Malazan Empire: Werthead - Viewing Profile - Malazan Empire

More than one source now saying they believe Ukraine has the capacity to launch an offensive in the spring or summer of 2026. Ukraine was unable to undertaken offensive operations in 2025 due to manpower restrictions in the early part of the year and then the difficulty in fending off the Pokrovsk attack later in the year, but thanks to manpower problems easing mid-year and Russia now experiencing significant manpower issues instead, that may shift the balance of power. Whether Ukraine can retake significant territory in the face of Russian defences remains a major question.

400 power generators from Poland's strategic reserve have been sent to Ukraine to help it weather the attacks on its energy infrastructure.

Russian forces in Kupyansk are now surrounded in a single downtown block, but are refusing to surrender. The Ukrainians are weighing negotiating with them or just flattening the block. Their patience with door-to-door fighting  at a heavy cost seems to be at an end in this area.

Putin possibly making a dig at Epstein Island, by talking about Denmark selling the Virgin Islands to the US.

It is extremely questionable if Iran can actually respond against all the US military bases in enough force to disable them. They almost certainly can't hit a carrier strike group or B-52s flying from the US mainland, so they'd have to hit civilian targets in Israel and possibly other countries (one reason the normally very cooperative Qatar has suddenly suggested that the US might not be able to use its airbase for attacks on Iran, and leaked sources claiming they might consider closing it altogether), and of course bringing Israel and its airforce into the fight (making up for a US deficit in the region at the moment) seals the fate of Iran's entire military infrastructure.

I think the current estimate is that almost 50% of Iran's ballistic missile stockpile was destroyed or used last summer, a lot of it unused on the ground, so how much of a threat can Iran be? But the Israelis were very worried about how many missiles got through their defences, particularly towards the end; 33 Israelis were killed and over 3200 were injured. And Israel has not rebuilt its interceptor stockpiles 100% since then, so there is some concern in Israel about how that would go again.

The real question is how much damage you can do to the regime whilst not remotely risking hitting the protesting civilians, whom in many cases are in proximity to government targets like police stations and regional IRGC barracks. Strategically targeting the regime to weaken it enough to a civilian uprising without causing collateral damage to said civilians is a very specific type of attack I'm not sure we've really seen before.

A whole bunch of Hamas forces kicked out of Lebanon are right in Iran with the security forces now. The entwinement between Hamas and the Iranian state is extraordinarily strong.

If the regime was to fall, Hamas along with it, and the replacement Iranian regime returned to the perspective of the pre-Revolution state (not a given at all), then the relationship would be utterly different. Shia Persian Iran is not an Arab state and is historically somewhat wary of the Sunni Arab states to its west and across the Gulf. It was an informal ally of Israel (and the first Muslim-majority country after Turkey to recognise it) until the 1979 Revolution, and afterwards Iranian intelligence officials would denounce the existence of Israel in one moment and then provide information to Israel the next to help weaken their mutual foe, Iraq and Saddam Hussein: some persistent claims that Iranian intelligence may have helped Israel decide to bomb the Iraqi nuclear programme in 1981 (how the wheel turns).

The Iranian people are not in love with Israel, especially the current government, but they are not as ideologically opposed to Israel's existence in their souls in the same way as many Sunni Arab states, and as the thawing with various Sunni Arab nations over decades has shown (even Saudi Arabia was preparing to recognise Israel before October 2023), even that's not as deep-seated as people think.

Even more unhinged reporting that Trump has privately suggested Putin and Lukashenko joining his Special Gaza Peace Board Club thing. Again, this cannot be ruled out.

The Pokrovsk - Myrnohrad strategic line is holding, despite pressure. Over 370 Russians were killed or wounded this week alone in concerted attacks on the line, with the Russia’s 76th Airborne Division suffering particularly heavy losses.

The Russian sub damaged by a drone attack in Novorossiysk is still stuck there, apparently the Russians lack the resources to remove it for repairs.

Apparently European powers are more seriously discussing backing Ukraine without any further assistance from the United States should the US withdraw from NATO.

Some reports that China is furious with Russia for not providing intelligence (possibly gained from the US) that Venezuela was about to be attacked by US forces. This left China's envoy, who met Maduro hours before his arrest, feeling humiliated and China looking impotent. Putin has been trying to shore up relations behind the scenes, but Beijing is also weighing current tensions between the US and its European allies as an opportunity. China has signed a new trade agreement with Canada, which the US was not happy about (despite Trump trying to say he didn't mind), and is now considering stronger ties with the EU itself. Some European leaders, though still wary of China, are seeing a possibility (however remote) of decoupling China from Russia.

Chancellor Merz has urged NATO allies to keep their eye on Ukraine, pointing out the biggest threat from Russia comes from the east, not the north-west.

The US has sent 15 F-15Es from RAF Lakenheath in the UK to Jordan, joining a growing number of aircraft redeployed from across the region. There are around 35 F-15s in Jordan, whilst the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group has cleared the Straits of Malacca and is now in the Indian Ocean, heading towards the Persian Gulf, though its precise staging area remains to be determined.

At current speed, the Lincoln air wing will be able to support operations over Iran in 4-6 days, depending on what range and loitering time they are aiming for.

Israel is apparently still scrambling to prepare for incoming fire. There's a lot of unease there as they have not been able to fully restock their interceptors from last summer's exchange of fire, and there's some rumours of wrangling over whether to stay out of a US strike and only respond to any fire directed at Israel, or to join the US to ensure the first strike is so massive Iran's ability to respond is correspondingly limited (Israel did destroy a substantial number of Iranian ballistic missiles on the ground last time). Netanyahu may use the excuse of his anger over the composition of the "Nobel-Worthy Trump Best Boy Board for Peace in Gaza or Whatever" to try to stay out of it.

At the moment the chances of a US strike on Iran at the end of this week and over the weekend looks pretty high.