting suburban areas. The Pelican fixed-wing drone may have been deployed in numbers for the first time.

Germany and Sweden have deployed 1,500 extra troops to Gotland Island in the Baltic.

France and Poland both holding extraordinary security meetings, both judging a considerably increased risk from Russia to NATO's eastern flank. No assessment an attack is imminent or probable, but now possible in a way it wasn't a few weeks ago.

Putin may be getting more desperate, or this might be a substantial psy-op designed to cover for another Russian push into Ukraine from Belarus. The situation is not desperate yet, but the risk has increased to a more concerning level than previously (i.e., if the risk of a Russian attack on NATO was previously ~10% it might now be ~20%, still a less likely outcome but the increase is large enough to be worrying).

ETA: The Swiss government is now saying they're expecting things to deteriorate in the near future.

It is possible this response by governments is to the simultaneous ratcheting up of tensions from Russia and the situation in Iran and Yemen, which is likely to push petrol prices much higher in the near future, possibly to the point of major interruptions in fuel supply to Europe. It might be that the assessment is that Russia could try something whilst that was going on, creating a dilemma for European politicians facing internal and external threats simultaneously.