Creation Vs Evolution
#1
Posted 07 October 2006 - 01:00 AM
http://www.youtube.c...h?v=xMpk7WerFWw
I know this is done to death. I also realise that I'm preaching to the choir in large part here: most of you are well educated and basically rational people. I know at least a couple are budding scientists, minimum.
However, I dont wish to start a creation evolution debate here. I want to highlight something about the creation evolution debate that I think is very important that has little to do with the actual information being debated.
What I want to highlight and open for discusion is the manner and forum for the debate. I think it explains a lot.
This is a video of three scientists and a creationist (clearly not a scientist, I dont care what appelation you have, you have to use the scientific method to be a scientist) in 'open' debate.
Firstly, its rigged. The creationist gets visual aids, a laptop that may well be on the net and so on. He has prepared information that the scientists do not. As usual the scientists are required to respond to the onslaught (ostensibly its equal: the scientists can ask questions, but they have no means to impart years worth of learning other than their voices).
Second, and more pertinent, I think, is the way the people involved make their case, and their background. It illustrates a significant distinction between the creationists and the scientists that I think represents the whole of the debate quite effectively, and explains how creationism has any credibility at all when you consider the number of active members of each camp (scientists outnumbering creationists hundreds, if not thousands to one).
Marketing.
The creationist here speaks clearly and rhythmically, he is articulate and knows what type of argument to use at what time. And by type, I mean he knows when to appeal to the incredulity and lack of understanding of the audience, he knows when to create strawman arguments that make the opposition look like something its not and deal with that instead of the facts, he knows when to appeal to the audiences ego, when to appeal to their emotions and so on.
The scientists do what scientists do. They try to make ground-up arguments based on rational argument.
The mob is not convinced!
Moreover the forum of public debate is not that of science. The creationist shows the flaw in his arguments by presenting them in this arena rather than, say, a paper, submitted to a legit journal.
My contention is therefore that in order for science to stand a chance in the public (and lets face it, generally uneducated eye: its a weapon for creationists that few people have a decent understanding of science) it has to get AGGRESSIVE. Creationism isnt an argued point, its a manipulatively advertised one. I believe (yes believe, but with some justification) that science can be equally compelling if targeted as effectively (obviously without losing the basic integrity of its case, as creationism does). The debaters for science here did a lousy job. They failed to target the creationists arguments, which were flawed one and all. They werent suited to public debate and came of as uncompelling, despite basically correct arguments due to the unfamilliar arena: one that is clearly the creationists bread and butter (as opposed to writing justified cases for peer approval ).
I know that if I had a transcript of his points I could destroy each one comprehensively, and I only know enough about evolution to know how much I dont really know. This frustrates me. Why dont scientists realise the kind of battle they are fighting?
Thoughts?
*edited to put the 'al' in 'rational' *
I know this is done to death. I also realise that I'm preaching to the choir in large part here: most of you are well educated and basically rational people. I know at least a couple are budding scientists, minimum.
However, I dont wish to start a creation evolution debate here. I want to highlight something about the creation evolution debate that I think is very important that has little to do with the actual information being debated.
What I want to highlight and open for discusion is the manner and forum for the debate. I think it explains a lot.
This is a video of three scientists and a creationist (clearly not a scientist, I dont care what appelation you have, you have to use the scientific method to be a scientist) in 'open' debate.
Firstly, its rigged. The creationist gets visual aids, a laptop that may well be on the net and so on. He has prepared information that the scientists do not. As usual the scientists are required to respond to the onslaught (ostensibly its equal: the scientists can ask questions, but they have no means to impart years worth of learning other than their voices).
Second, and more pertinent, I think, is the way the people involved make their case, and their background. It illustrates a significant distinction between the creationists and the scientists that I think represents the whole of the debate quite effectively, and explains how creationism has any credibility at all when you consider the number of active members of each camp (scientists outnumbering creationists hundreds, if not thousands to one).
Marketing.
The creationist here speaks clearly and rhythmically, he is articulate and knows what type of argument to use at what time. And by type, I mean he knows when to appeal to the incredulity and lack of understanding of the audience, he knows when to create strawman arguments that make the opposition look like something its not and deal with that instead of the facts, he knows when to appeal to the audiences ego, when to appeal to their emotions and so on.
The scientists do what scientists do. They try to make ground-up arguments based on rational argument.
The mob is not convinced!
Moreover the forum of public debate is not that of science. The creationist shows the flaw in his arguments by presenting them in this arena rather than, say, a paper, submitted to a legit journal.
My contention is therefore that in order for science to stand a chance in the public (and lets face it, generally uneducated eye: its a weapon for creationists that few people have a decent understanding of science) it has to get AGGRESSIVE. Creationism isnt an argued point, its a manipulatively advertised one. I believe (yes believe, but with some justification) that science can be equally compelling if targeted as effectively (obviously without losing the basic integrity of its case, as creationism does). The debaters for science here did a lousy job. They failed to target the creationists arguments, which were flawed one and all. They werent suited to public debate and came of as uncompelling, despite basically correct arguments due to the unfamilliar arena: one that is clearly the creationists bread and butter (as opposed to writing justified cases for peer approval ).
I know that if I had a transcript of his points I could destroy each one comprehensively, and I only know enough about evolution to know how much I dont really know. This frustrates me. Why dont scientists realise the kind of battle they are fighting?
Thoughts?
*edited to put the 'al' in 'rational' *
#2 Guest_potsherds_*
Posted 07 October 2006 - 01:41 AM
D Man said:
Why dont scientists realise the kind of battle they are fighting?
This is an important question. Let me explain how the scientific community largely considers this issue.
There is no 'battle' to be fought. The science of evolution is correct, and unequivocal. No matter what some irrational, uneducated fundamentalists think, no matter what they advertise, evolution is still fact.
In general, its encouraged for us to avoid any public debate on the subject, thinking (and hoping) that if it's ignored, it will go away on its own. By arguing about this ridiculous religious opinion fluffed up in science-speak to appear legitimate, we only bring more attention to it, and frankly, its not worth any consideration at all. Its utter trash.
What I DO wish, was that more shows like Bill Nye and that older one with the eccentric old man teaching science were still aired regularly in the U.S. I would like to think that if we encouraged the understanding of science and the scientific method earlier in kids lives, they might grow up to be more rational as adults than the current adults are.
#3
Posted 07 October 2006 - 02:24 AM
potsherds;122532 said:
This is an important question. Let me explain how the scientific community largely considers this issue.
There is no 'battle' to be fought. The science of evolution is correct, and unequivocal. No matter what some irrational, uneducated fundamentalists think, no matter what they advertise, evolution is still fact.
In general, its encouraged for us to avoid any public debate on the subject, thinking (and hoping) that if it's ignored, it will go away on its own. By arguing about this ridiculous religious opinion fluffed up in science-speak to appear legitimate, we only bring more attention to it, and frankly, its not worth any consideration at all. Its utter trash.
What I DO wish, was that more shows like Bill Nye and that older one with the eccentric old man teaching science were still aired regularly in the U.S. I would like to think that if we encouraged the understanding of science and the scientific method earlier in kids lives, they might grow up to be more rational as adults than the current adults are.
There is no 'battle' to be fought. The science of evolution is correct, and unequivocal. No matter what some irrational, uneducated fundamentalists think, no matter what they advertise, evolution is still fact.
In general, its encouraged for us to avoid any public debate on the subject, thinking (and hoping) that if it's ignored, it will go away on its own. By arguing about this ridiculous religious opinion fluffed up in science-speak to appear legitimate, we only bring more attention to it, and frankly, its not worth any consideration at all. Its utter trash.
What I DO wish, was that more shows like Bill Nye and that older one with the eccentric old man teaching science were still aired regularly in the U.S. I would like to think that if we encouraged the understanding of science and the scientific method earlier in kids lives, they might grow up to be more rational as adults than the current adults are.
Theres no need to explain to me what scientists think, I am one .
And youre right. Thats what scientists think. And its very very foolish. If creationism gets its wicked way, then what of any and all research involving genetics? Wheres that cure for multiple sclerosis now?
It absolutely will not go away if its ignored. The problem is that scientists (as I recall, post, youre a nuclear physics student? Or maybe were one, by now?) do think that its insanity and will surely get left by the wayside. Well, that waysides been waiting there for about, oh, 2000 years now, and still here we are.
Why? Creationists take what they have to say and shove it in peoples faces.
Scientists like us need to wake up and take why its a pile of crap and shove it in peoples faces. Worst case senario: you get more people into sciences and innovation increase, technology, medicine and quality of life improves. Best case: you can stop science from going into decline in favour of placating fundamentalist masses. Both would save lives. Its not a small problem, and we cant bury our heads in the sand.
#4 Guest_Fool_*
Posted 07 October 2006 - 07:35 AM
Quote
This frustrates me. Why dont scientists realise the kind of battle they are fighting?
Quote
Theres no need to explain to me what scientists think, I am one
If you already know, why ask? :confused:
The biggest problem, i think, is that scientists will happily debate the merits of evolution or whatever else the creationists feel like bringing up, instead of focusing on the real issue. That Intelligent Design is not science and should thus not be thaught in science class. As soon as you start talking about evolution you've already lost, because it is way too comprehensive a theory to have no holes whatsoever, and as long as there are holes there will always be room for the creationists to cast doubt on it.
But scientists, they like explaining things, so when some creationists spouts gibberish they enjoy setting them straight, while the audience falls asleep. When what they should really be saying is: "A scientific theory needs to have these qualities, ID does not have these qualities, thus it's not a scientific theory and has no place in science class."
#5
Posted 07 October 2006 - 08:30 AM
The two sides are talking past each other. A scientist aims to convince by rational argument (hard), a demagogue aims to persuade by appealing to popular opinion (easy).
While the public remains generally ignorant of the sciences, the second course will be easier.
It is frustrating to note that this is only a hot topic because scientific results disagree with religious dogma. Were these scientists considering any topic that did not infringe on some holy ground, they would be treated with deference, and considered experts by the public. They would be believed, which is necessary since you cannot convince people who do not understand atomic physics or quantum mechanics.
Evolution is the unifying theory of biology. The evidence in favour of it is overwhelming. Every serious argument a creationist makes against it is flawed, but they are no less persuasive for that.
Problem: the pro-evolution scientist is reasonable. He admits there are flaws in evolution. That it may be wrong, as all scientific theories may be wrong. It could be overturned in the future by contrary evidence. It could be supplanted by a better theory. But at the moment it is the best theory there is, and it is in agreement with the evidence.
The creationist is not so reasonable. He seizes on any flaws in evolution (most commonly missing intermediate species, incomplete fossil records, "irreducible complexity", none of which are fatal flaws, or even real ones) and argues that because of these, evolution is WRONG, and must be DISCARDED.
In favour of his pet theory, that the Earth was created in a week by God himself, 6000 years ago. A theory which, thankfully, contains no internal contradictions or external conflicts with evidence, and thus meets the extremely high scientific standards of the zea-, I mean, creationist.
Bertrand Russell phrased it well.
While the public remains generally ignorant of the sciences, the second course will be easier.
It is frustrating to note that this is only a hot topic because scientific results disagree with religious dogma. Were these scientists considering any topic that did not infringe on some holy ground, they would be treated with deference, and considered experts by the public. They would be believed, which is necessary since you cannot convince people who do not understand atomic physics or quantum mechanics.
Evolution is the unifying theory of biology. The evidence in favour of it is overwhelming. Every serious argument a creationist makes against it is flawed, but they are no less persuasive for that.
Problem: the pro-evolution scientist is reasonable. He admits there are flaws in evolution. That it may be wrong, as all scientific theories may be wrong. It could be overturned in the future by contrary evidence. It could be supplanted by a better theory. But at the moment it is the best theory there is, and it is in agreement with the evidence.
The creationist is not so reasonable. He seizes on any flaws in evolution (most commonly missing intermediate species, incomplete fossil records, "irreducible complexity", none of which are fatal flaws, or even real ones) and argues that because of these, evolution is WRONG, and must be DISCARDED.
In favour of his pet theory, that the Earth was created in a week by God himself, 6000 years ago. A theory which, thankfully, contains no internal contradictions or external conflicts with evidence, and thus meets the extremely high scientific standards of the zea-, I mean, creationist.
Bertrand Russell phrased it well.
Bertrand Russell said:
The trouble with the world is that the stupid are cocksure and the intelligent are full of doubt.
#6
Posted 07 October 2006 - 10:44 AM
And yet, there are a very large number of scientists who are very religious and believe deeply in the bible.
Now, Intelligent Design is obviously an extreme form of creationism that it's pretty reasonable to assume is quite a long way over the top. What some people don't seem to consider is that evolution doesn't neccessarily rule out the existance of some sort of guiding force (lets call it "god", shall we?).
Science does not exclude religion, though extremists such as this guy seem to exclude science.
What you mustn't make the mistake of thinking is that being a scientist automatically makes you an athiest.
Now, Intelligent Design is obviously an extreme form of creationism that it's pretty reasonable to assume is quite a long way over the top. What some people don't seem to consider is that evolution doesn't neccessarily rule out the existance of some sort of guiding force (lets call it "god", shall we?).
Science does not exclude religion, though extremists such as this guy seem to exclude science.
What you mustn't make the mistake of thinking is that being a scientist automatically makes you an athiest.
O xein', angellein Lakedaimoniois hoti têde; keimetha tois keinon rhémasi peithomenoi.
#7
Posted 07 October 2006 - 04:44 PM
The pope went out against the evangelists of the US claiming that the theory of evolution shows how perfect and complete the creation truly is
Take good care to keep relations civil
It's decent in the first of gentlemen
To speak friendly, Even to the devil
It's decent in the first of gentlemen
To speak friendly, Even to the devil
#8
Posted 07 October 2006 - 05:02 PM
It might be worth considering that the theory of evolution has went through more changes in the last 20 years than any advancements before that. Indeed evolution is such a huge subject it can't rightly be called Darwinism any more. The most grievous error with Darwinism is the notion of gradualism...something which should be rejected in favour of a set pattern of spontaneous evolutionary changes.
This theory called evo-devo accomadates enviornmental adaptation and posits some rules to evolution, rules we are aren't fully aware of. I find this quite interesting
I will post some back up points later. and more info on this subject
It is too big to sum up.
This theory is still one of evolution, just not a Darwinian fundamentalist approach, it still rejects creationism as retarded
This theory called evo-devo accomadates enviornmental adaptation and posits some rules to evolution, rules we are aren't fully aware of. I find this quite interesting
I will post some back up points later. and more info on this subject
It is too big to sum up.
This theory is still one of evolution, just not a Darwinian fundamentalist approach, it still rejects creationism as retarded
#9
Posted 07 October 2006 - 06:02 PM
A point first of all against Dawkins a Darwinian fundamentalist...showing while creationist are idiotic it is not a vice held by them alone
5. THE SEQUENCE OF STRUCTURES CORRELATIVE TO THE SEQUENCE OF SCIENCES
We can give as an example the set of explanatory correlations provided by the sciences: where the laws of physics hold for the 4 forces of gravity, the weak and strong nuclear forces, and electromagnetic interactions, and for the subatomic particles; the laws of physics and chemistry hold for elements and compounds; the laws of physics, chemistry and biology hold for cell life, those 3 sets of laws plus the laws of botany hold for plants, and so on. ‘As one moves from one genus [here meaning level of being] to the next, there is added a new set of laws which defines its own basic terms by its own empirically established correlations.’ (Insight, 255)
Corresponding to the successive levels of being, there will be distinct and autonomous empirical sciences. ‘And the distinct autonomous sciences will be related as successive higher viewpoints.’ (Insight, 438–39) So, we have the series of generically or essentially different levels of things; corresponding to those levels of being is the set of autonomous sciences as a sequence of higher viewpoints: physics -> chemistry-> biology ->zoology (sensory-perceptual psychology) -> intellectual psychology + philosophical anthropology.
Against the reductionist viewpoint, which would hold that all the higher sciences can ultimately be reduced to the lower sciences, of physics, chemistry and biochemistry, there is rather, for Lonergan a relative autonomy of higher from lower sciences: If the laws of a science at a lower level have to regard ranges of occurrences ‘as mere patterns of happy coincidences’ there develops an autonomous higher science. The point is that when you ask questions as to why a whole range of data that’s making some sort of sense, can’t be explained at a certain level, you may then have to move to another level of science. If you saw the film, The March of the Penguins in 2006, which followed the life cycle of emperor penguins in Antarctica for a year—including witner temperatures of
–80ºC, it’s a typical example of data that is easily recognizable as meaningful, but inexplicable at the level of the lower natural sciences:
Every March, as winter approaches, the emperor penguins trek 70 miles across ice to the mating ground. There, they mate, and after the female lays an egg, the males, all huddled together, keep themselves and the eggs warm, holding them between their feet. The females walk (their characteristic waddle has been shown to be the perfect way of balance for these 1 meter tall birds) back to the sea to feed themselves, bringing back some food for the chicks, who have hatched in time for their return. Then, the males walk back to the sea, and after several alternating 140 mile round-trips by the parents, the chicks are developed enough to be left on their own, and the families break up. Back in the Southern Ocean they can dive over 500 meters for prey, staying underwater for over 20 minutes, deeper and longer than any other bird. The life-cycle continues.
Just imagine trying to understand what’s happening here in terms of chemistry, or biology, or botany. Rather, what’s needed are the kind of categories emerging from comparative avian zoology, including of course, avian communication, mating rituals, defence mechanisms such as flight, fight, dependency, pairing—remember their apparent indifference to attacks by South Polar skuas on some of the chicks, presumably they’re aware it’s a battle they can’t win, given they’re flightless.
To get back to our questioning reductionism in the natural sciences, we can note with Lonergan: ‘Nor does the introduction of the higher autonomous science interfere with the autonomy of the lower; for the higher enters into the field of the lower only in so far as it makes systematic on the lower level what otherwise would be merely coincidental.’ (256)
Lonergan links the main departments of science with his understanding of successive higher viewpoints, and notes that ‘it is because new insights intervene’ that the higher science is essentially, or, GENERICALLY different from the lower. ‘The contention that things are all of one kind has rested, not on concrete evidence, but on mechanist assumption.’ (257) Again, think of comparative zoology as a higher viewpoint in relation to the previous lower sciences of botany, biology and chemistry—where at least botany and chemistry would still have very interesting sets of observations to make on, say, the emperor penguin’s diet, metabolism, and so on.
THINGS WITHIN THINGS: Lonergan discusses another argument against reductionism in terms of his criticism of the notion that there are things within things. ‘The fact that the laws of the lower orders are verified in the higher genus proves that [correlations] of the lower order exist in things of the higher genus. But it is one thing to prove that [correlations] of the lower order survive within the higher genus; it is quite another to prove that things defined solely by the lower correlations also survive. To arrive at correlations, abstractive procedures are normal; one considers events under some aspects and disregards other aspects of the same events. But to arrive at a thing, one must consider all data within a totality, and one must take into account all their aspects.’ (258)
An example would be a field of buttercups, showing slight species variation depending on their position in wetter or drier parts of the field. So, although the laws of chemistry and biology hold for the buttercups—you could fill a book with a listing of all the biochemical changes occurring each day in terms of photosynthesis, by which the flower’s chlorophyll molecules convert sunlight into energy. Still, however exhaustively the biochemical changes in the buttercups were registered, no such account would yield the specifically botanical insight into why those photosynthetic activities are occurring in such a systematic way. [I owe this example to Philip McShane’s discussion in his Randomness, Statistics and Emergence (1970), 71–76, and his arguments for the specific difference of botany over biochemistry in his Plants and Pianos: Two Essays in Advanced Methodology (Dublin: Milltown Institute, 1971)].
Nor are the millions of cells in each buttercup separate ‘things,’ since intrinsic to the constitution of each cell is that they are buttercup cells. Voegelin puts it very concretely:
A plant is a plant. You see it. You don’t see its physical-chemical processes, and nothing about the plant changes if you know that physical-chemical processes are going on inside. How these processes will result in what you experience immediately as a plant (a rose or an oak tree), you don’t know anyway. So if you know these substructures in the lower levels of the ontic hierarchy (beyond the plant which is organism) and go into the physical, chemical, molecular and atomic structures, ever farther down, the greater becomes the miracle how all that thing is a plant. Nothing is explained. If you try to explain it in terms of some mechanism, you have committed the fallacy of reduction. (in Eric Voegelin, Conversations with Eric Voegelin, 93).
Of course, there are ‘things within things’ in the biological world—there are many examples of codependency between say, us, and micro-bacteria in our digestive system—about 100 trillion or so. Some of these bacteria are able to manufacture essential vitamins not found in our diet nor provided well by human cells, including several B vitamins. Still they only account for about 3 pounds of our weight. (Cf. Rick Weiss, Washington Post, June 5, 2006).
But, as we’ve been saying, in things of any higher genus (say, the emperor penguins), there survive those aspects of those birds that we know in terms of the correlations of the sciences lower than zoology (for example, chemical and biological correlations), but there do not survive lower things. The levels of reality understood in terms of lower correlations survive, for without them there would be nothing for the higher system of correlations to systematize. On the other hand, lower things do not survive within higher things. This is exactly the opposite to the reductionism of Richard Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene (1976) where he summarizes his argument: ‘Our genes made us. We animals exist for their preservation and are nothing more than their throwaway survival machines.’ (cf. 19–20) Here, Dawkins is saying that the real ‘things’ in us are our genes, and that effectively, ‘we’ aren’t things in ourselves at all, we’re not human persons in a scientific sense.
5. THE SEQUENCE OF STRUCTURES CORRELATIVE TO THE SEQUENCE OF SCIENCES
We can give as an example the set of explanatory correlations provided by the sciences: where the laws of physics hold for the 4 forces of gravity, the weak and strong nuclear forces, and electromagnetic interactions, and for the subatomic particles; the laws of physics and chemistry hold for elements and compounds; the laws of physics, chemistry and biology hold for cell life, those 3 sets of laws plus the laws of botany hold for plants, and so on. ‘As one moves from one genus [here meaning level of being] to the next, there is added a new set of laws which defines its own basic terms by its own empirically established correlations.’ (Insight, 255)
Corresponding to the successive levels of being, there will be distinct and autonomous empirical sciences. ‘And the distinct autonomous sciences will be related as successive higher viewpoints.’ (Insight, 438–39) So, we have the series of generically or essentially different levels of things; corresponding to those levels of being is the set of autonomous sciences as a sequence of higher viewpoints: physics -> chemistry-> biology ->zoology (sensory-perceptual psychology) -> intellectual psychology + philosophical anthropology.
Against the reductionist viewpoint, which would hold that all the higher sciences can ultimately be reduced to the lower sciences, of physics, chemistry and biochemistry, there is rather, for Lonergan a relative autonomy of higher from lower sciences: If the laws of a science at a lower level have to regard ranges of occurrences ‘as mere patterns of happy coincidences’ there develops an autonomous higher science. The point is that when you ask questions as to why a whole range of data that’s making some sort of sense, can’t be explained at a certain level, you may then have to move to another level of science. If you saw the film, The March of the Penguins in 2006, which followed the life cycle of emperor penguins in Antarctica for a year—including witner temperatures of
–80ºC, it’s a typical example of data that is easily recognizable as meaningful, but inexplicable at the level of the lower natural sciences:
Every March, as winter approaches, the emperor penguins trek 70 miles across ice to the mating ground. There, they mate, and after the female lays an egg, the males, all huddled together, keep themselves and the eggs warm, holding them between their feet. The females walk (their characteristic waddle has been shown to be the perfect way of balance for these 1 meter tall birds) back to the sea to feed themselves, bringing back some food for the chicks, who have hatched in time for their return. Then, the males walk back to the sea, and after several alternating 140 mile round-trips by the parents, the chicks are developed enough to be left on their own, and the families break up. Back in the Southern Ocean they can dive over 500 meters for prey, staying underwater for over 20 minutes, deeper and longer than any other bird. The life-cycle continues.
Just imagine trying to understand what’s happening here in terms of chemistry, or biology, or botany. Rather, what’s needed are the kind of categories emerging from comparative avian zoology, including of course, avian communication, mating rituals, defence mechanisms such as flight, fight, dependency, pairing—remember their apparent indifference to attacks by South Polar skuas on some of the chicks, presumably they’re aware it’s a battle they can’t win, given they’re flightless.
To get back to our questioning reductionism in the natural sciences, we can note with Lonergan: ‘Nor does the introduction of the higher autonomous science interfere with the autonomy of the lower; for the higher enters into the field of the lower only in so far as it makes systematic on the lower level what otherwise would be merely coincidental.’ (256)
Lonergan links the main departments of science with his understanding of successive higher viewpoints, and notes that ‘it is because new insights intervene’ that the higher science is essentially, or, GENERICALLY different from the lower. ‘The contention that things are all of one kind has rested, not on concrete evidence, but on mechanist assumption.’ (257) Again, think of comparative zoology as a higher viewpoint in relation to the previous lower sciences of botany, biology and chemistry—where at least botany and chemistry would still have very interesting sets of observations to make on, say, the emperor penguin’s diet, metabolism, and so on.
THINGS WITHIN THINGS: Lonergan discusses another argument against reductionism in terms of his criticism of the notion that there are things within things. ‘The fact that the laws of the lower orders are verified in the higher genus proves that [correlations] of the lower order exist in things of the higher genus. But it is one thing to prove that [correlations] of the lower order survive within the higher genus; it is quite another to prove that things defined solely by the lower correlations also survive. To arrive at correlations, abstractive procedures are normal; one considers events under some aspects and disregards other aspects of the same events. But to arrive at a thing, one must consider all data within a totality, and one must take into account all their aspects.’ (258)
An example would be a field of buttercups, showing slight species variation depending on their position in wetter or drier parts of the field. So, although the laws of chemistry and biology hold for the buttercups—you could fill a book with a listing of all the biochemical changes occurring each day in terms of photosynthesis, by which the flower’s chlorophyll molecules convert sunlight into energy. Still, however exhaustively the biochemical changes in the buttercups were registered, no such account would yield the specifically botanical insight into why those photosynthetic activities are occurring in such a systematic way. [I owe this example to Philip McShane’s discussion in his Randomness, Statistics and Emergence (1970), 71–76, and his arguments for the specific difference of botany over biochemistry in his Plants and Pianos: Two Essays in Advanced Methodology (Dublin: Milltown Institute, 1971)].
Nor are the millions of cells in each buttercup separate ‘things,’ since intrinsic to the constitution of each cell is that they are buttercup cells. Voegelin puts it very concretely:
A plant is a plant. You see it. You don’t see its physical-chemical processes, and nothing about the plant changes if you know that physical-chemical processes are going on inside. How these processes will result in what you experience immediately as a plant (a rose or an oak tree), you don’t know anyway. So if you know these substructures in the lower levels of the ontic hierarchy (beyond the plant which is organism) and go into the physical, chemical, molecular and atomic structures, ever farther down, the greater becomes the miracle how all that thing is a plant. Nothing is explained. If you try to explain it in terms of some mechanism, you have committed the fallacy of reduction. (in Eric Voegelin, Conversations with Eric Voegelin, 93).
Of course, there are ‘things within things’ in the biological world—there are many examples of codependency between say, us, and micro-bacteria in our digestive system—about 100 trillion or so. Some of these bacteria are able to manufacture essential vitamins not found in our diet nor provided well by human cells, including several B vitamins. Still they only account for about 3 pounds of our weight. (Cf. Rick Weiss, Washington Post, June 5, 2006).
But, as we’ve been saying, in things of any higher genus (say, the emperor penguins), there survive those aspects of those birds that we know in terms of the correlations of the sciences lower than zoology (for example, chemical and biological correlations), but there do not survive lower things. The levels of reality understood in terms of lower correlations survive, for without them there would be nothing for the higher system of correlations to systematize. On the other hand, lower things do not survive within higher things. This is exactly the opposite to the reductionism of Richard Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene (1976) where he summarizes his argument: ‘Our genes made us. We animals exist for their preservation and are nothing more than their throwaway survival machines.’ (cf. 19–20) Here, Dawkins is saying that the real ‘things’ in us are our genes, and that effectively, ‘we’ aren’t things in ourselves at all, we’re not human persons in a scientific sense.
#10
Posted 07 October 2006 - 06:07 PM
Stuff about Darwinism and comments by noted bioloigists
AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL BLIND SPOT: DARWIN’S ASSERTION OF GRADUALISM COUNTERED BY THE PROBLEM OF THE GAPS IN THE FOSSIL RECORD
One of Lonergan’s criticisms of Darwin is that his notion of scientific explanation depends on a perceptual rather than an intellectual epistemology. So, his notion of the basic unit as the species (even if changing all the time), rather than the species in interaction with the environment, and his focusing on a gradual accretion of minor changes as an insight into macroevolutionary development (that is, development from one species to another, rather than minor changes within a species), seem to depend on a notion of scientific knowledge as taking a good look at what’s happening rather than employing a notion of explanation in terms of correlations between the data: for relations between various species over time, there’s no question of looking for visible, gradual changes.
Voegelin, in his 1964 Hitler and the Germans lectures (144f), comments on this:
So the expression, ‘survival of the fittest,’ which he willingly uses in place of his earlier expression ‘natural selection’ (in contrast to artificial selection by man), comes from Spencer and the context of English early liberalism. It thus contains precisely this social element that is later asserted to have been illegitimately pinned on Darwin. Darwin continues:
[M]an by selection can certainly produce great results...But Natural Selection...is a power incessantly ready for action, and is as immeasurably superior to man’s feeble efforts, as the works of Nature are to those of Art. (OS, 77)
And now, how does nature carry out its selection?
A struggle for existence inevitably follows from the high rate at which all organic beings tend to increase... It is the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms. (OS, 79)
That is…in order to strengthen his theory of evolution, Darwin uses the categories of English early liberalism from the politics of Spencer and of Malthus. He hasn’t observed anything at all. Indeed, after he developed his theory, he had to make yet another great restriction. In the evolutionary theories of the Darwinian type (there are also other evolutionary theories—there should be no doubt about evolution—but now we are speaking about the specifically Darwinian evolutionary theory) it is established, on the basis of observation of plant and animal breeding, that there are what later were called mutations, slight changes, producing new varieties within a species. Darwin now extrapolates from this, saying that also the species that are clearly differentiated, have changed from one to the other through similar little steps, like those one observes in artificial and natural breeding within the species. But from this it would follow that between the species recognizable today—which are rather far away from each other—there must be an unlimited profusion of infinitesimal transitions, if not from one to another, then from the different species available at present back to common original species from which they have developed. And Darwin now makes this supposition too. Evolution took place through this infinitely small change of variations, from which the species then arose. But the question then arises: Why then do we have only these clearly distinguishable species, and what has happened to all these links in between?
And Darwin…replies now to this, in chapter 10, entitled ‘On the Imperfection of the Geological Record.’ He speaks of the principal objection to his theory as:
the distinctness of specific forms, and their not being blended together by innumerable transitional links...Geology assuredly does not reveal any such finely graduated organic chain; and this, perhaps, is the most obvious and serious objection which can be urged against the theory. The explanation [which all these missing links, that must have been innumerable, does not produce] lies, as I believe, in the extreme imperfection of the geological record. (OS, 412-3)
…Precisely this part of the theory, which for Darwin is the most decisive, has no empirical basis, and has had none up to now. Rather, this part of the theory is an application to geological phenomena of the liberal politics of competition and the selection of the best in competition with each other, without a trace of an empirical observation.
Long after the 1859 publication of the Origin, Darwin continued to be aware of particular gaps in the fossil record.
For example, he knew of a difficulty about 120m years ago with the sudden appearance of the angiosperms (the flowering plants: flowers, cereals, grasses, all trees from beech to palm, except conifers, most vegetables). The angiosperms have no ancestors in the fossil record, nor can any intermediate links be traced between them and the conifers or gymnosperms, which they largely replaced. Darwin wrote in an 1881 letter to Hooker: ‘Nothing is more extraordinary in the history of the Vegetable Kingdom, as it seems to me, than the apparently very sudden or abrupt development of the higher plants.’
Another type of difficulty has to do with the assertion that sophisticated physiological organs have occurred gradually over time. Darwin himself was also fully aware of this problem, writing to Asa Gray in 1861: ‘The eye to this day gives me a cold shudder.’ (Quoted in Denton, Evolution, 326) It is precisely these difficulties that have been raised within paleontology and biology especially since the early 1970s.
What we’re saying here does not disparage Darwin’s tremendous capacity for detailed observation, his lifetime of collecting specimens, experimentation with plants, and small animals, and so on. And, as Lonergan noted, in fact Darwin’s notion of chance variation can be seen as an instance of what we called the principle of material emergence.
Still, there are a number of basic biological difficulties with the theory at the level of empirical data. Thomas Huxley pointed out one of the main problems to Darwin. Darwin had written (quoted in Johnson, Darwin on Trial, 33):
‘[S]o will natural selection, if it be a true principle, banish the belief of the continued creation of new organic beings, or of any great and sudden modification in their structure.’
Huxley warned Darwin that, ‘You have loaded yourself with an unnecessary difficulty in adopting natura non facit saltum [nature does not make jumps] so unreservedly.’ (Johnson, 33)
Darwin should have differentiated philosophical questions involving efficient causality (or extrinsic causation) from the kind of interrelational explanation (or intrinsic causation) proper to the natural sciences. If he had done so, what seems most original in his theory, its magnificent attempt to deal at the level of an explanatory biology with the unity and diversity of all living reality, would not have run into so many problems.
DARWIN COULD EXPLAIN ‘MICRO-EVOLUTION’ BUT NOT ‘MACRO-EVOLUTION’
As a fairly typical example of dissent from within biology itself, Denton quotes Steven Stanley’s Macroevolution:
The known fossil record fails to document a single example of phyletic (gradual) evolution accomplishing a major morphological transition and hence offers no evidence that the gradualistic model can be valid. (Quoted in Denton, 164)
And Darwinian evolutionist Stephen Gould berates what he calls ‘the false iconography of the march of progress.’ (Gould, Wonderful Life, 31) He criticizes not only what he calls ‘the great warhorse of tradition’—the familiar illustration of the various stages in the evolution of the horse—as quite fallacious, but the even more widespread iconography of human evolution, from monkey through apes through hominids to man. (Gould, Wonderful Life, 37; 27–36)
While few paleontologists would say that there are no examples in the fossil record of gradual sequences that could be used as evidence for Darwinism, nonetheless, within the Darwinian fold itself, the general lack of fossil evidence has been pointed out rather bluntly, for example, by Niles Eldredge, in his Reinventing Darwin: The Great Evolutionary Debate, 3; 94–95:
[I]n the 1960s...I tried to document examples of the kind of slow, steady, directional change we all thought ought to be there, ever since Darwin told us that natural selection should leave precisely such a telltale signal as we collect our fossils up cliff faces. I found instead that once species appear in the fossil record, they tend not to change very much at all. Species remain imperturbably...resistant to change as a matter of course—often for millions of years...species are fundamentally stable entities—a phenomenon that Stephen Jay Gould and I dubbed ‘stasis’ in our 1972 paper elaborating the evolutionary notion of ‘punctuated equilibria.’
[N]ew species...tend to show up abruptly in the fossil record as the overwhelming rule...No wonder paleontologists shied away from evolution for so long. It seems never to happen...When we do see the introduction of evolutionary novelty, it usually shows up with a bang, and often with no firm evidence that the organisms did not evolve elsewhere!
Niles Eldredge’s earlier comment on the behaviour of palaeontologists since the late 1940s is instructive:
We have proffered a collective tacit acceptance of the story of gradual adaptive change, a story that strengthened and became even more entrenched as the [neo-Darwinian] synthesis took hold. We palaeontologists have said that the history of life supports this interpretation, all the while really knowing that it does not. [Time Frames: The Rethinking of Darwinian Evolution and the Theory of Punctuated Equilibria, 144.]
Robert Augros and George Stanciu, who have quoted Eldredge, add that ‘Something is gravely wrong with a theory that forces us to deny or ignore the data of an entire science.’ [The New Biology, 175.]
What I think is an ideological rather than scientific attempt to tailor the data to a scientistic rather than scientific theory can be found in the attempt to prevent questions of existence arising by what we can call the Great Wall of Gradualism.
We’re ruling out here that a sequence where minor modifications of a Darwinian type occur could gradually bring about major ones, which has been characterized as micro-evolution. But it’s helpful to distinguish micro-evolution from macro-evolution—which is what Darwin considered he was explaining:
There is no question that evolution of the Darwinian kind occurs, in the sense that types of living organisms have a certain capacity for variation. This is a process commonly called microevolution, and it accounts for such things as the variant characteristics of plants and animals that have been transported to an isolated island environment. The problem is that there is no evidence for, and very much evidence against, the Darwinian assumption that some similar process of step-by-step gradual change produced the basic body plans of plants and animals in the first place or brought about the existence of complex organs like wings and eyes. (Phillip Johnson, Reason in the Balance,14).
Johnson is referring to changes in finch beaks in the Galapagos Islands described by Peter and Rosemary Grant in The Beak of the Finch: A Story of Evolution in Our Time, 1994, where finch beaks grew about 5% longer after the drought year of 1977, which were better shaped for opening the last tough seeds remaining. Then, after the floods of 1983, the first postflood generation of finches again had smaller beaks, more suited to the many tiny seeds that had become available—so a cycle of beak size, from smaller to larger and back to smaller, due to environmental changes, was observed.
Johnson also comments on the effect of industrial melanism in the peppered moth: H. B. D. Kettlewell observed in 1959 how the moth’s wings changed from light-coloured to dark to provide the species with better camouflage from birds when it found itself in industrially polluted areas: ‘The example does not illustrate moths in the process of changing to something else, or even changing in color. It illustrates an essentially stable population that can vary cyclically to adjust to conditions.’ (Ibid., 73n) (Unfortunately, Kettlewell’s observations, frequently put forward as a convincing argument for evolution in general, including macro-evolution, have been shown to be seriously flawed, if not downright fraudulent: cf. Judith Hooper’s 2002 investigation, Of Moths and Men: Intrigue, Tragedy & the Peppered Moth.)
Later, we can ask ourselves what all the fuss was about, since we’ll be agreeing with another group of molecular biologists from the 1990s on who seem to have indicated how macro-mutations can occur without any gradual processes. It’s just that it seems as if, to prevent questions that a philosopher would see to be questions about existence from being raised at all, Darwin tried with all his might not to allow any ‘chink’ in the armour of gradualism.
ALTERNATIVES TO A GRADUALIST THEORY OF EVOLUTION:
i) Berg-Goldschmidt-Groves
Australian primatologist and evolutionary theorist Colin P. Groves, in his A Theory of Human and Primate Evolution sees ‘neoteny’ as the ‘law’ behind evolution. He quotes Stephen Jay Gould as writing that ‘neoteny’ [the persistence of some infant- or childlike-characteristics in later development] requires that ‘aspects of shape are retarded with respect to the rest of development.’
The vast potential for evolutionary change opened up by heterochrony [that is, development of different parts of an organism at varying speeds] has perhaps not been appreciated by most biologists; in the last analysis, it seems possible to ascribe a major proportion of evolutionary change to changes in rates of development. Extreme dissociation of developmental rates of different organ systems is what the Krassilov Effect is all about. I have no intention of insisting that “heterochrony” is a synonym for “evolution.” But I would like to stress the uninvestigated explanatory potential embodied in the concept. (Groves, 57–8)
Groves: ‘The first of the “complete theories” of evolution developed in modern times was the “nomogenesis” of Berg (Lev S. Berg, Nomogenesis or evolution determined by law, (1922) tr. J. N. Rostovson, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1969]). ‘…Berg’s consideration of the Darwinian model led him to the conclusion that it was incompatible, at least as the major mechanism, with what he knew of the pattern of living organisms and their evolution. His conclusions are as follows (1969, 406–7):
1. Evolution is based not on chance variations but on laws (hence the title “nomogenesis” [genesis or development according to law, Greek nomos])
4. Evolution proceeds not by slow continuous changes but by jumps.
5. Hereditary variations (mutations) are restricted in number and are directional, not numerous and random.
6. Natural selection is primarily an agency of conservation, not of change.
7. New species arise by “mutations” (meaning sharply distinct changes).
8. Much of evolution is the unfolding of pre-existing rudiments, rather than the formation of new characters as such.’ (Groves, 60)
And Michael Denton, in his Nature’s Destiny: How the Laws of Biology reveal Purpose in the Universe (1998) notes that Berg ‘believed that the variation of characters in an evolutionary lineage is confined within certain limits, that it follows a “definite course, like an electric current moving along a wire.”’ Denton continues, quoting examples of nomogenesis given by Berg: ‘[H]e cited the gradual ossification [bone-growth] of the vertebral [spinal] column, a reduction in the number of bones in the skull, and the transformation of a two-chambered heart into a three- and four-chambered organ associated with a corresponding increase in the complexity of the circulatory system.’ (273)
Colin Groves also mentions the work of the German zoologist Richard Goldschmidt, which while much criticized in the 1940s, has been rediscovered as relevant in the light of continual difficulties with Darwinian gradualism:
Goldschmidt could not believe that natural selection, with all its slowness and the slightness of its effects, could produce anything but microevolutionary changes. In particular, he found it difficult to accept that macroevolutionary changes are simply an accumulation of microevolutionary changes as required by the [neo-Darwinian] synthesis [of Darwin’s theory with genetics]. From time to time, he proposed, a major mutation occurs producing a radically different form, which must then be tested against pre-existing forms.
In many respects, the punctuated equilibrium model is a simple resurrection and elaboration of the hopeful monster [=Goldschmidt’s] theory. (Groves, 62)
Groves thinks that, while more is needed for a complete theory of evolution, ‘the accumulating evidence does suggest that some version of the Goldschmidt theory is by now inescapable.’ (Groves, 62)
‘Gould’s interim model [see below on punctuated equilibrium], which is really all that it’s intended to be, is largely descriptive, with little attempt to elucidate mechanisms…it needs to be elaborated by some attempt to explain processes, and certainly it badly needs the concept of directionality. That is why the most satisfactory evolutionary model is, I believe, best described by Berg’s term, nomogenesis.’ (Groves, 62–3)
Simon Conway-Morris, in his 2003 Life’s Solution: Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe, quotes Denton & Marshall: ‘underlying all the diversity of life is a finite set of natural forms that will recur over and over again anywhere in the cosmos where there is carbon-based life.’ (11). And Denton, Marshall and Legge in their essay on ‘The Protein Folds as Platonic Forms: New Support for the Pre-Darwinian Conception of Evolution by Natural Law,’ (2002) suggest that ‘natural law may have played a far greater role in the origin and evolution of life than is currently assumed.’ (325) This is on the basis of the extremely limited number of protein folds (‘the basic building blocks of proteins and therefore of the cell…’ (330)
Again and again they question the priority of function over form in modern evolutionary thinking. They refer to Aristotle’s Parts of Animals, ‘in the famous analogy, where he envisages the pre-existing plan [or form] of a house acting as an “attractor” molding the material constituents, the bricks and stones, during the building of the house into conformity with its pre-existing plan: “Now the order of things in the process of formation is the reverse of their real and essential order…bricks and stone come chronologically before the house…but logically the real essence and the Form of the thing [the pre-existing plan of the house or the pre-existing Form of the protein fold] comes first.”’ (333)
Further, Conway-Morris notes how biologists’ use of ‘surprising,’ ‘amazing,’ etc. regarding convergences between different organisms—means they ‘sense the ghost of teleology looking over their shoulders.’ For example, mosquito hearing by amplification is amazingly equivalent to vertebrates, 191, with a deeper auditory similarity called transduction [conversion of a mechanical force, for example, sound, into electrical signals, in quite different phyla [major animal groups], insects and vertebrates, 193.
He discusses ant and bee capacities, quoting an author on army ant colonies where we see ‘the emergence of flexible problem-solving far exceeding the capacity of the individual’ and presupposing effective communication, so that ‘intelligence, natural or artificial, is an emergent property of collective communication…This is exactly what happens when army ants pass information from individual to individual through the “writing” and “reading” of symbols, often in the form of chemical messengers or trail pheromones, which act as stimuIi for changing behavior patterns.’ 203
Again, Conway-Morris notes (403nn43–44) the convergent evolutionary emergence of eusocial [that is, in favour of the whole society] behavior in different types of insects, ants, wasps, stingless and other bees, and sees it as expression of inevitable constraints [including climate change] on the evolution process. He also notes how hummingbirds, songbirds and parrots have evolved different solutions to the same problem of vocal learning.
Conway-Morris makes an important concession on ‘inevitable’: ‘…evolution is labile, it does show reversals, but the point still remains that the emergence of various biological properties is in response to adaptation and is governed by selection…Convergence simply tells us that the evolution of various biological properties is certainly highly probable, and in many cases highly predictable.’ LS, 223.
ii) Eldredge-Gould: Punctuated Equilibrium
While it’s not possible here to go into the dramatic shift from non-perceptual life to life which is perceptually organized, it’s no secret that the gaps in the fossil record Darwin presumed would soon be filled have remained. As a result, Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould in 1972 proposed what they saw was an important modification to gradualist Darwinian evolution, in their ground-breaking article, ‘Punctuated Equilibria: An alternative to Phyletic Gradualism.’ [Reprinted in Niles Eldredge, Time Frames: The Rethinking of Darwinian Evolution and the Theory of Punctuated Equilibria, 193–223]
Succinctly, Eldredge explains:
[I]f evolutionary change doesn’t simply accumulate over the course of time, the question becomes, When and under what conditions does evolutionary change occur?...new species...tend to show up abruptly in the fossil record as the overwhelming rule...Punctuated equilibria is a combination of empirical pattern (stasis interrupted by brief bursts of evolutionary change) coupled with preexisting biological theory. [Reinventing Darwin: The Great Evolutionary Debate, 94, 104.]
The supporters of classical Darwinism, represented most vocally by Richard Dawkins in England and Daniel Dennett in America, regarded punctuated equilibrium as less a revision than a heretical betrayal of Darwin. Eldredge and Gould were subjected to vitriolic attack, even though Dawkins was quite aware that they wished to be regarded as Darwinian biologists.
Simon Conway Morris’s approach in Life’s Solution is not too far from Lonergan’s—who understands biological and zoological species as successful answers to certain questions of survival in a given habitat. Conway Morris too sees evolutionary changes as varying solutions to the problem of living in a given environment. Writing, for example, of different plant ‘solutions’ to surviving in different desert environments, he notes that: ‘there may be more than one adaptive solution to a problem’ 365n138. He provides interesting data on cross-phyletic mechanisms—where vertebrates, insects and mollusks (slugs, 390n215)—have the same odor mechanisms (389n208). For Conway Morris, these have evolved separately, since the organisms preceding them lack these mechanisms. They also have the same underlying molecular background. In addition, he writes about the similar molecular pathways underlying both visual and smell mechanisms (indicating what a philosopher would see as a shared material basis for Aristotle’s (180–81), the common or organizing perceptual integration of the various sensory systems in animals. Conway Morris also notes the same capacity for echo-location in bats, dolphins and some birds, 181–82.
DESPITE THESE PERSPECTIVES ON THE COSMOLOGICAL-BIOLOGICAL WHOLE, THERE REMAIN QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF LIFE
Conway Morris, in Life’s Solution, observes that ‘how inanimate became animate has proved stubbornly recalcitrant’ (xiv); still, in a very short time—maybe as little as 200m yrs, what could be the best possible genetic code emerges on earth. He is immensely sceptical regarding hypotheses about the origin of life. At the same time, and perhaps this is a contradiction, Conway Morris is convinced that life must have begun through a step-like process, (53), although he rejects Graham Cairns-Smith’s hypothesis on clay as the origin of life as without the reality check of experimentation. (342n33) It’s beyond my competence to pronounce on this matter, still, some biologists come close to denying any gradual emergence of life from non-living material. For example, in 1953, the same year as Stanley Miller and Harold Urey tried to produce life experimentally, James Watson’s and Francis Crick’s discovery of the role of the DNA molecule in all living things indicated an extraordinary complexity in living cells, making a chance emergence of living organisms from chemicals appear less likely. Nobel prizewinning biologist Jacques Monod remarked that:
the simplest cells available to us for study have nothing ‘primitive’ about them....the major problem is the origin of the genetic code and of its transitional mechanism. Indeed it is not so much a ‘problem’ as a veritable enigma. The code is meaningless unless translated. The modern cell’s translating machinery consists of at least fifty macro-molecular components which are themselves coded in DNA: the code cannot be translated except by products of translation. It is the modern expression of omne vivum ex ovo [all that’s living comes from an egg]. When and how did this circle become closed? It is exceedlingly difficult to imagine. [Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Modern Biology, 134f.] [Author’s emphasis].
And Francis Crick, co-discoverer of the structure of DNA noted that:
An honest man, armed with all the knowledge available to us now, could only state that in some sense, the origin of life appears at the moment to be almost a miracle, so many are the conditions which would have had to have been satisfied to get it going. [Quoted in: Michael Denton, Evolution: A Theory in Crisis, 268.]
Conway Morris in Life’s Solution, reflects that despite fact that most [scientists] presume there’s ‘unbroken continuity’ between prebiotic ‘soup, clay, clouds…’ and the origin of life, such a hypothesis presumes there’d be aeons of time for life to emerge—but ‘there probably were not.’ He goes on in chapter 5 to suggest that life’s emergence is very rare, or maybe unique to our Solar System.
Daniel Dennett quotes Stephen Gould somewhat dismissively for recognizing the intrinsic limitations of biology (even if those limitations can hardly be overcome by passing them on to chemistry):
Evolution, in fact, is not the study of origins at all. Even the more restricted (and scientifically permissible) question of life’s origin on our earth lies outside its domain. (This interesting problem, I suspect, falls primarily within the purview of chemistry and the physics of self-organizing systems.) Evolution studies the pathways and mechanisms of organic change following the origin of life. (in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 310)
Few biologists, in fact, are more aware of the contingency of their subject-matter than Gould—the final chapter of Wonderful Life is a reflection on the contingency of the biological world. Yet he does not seem inclined to move beyond contingency. But contingent existence is existence by definition requiring an existing, non-contingent ground. And while the heat in Dennett’s attack on Gould’s ‘punctuated equilibrium’ revision conveys something of the inquisitor’s fire, as if Gould had been guilty of lèse majesté for daring to criticize Darwin’s theory at all, what’s even more striking is that neither Dennett nor Gould seem to advert to the philosophical question of existence as such. (Ibid., 282–312. Gould’s own riposte to what he calls the ‘fundamentalism’ of Dawkins and Dennett is to be found in his essays, ‘Darwinian Fundamentalism’ (New York Review of Books, June 12, 34–37; ‘Evolution: Pleasures of Pluralism’ (NYRB, June 26, 47–52.)
Since Gould has been fiercely attacked by those he would be driven to call ‘Darwinian Fundamentalists,’ the reason why a gradualist as opposed to a saltatory approach to evolution was adopted, is perhaps, as Thomas Nagel seems to think, due to a ressentiment not only towards a first cause, but towards philosophy. Such a ressentiment ill serves biology as a natural science:
My guess is that this cosmic authority problem is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism of our time. One of the tendencies it supports is the ludicrous overuse of evolutionary biology to explain everything about life, including everything about the human mind. Darwin enabled modern secular culture to heave a collective sigh of relief, by apparently providing a way to eliminate purpose, meaning and design as fundamental features of the world. Instead they became epiphenomena, generated incidentally by a process that can be entirely explained by the operation of nonteleological laws of physics on the material of which we and our environments are all composed. There might still be thought to be a religious threat in the existence of the laws of physics themselves, and indeed the existence of anything at all—but it seems to be less alarming to most atheists. [The Last Word (1997), 131]
Voegelin too, in his Hitler and the Germans lectures (1999), 144f., commented on the non-observational core of Darwin’s evolutionary theory. Voegelin’s reference, from the viewpoint of the natural sciences, to the givenness of ‘the epiphany of structures in reality’ accompanied by a pneumopathological fear of the underlying mystery, may be one of the factors making any debate on biological or zoological emergence such a heated one in our culture.
However, as we’ll see, Neal C. Gillespie in his Charles Darwin and the Problem of Creation amply discusses the anti-intellectualism Darwin had to deal with in certain religious circles, along with his own internal religious struggle—a struggle perhaps more cultural than religious in fact. The whole issue of closure to scientific inquiry by a school of apologists in the name of a literalizing reading of Scripture makes one sympathetic to writers like Dennett’s and Dawkins’ exasperated desire to fend them off, however polemically..
iii) Evolutionary-Developmental (‘evo-devo’) Theory
The more recent breakthrough in the early ’90s, called ‘evolutionary-developmental’ or ‘evo-devo,’ seems in many ways to correspond at the molecular level to Eldredge and Gould’s punctuated equilibrium hypothesis, which in turn is supplemented by Berg and Groves’ insight into nomogenesis as underlying the macro-evolutionary shifts Eldredge and Gould were trying to deal with. Gould’s last great work, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002) is a massive attempt to marry both his revisionary Darwinism with evo-devo.
The basic discovery, made in the early 1990s, was that the sudden emergence of the 35 phyla or major zoological groups (chordates, crustaceans, mollusks, etc.), around 550m years ago showed a common deep genetic structure. Each phylum had the same genetic instructions for its top/bottom axis, front/back polarity, head, and sensory organs. To get some of the flavor of what evo-devo involves, I’ll quote from Raff’s The Shape of Life:
Higher taxonomic groups, most notably phyla, possess suites of anatomical features that distinguish them from other groups. Such an underlying anatomical arrangement is called a body plan…no new phyla appear to have originated since the Cambrian….(xiv)
Wallace Arthur in his The Origin of Animal Body Plans: A Study in Evolutionary Developmental Biology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 81], gives his opinion that:
there was no multicellular animal life prior to 600 my ago; there was an explosion of body plans in Ediacaran times, with many becoming extinct, and a second body-plan explosion in the early Cambrian; evolution in Vendian and Cambrian times was much more ‘experimental’ than it is now; and internal factors such as developmental constraint (or early lack of it) are important in evolution as well as considerations about niche space and external adaptation.
So it’s no surprise that Sean Carroll discusses this Cambrian event—in one of its most famous expressions, the Burgess Shale in Alberta, of 510m years ago (along with the related Ediacaran in South Australia [545m years ago] and the recently discovered Chengjian fauna in China [520 m years ago]) in chapter 6 of his Endless Forms Most Beautiful: The New Science of Evo Devo and the Making of the Animal Kingdom (New York: Norton, 2005)—as ‘The Big Bang of Animal Evolution.’ He asks, ‘What ignited the Explosion? Why did large and complex animals first appear at this time? Why did these particular forms succeed?’ (138)
What’s amazing are the jellyfish, or cnidarians, belonging to a 36th phylum which may have originated with the first Ediacaran fauna originating 50m years earlier without the two-sided body-plans of the other 35 phyla: although they lack a brain, they still seem to have the same genetic plan for eyes that they share with the other phyla.
The most primitive animals with eyes are the cnidarians. Some have simple eyes lacking lenses, but other medusae [type of jellyfish] have well-developed eyes on the edges of their bells. The Cubomedusae (box jellies), whose highly toxic stings are such a notorious threat to swimmers on Australia’s north coast, have up to 24 eyes that are linked to the nerve net and enable them to orient accurately in light. These eyes are complex, with an epidermal cornea, a spherical lens, a multilayered retina, and a region of nerve fibers. There are about 1,000 sensory cells in each eye. As [these jellyfish] are the deepest [=earliest] branch of the metazoan tree, the complexity of their eyes is surprising. If cnidarians were indeed part of the Ediacaran fauna, it suggests that eyes long predate the Cambrian radiation of bilaterian animals. [Rudolf A. Raff, The Shape of Life: Genes, Development, and the Evolution of Animal Form (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 376–77.
This early origin of eyes, or at least organs sensitive to light are mentioned by Simon Conway Morris, in Life’s Solution, 165f. He writes of eukaryotic visual sensation: ‘Despite the absence of a nervous system,’ its eye-spot is ‘strikingly convergent on the animal eye.’ So he argues for evolutionary co-option and redeployment of these pre-existing capacities rather than a sudden emergence of the eye. He points out that even bacteria have eye-spots, though this doesn’t mean sight, along with later protistan [mobile eukaryotic cells] eye spots. (171f; cf 381–82nn101–111) The time for the evolution from eye-spot to eye, would then be less than 1m yrs. (387n182)
Raff notes that:
‘If externally applied natural selection is the only force required to produce evolutionary change, then developmental processes don’t matter except as features upon which selection can act. If internal organization and processes govern modes of change, then development must be incorporated into any complete theory of evolution.’ (xviii) [We can suggest a melding of both approaches, with ‘external’ including the properly zoological in interaction with environment.]
‘The major concern of this book is to establish the connection between the developmental processes that produce body structure in each generation and the evolutionary processes that produce new anatomical features and novel animal body shapes.’
‘Because metazoans [earliest living multicellular animals] are monophyletic [belonging to a single phylum, or major group of animals], all animal body plans arose as a result of transformations of a single ancestral body plan. Further, because all bilaterian [= two-sided] animals share a common ancestor, they arose from a common bilaterian body plan. The interesting question then becomes whether there is a set of genetic rules that bilaterian animals share. If there is, the diverse body plans of bilaterian phyla have been built upon shared developmental genetic themes, which might constitute a conserved genetic body plan. Slack and co-workers have called this hypothetical Hox gene-centered genetic body plan for most animal phyla the “zootype”…. [Wallace Arthur has an important correction to this statement, in his The Origin of Animal Body Plans: ‘…neither the “zootype” of Slack et al. (1993) nor any other pattern of gene activity represents a body plan; rather such patterns may form part of the explanation of body plans.’ (28)]
‘The central problem for evolutionary biologists interested in development has been how morphology is transformed in evolution.’ (23) He writes that in 1933, Joseph Needham ‘suggested the idea of dissociability of elements of developmental machinery. He pointed out that it is possible experimentally to separate differentiation from growth or cell division, biochemical differentiation from morphogenesis, and some aspects of morphogenesis from one another. The implication of this idea is enormous: developmental processes could be dissociated in evolution to produce novel ontogenies out of existing processes, as long as an integrated developmental program and organismal function could be maintained.’ (23) [This seems close to what Lonergan has to say on the non-systematic that calls forth correspondence, and we’ve already mentioned heterochrony as a possible agent in evolution] Raff speaks of ‘heterochrony’ as ‘an evolutionary dissociation in timing.’ (24) But Raff warns against it becoming the dominant explanation at developmental level for evolutionary changes in morphology. (24)
‘Because we now have the ability to clone regulatory genes, purely developmental questions have quickly become issues in evolutionary biology as well. The most prominent of the gene domains that has been studied…is the homeobox. This is a sequence that encodes a 60-amino-acid-long protein domain rich in basic amino acids that has been shown…to fold into a helix-turn-helix structure that binds DNA in a highly specific manner. The homeobox was discovered…in homeotic genes of Drosophila. Homeoboxes are highly conserved in evolution and…were very quickly found…to be present in other phyla as well. The surprise was that although homeoboxes are associated with genes that control external body segmentation in Drosophila, they are also present in nonsegmented phyla such as echinoderms and nematodes, as well as in the vertebrates, which exhibit some internal segmental features. In all organisms in which they have been studied, homeobox-containing genes homologous to those of the homeotic genes of Drosophila function in some aspect of developmental specification of aspects of the body axis.’ (26)
‘The phylogenetic distribution of homeobox-containing genes indicates a pattern of gene duplication and divergence as well as profound conservation. It is also clear that the roles homeobox-containing genes play in development have undergone significant modification. Homeobox-containing genes in vertebrates establish axial polarity in the central nervous system, but do not set up epidermal segmental patterns as in insects. Additional roles can be shown for them in aspects of vertebrate development and co-option for new functions, such as in neural crest cell patterning…Other regulatory gene families, such as the steroid receptor family…show analogous patterns of evolutionary expansion and co-option to provide genetic raw material for regulatory innovations in the evolution of development. It has happened again and again in evolution within numerous families of regulators. [emergent probability]
The revelation of wide-ranging conservation and co-option of regulatory genes is a new and crucial one for two reasons. First, it presents us with the linkage between an evolutionary continuity of gene structure and the changing function of those genes in the evolution of development. Second, the underlying genomic similarity in the development of highly disparate animals reveals one of the things that makes the evolution of complex forms possible at all.
If each new species required the reinvention of control elements, there would not be time enough for much evolution at all, let alone the spectacularly rapid evolution of novel features observed in the phylogenetic record. There is a kind of tinkering at work, in which the same regulatory elements are recombined into new developmental machines. Dissociability of processes requires the dissociability of molecular components and their reassembly.’ (27)
‘In contemplating the rapid radiation of animal body plans during the Cambrian and their subsequent stability, both Gould and Jacobs have suggested that a form of internal genetic constraint may act as a brake on body plan evolution. They argue that an originally flexible developmental regulatory system allowed experimentation with very basic patterns of development. Once patterns were established, genetic regulatory system became rigidly fixed. After that, a powerful genetic constraint limited evolution to changes within existing body plans.’ (309
AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL BLIND SPOT: DARWIN’S ASSERTION OF GRADUALISM COUNTERED BY THE PROBLEM OF THE GAPS IN THE FOSSIL RECORD
One of Lonergan’s criticisms of Darwin is that his notion of scientific explanation depends on a perceptual rather than an intellectual epistemology. So, his notion of the basic unit as the species (even if changing all the time), rather than the species in interaction with the environment, and his focusing on a gradual accretion of minor changes as an insight into macroevolutionary development (that is, development from one species to another, rather than minor changes within a species), seem to depend on a notion of scientific knowledge as taking a good look at what’s happening rather than employing a notion of explanation in terms of correlations between the data: for relations between various species over time, there’s no question of looking for visible, gradual changes.
Voegelin, in his 1964 Hitler and the Germans lectures (144f), comments on this:
So the expression, ‘survival of the fittest,’ which he willingly uses in place of his earlier expression ‘natural selection’ (in contrast to artificial selection by man), comes from Spencer and the context of English early liberalism. It thus contains precisely this social element that is later asserted to have been illegitimately pinned on Darwin. Darwin continues:
[M]an by selection can certainly produce great results...But Natural Selection...is a power incessantly ready for action, and is as immeasurably superior to man’s feeble efforts, as the works of Nature are to those of Art. (OS, 77)
And now, how does nature carry out its selection?
A struggle for existence inevitably follows from the high rate at which all organic beings tend to increase... It is the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms. (OS, 79)
That is…in order to strengthen his theory of evolution, Darwin uses the categories of English early liberalism from the politics of Spencer and of Malthus. He hasn’t observed anything at all. Indeed, after he developed his theory, he had to make yet another great restriction. In the evolutionary theories of the Darwinian type (there are also other evolutionary theories—there should be no doubt about evolution—but now we are speaking about the specifically Darwinian evolutionary theory) it is established, on the basis of observation of plant and animal breeding, that there are what later were called mutations, slight changes, producing new varieties within a species. Darwin now extrapolates from this, saying that also the species that are clearly differentiated, have changed from one to the other through similar little steps, like those one observes in artificial and natural breeding within the species. But from this it would follow that between the species recognizable today—which are rather far away from each other—there must be an unlimited profusion of infinitesimal transitions, if not from one to another, then from the different species available at present back to common original species from which they have developed. And Darwin now makes this supposition too. Evolution took place through this infinitely small change of variations, from which the species then arose. But the question then arises: Why then do we have only these clearly distinguishable species, and what has happened to all these links in between?
And Darwin…replies now to this, in chapter 10, entitled ‘On the Imperfection of the Geological Record.’ He speaks of the principal objection to his theory as:
the distinctness of specific forms, and their not being blended together by innumerable transitional links...Geology assuredly does not reveal any such finely graduated organic chain; and this, perhaps, is the most obvious and serious objection which can be urged against the theory. The explanation [which all these missing links, that must have been innumerable, does not produce] lies, as I believe, in the extreme imperfection of the geological record. (OS, 412-3)
…Precisely this part of the theory, which for Darwin is the most decisive, has no empirical basis, and has had none up to now. Rather, this part of the theory is an application to geological phenomena of the liberal politics of competition and the selection of the best in competition with each other, without a trace of an empirical observation.
Long after the 1859 publication of the Origin, Darwin continued to be aware of particular gaps in the fossil record.
For example, he knew of a difficulty about 120m years ago with the sudden appearance of the angiosperms (the flowering plants: flowers, cereals, grasses, all trees from beech to palm, except conifers, most vegetables). The angiosperms have no ancestors in the fossil record, nor can any intermediate links be traced between them and the conifers or gymnosperms, which they largely replaced. Darwin wrote in an 1881 letter to Hooker: ‘Nothing is more extraordinary in the history of the Vegetable Kingdom, as it seems to me, than the apparently very sudden or abrupt development of the higher plants.’
Another type of difficulty has to do with the assertion that sophisticated physiological organs have occurred gradually over time. Darwin himself was also fully aware of this problem, writing to Asa Gray in 1861: ‘The eye to this day gives me a cold shudder.’ (Quoted in Denton, Evolution, 326) It is precisely these difficulties that have been raised within paleontology and biology especially since the early 1970s.
What we’re saying here does not disparage Darwin’s tremendous capacity for detailed observation, his lifetime of collecting specimens, experimentation with plants, and small animals, and so on. And, as Lonergan noted, in fact Darwin’s notion of chance variation can be seen as an instance of what we called the principle of material emergence.
Still, there are a number of basic biological difficulties with the theory at the level of empirical data. Thomas Huxley pointed out one of the main problems to Darwin. Darwin had written (quoted in Johnson, Darwin on Trial, 33):
‘[S]o will natural selection, if it be a true principle, banish the belief of the continued creation of new organic beings, or of any great and sudden modification in their structure.’
Huxley warned Darwin that, ‘You have loaded yourself with an unnecessary difficulty in adopting natura non facit saltum [nature does not make jumps] so unreservedly.’ (Johnson, 33)
Darwin should have differentiated philosophical questions involving efficient causality (or extrinsic causation) from the kind of interrelational explanation (or intrinsic causation) proper to the natural sciences. If he had done so, what seems most original in his theory, its magnificent attempt to deal at the level of an explanatory biology with the unity and diversity of all living reality, would not have run into so many problems.
DARWIN COULD EXPLAIN ‘MICRO-EVOLUTION’ BUT NOT ‘MACRO-EVOLUTION’
As a fairly typical example of dissent from within biology itself, Denton quotes Steven Stanley’s Macroevolution:
The known fossil record fails to document a single example of phyletic (gradual) evolution accomplishing a major morphological transition and hence offers no evidence that the gradualistic model can be valid. (Quoted in Denton, 164)
And Darwinian evolutionist Stephen Gould berates what he calls ‘the false iconography of the march of progress.’ (Gould, Wonderful Life, 31) He criticizes not only what he calls ‘the great warhorse of tradition’—the familiar illustration of the various stages in the evolution of the horse—as quite fallacious, but the even more widespread iconography of human evolution, from monkey through apes through hominids to man. (Gould, Wonderful Life, 37; 27–36)
While few paleontologists would say that there are no examples in the fossil record of gradual sequences that could be used as evidence for Darwinism, nonetheless, within the Darwinian fold itself, the general lack of fossil evidence has been pointed out rather bluntly, for example, by Niles Eldredge, in his Reinventing Darwin: The Great Evolutionary Debate, 3; 94–95:
[I]n the 1960s...I tried to document examples of the kind of slow, steady, directional change we all thought ought to be there, ever since Darwin told us that natural selection should leave precisely such a telltale signal as we collect our fossils up cliff faces. I found instead that once species appear in the fossil record, they tend not to change very much at all. Species remain imperturbably...resistant to change as a matter of course—often for millions of years...species are fundamentally stable entities—a phenomenon that Stephen Jay Gould and I dubbed ‘stasis’ in our 1972 paper elaborating the evolutionary notion of ‘punctuated equilibria.’
[N]ew species...tend to show up abruptly in the fossil record as the overwhelming rule...No wonder paleontologists shied away from evolution for so long. It seems never to happen...When we do see the introduction of evolutionary novelty, it usually shows up with a bang, and often with no firm evidence that the organisms did not evolve elsewhere!
Niles Eldredge’s earlier comment on the behaviour of palaeontologists since the late 1940s is instructive:
We have proffered a collective tacit acceptance of the story of gradual adaptive change, a story that strengthened and became even more entrenched as the [neo-Darwinian] synthesis took hold. We palaeontologists have said that the history of life supports this interpretation, all the while really knowing that it does not. [Time Frames: The Rethinking of Darwinian Evolution and the Theory of Punctuated Equilibria, 144.]
Robert Augros and George Stanciu, who have quoted Eldredge, add that ‘Something is gravely wrong with a theory that forces us to deny or ignore the data of an entire science.’ [The New Biology, 175.]
What I think is an ideological rather than scientific attempt to tailor the data to a scientistic rather than scientific theory can be found in the attempt to prevent questions of existence arising by what we can call the Great Wall of Gradualism.
We’re ruling out here that a sequence where minor modifications of a Darwinian type occur could gradually bring about major ones, which has been characterized as micro-evolution. But it’s helpful to distinguish micro-evolution from macro-evolution—which is what Darwin considered he was explaining:
There is no question that evolution of the Darwinian kind occurs, in the sense that types of living organisms have a certain capacity for variation. This is a process commonly called microevolution, and it accounts for such things as the variant characteristics of plants and animals that have been transported to an isolated island environment. The problem is that there is no evidence for, and very much evidence against, the Darwinian assumption that some similar process of step-by-step gradual change produced the basic body plans of plants and animals in the first place or brought about the existence of complex organs like wings and eyes. (Phillip Johnson, Reason in the Balance,14).
Johnson is referring to changes in finch beaks in the Galapagos Islands described by Peter and Rosemary Grant in The Beak of the Finch: A Story of Evolution in Our Time, 1994, where finch beaks grew about 5% longer after the drought year of 1977, which were better shaped for opening the last tough seeds remaining. Then, after the floods of 1983, the first postflood generation of finches again had smaller beaks, more suited to the many tiny seeds that had become available—so a cycle of beak size, from smaller to larger and back to smaller, due to environmental changes, was observed.
Johnson also comments on the effect of industrial melanism in the peppered moth: H. B. D. Kettlewell observed in 1959 how the moth’s wings changed from light-coloured to dark to provide the species with better camouflage from birds when it found itself in industrially polluted areas: ‘The example does not illustrate moths in the process of changing to something else, or even changing in color. It illustrates an essentially stable population that can vary cyclically to adjust to conditions.’ (Ibid., 73n) (Unfortunately, Kettlewell’s observations, frequently put forward as a convincing argument for evolution in general, including macro-evolution, have been shown to be seriously flawed, if not downright fraudulent: cf. Judith Hooper’s 2002 investigation, Of Moths and Men: Intrigue, Tragedy & the Peppered Moth.)
Later, we can ask ourselves what all the fuss was about, since we’ll be agreeing with another group of molecular biologists from the 1990s on who seem to have indicated how macro-mutations can occur without any gradual processes. It’s just that it seems as if, to prevent questions that a philosopher would see to be questions about existence from being raised at all, Darwin tried with all his might not to allow any ‘chink’ in the armour of gradualism.
ALTERNATIVES TO A GRADUALIST THEORY OF EVOLUTION:
i) Berg-Goldschmidt-Groves
Australian primatologist and evolutionary theorist Colin P. Groves, in his A Theory of Human and Primate Evolution sees ‘neoteny’ as the ‘law’ behind evolution. He quotes Stephen Jay Gould as writing that ‘neoteny’ [the persistence of some infant- or childlike-characteristics in later development] requires that ‘aspects of shape are retarded with respect to the rest of development.’
The vast potential for evolutionary change opened up by heterochrony [that is, development of different parts of an organism at varying speeds] has perhaps not been appreciated by most biologists; in the last analysis, it seems possible to ascribe a major proportion of evolutionary change to changes in rates of development. Extreme dissociation of developmental rates of different organ systems is what the Krassilov Effect is all about. I have no intention of insisting that “heterochrony” is a synonym for “evolution.” But I would like to stress the uninvestigated explanatory potential embodied in the concept. (Groves, 57–8)
Groves: ‘The first of the “complete theories” of evolution developed in modern times was the “nomogenesis” of Berg (Lev S. Berg, Nomogenesis or evolution determined by law, (1922) tr. J. N. Rostovson, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1969]). ‘…Berg’s consideration of the Darwinian model led him to the conclusion that it was incompatible, at least as the major mechanism, with what he knew of the pattern of living organisms and their evolution. His conclusions are as follows (1969, 406–7):
1. Evolution is based not on chance variations but on laws (hence the title “nomogenesis” [genesis or development according to law, Greek nomos])
4. Evolution proceeds not by slow continuous changes but by jumps.
5. Hereditary variations (mutations) are restricted in number and are directional, not numerous and random.
6. Natural selection is primarily an agency of conservation, not of change.
7. New species arise by “mutations” (meaning sharply distinct changes).
8. Much of evolution is the unfolding of pre-existing rudiments, rather than the formation of new characters as such.’ (Groves, 60)
And Michael Denton, in his Nature’s Destiny: How the Laws of Biology reveal Purpose in the Universe (1998) notes that Berg ‘believed that the variation of characters in an evolutionary lineage is confined within certain limits, that it follows a “definite course, like an electric current moving along a wire.”’ Denton continues, quoting examples of nomogenesis given by Berg: ‘[H]e cited the gradual ossification [bone-growth] of the vertebral [spinal] column, a reduction in the number of bones in the skull, and the transformation of a two-chambered heart into a three- and four-chambered organ associated with a corresponding increase in the complexity of the circulatory system.’ (273)
Colin Groves also mentions the work of the German zoologist Richard Goldschmidt, which while much criticized in the 1940s, has been rediscovered as relevant in the light of continual difficulties with Darwinian gradualism:
Goldschmidt could not believe that natural selection, with all its slowness and the slightness of its effects, could produce anything but microevolutionary changes. In particular, he found it difficult to accept that macroevolutionary changes are simply an accumulation of microevolutionary changes as required by the [neo-Darwinian] synthesis [of Darwin’s theory with genetics]. From time to time, he proposed, a major mutation occurs producing a radically different form, which must then be tested against pre-existing forms.
In many respects, the punctuated equilibrium model is a simple resurrection and elaboration of the hopeful monster [=Goldschmidt’s] theory. (Groves, 62)
Groves thinks that, while more is needed for a complete theory of evolution, ‘the accumulating evidence does suggest that some version of the Goldschmidt theory is by now inescapable.’ (Groves, 62)
‘Gould’s interim model [see below on punctuated equilibrium], which is really all that it’s intended to be, is largely descriptive, with little attempt to elucidate mechanisms…it needs to be elaborated by some attempt to explain processes, and certainly it badly needs the concept of directionality. That is why the most satisfactory evolutionary model is, I believe, best described by Berg’s term, nomogenesis.’ (Groves, 62–3)
Simon Conway-Morris, in his 2003 Life’s Solution: Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe, quotes Denton & Marshall: ‘underlying all the diversity of life is a finite set of natural forms that will recur over and over again anywhere in the cosmos where there is carbon-based life.’ (11). And Denton, Marshall and Legge in their essay on ‘The Protein Folds as Platonic Forms: New Support for the Pre-Darwinian Conception of Evolution by Natural Law,’ (2002) suggest that ‘natural law may have played a far greater role in the origin and evolution of life than is currently assumed.’ (325) This is on the basis of the extremely limited number of protein folds (‘the basic building blocks of proteins and therefore of the cell…’ (330)
Again and again they question the priority of function over form in modern evolutionary thinking. They refer to Aristotle’s Parts of Animals, ‘in the famous analogy, where he envisages the pre-existing plan [or form] of a house acting as an “attractor” molding the material constituents, the bricks and stones, during the building of the house into conformity with its pre-existing plan: “Now the order of things in the process of formation is the reverse of their real and essential order…bricks and stone come chronologically before the house…but logically the real essence and the Form of the thing [the pre-existing plan of the house or the pre-existing Form of the protein fold] comes first.”’ (333)
Further, Conway-Morris notes how biologists’ use of ‘surprising,’ ‘amazing,’ etc. regarding convergences between different organisms—means they ‘sense the ghost of teleology looking over their shoulders.’ For example, mosquito hearing by amplification is amazingly equivalent to vertebrates, 191, with a deeper auditory similarity called transduction [conversion of a mechanical force, for example, sound, into electrical signals, in quite different phyla [major animal groups], insects and vertebrates, 193.
He discusses ant and bee capacities, quoting an author on army ant colonies where we see ‘the emergence of flexible problem-solving far exceeding the capacity of the individual’ and presupposing effective communication, so that ‘intelligence, natural or artificial, is an emergent property of collective communication…This is exactly what happens when army ants pass information from individual to individual through the “writing” and “reading” of symbols, often in the form of chemical messengers or trail pheromones, which act as stimuIi for changing behavior patterns.’ 203
Again, Conway-Morris notes (403nn43–44) the convergent evolutionary emergence of eusocial [that is, in favour of the whole society] behavior in different types of insects, ants, wasps, stingless and other bees, and sees it as expression of inevitable constraints [including climate change] on the evolution process. He also notes how hummingbirds, songbirds and parrots have evolved different solutions to the same problem of vocal learning.
Conway-Morris makes an important concession on ‘inevitable’: ‘…evolution is labile, it does show reversals, but the point still remains that the emergence of various biological properties is in response to adaptation and is governed by selection…Convergence simply tells us that the evolution of various biological properties is certainly highly probable, and in many cases highly predictable.’ LS, 223.
ii) Eldredge-Gould: Punctuated Equilibrium
While it’s not possible here to go into the dramatic shift from non-perceptual life to life which is perceptually organized, it’s no secret that the gaps in the fossil record Darwin presumed would soon be filled have remained. As a result, Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould in 1972 proposed what they saw was an important modification to gradualist Darwinian evolution, in their ground-breaking article, ‘Punctuated Equilibria: An alternative to Phyletic Gradualism.’ [Reprinted in Niles Eldredge, Time Frames: The Rethinking of Darwinian Evolution and the Theory of Punctuated Equilibria, 193–223]
Succinctly, Eldredge explains:
[I]f evolutionary change doesn’t simply accumulate over the course of time, the question becomes, When and under what conditions does evolutionary change occur?...new species...tend to show up abruptly in the fossil record as the overwhelming rule...Punctuated equilibria is a combination of empirical pattern (stasis interrupted by brief bursts of evolutionary change) coupled with preexisting biological theory. [Reinventing Darwin: The Great Evolutionary Debate, 94, 104.]
The supporters of classical Darwinism, represented most vocally by Richard Dawkins in England and Daniel Dennett in America, regarded punctuated equilibrium as less a revision than a heretical betrayal of Darwin. Eldredge and Gould were subjected to vitriolic attack, even though Dawkins was quite aware that they wished to be regarded as Darwinian biologists.
Simon Conway Morris’s approach in Life’s Solution is not too far from Lonergan’s—who understands biological and zoological species as successful answers to certain questions of survival in a given habitat. Conway Morris too sees evolutionary changes as varying solutions to the problem of living in a given environment. Writing, for example, of different plant ‘solutions’ to surviving in different desert environments, he notes that: ‘there may be more than one adaptive solution to a problem’ 365n138. He provides interesting data on cross-phyletic mechanisms—where vertebrates, insects and mollusks (slugs, 390n215)—have the same odor mechanisms (389n208). For Conway Morris, these have evolved separately, since the organisms preceding them lack these mechanisms. They also have the same underlying molecular background. In addition, he writes about the similar molecular pathways underlying both visual and smell mechanisms (indicating what a philosopher would see as a shared material basis for Aristotle’s (180–81), the common or organizing perceptual integration of the various sensory systems in animals. Conway Morris also notes the same capacity for echo-location in bats, dolphins and some birds, 181–82.
DESPITE THESE PERSPECTIVES ON THE COSMOLOGICAL-BIOLOGICAL WHOLE, THERE REMAIN QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF LIFE
Conway Morris, in Life’s Solution, observes that ‘how inanimate became animate has proved stubbornly recalcitrant’ (xiv); still, in a very short time—maybe as little as 200m yrs, what could be the best possible genetic code emerges on earth. He is immensely sceptical regarding hypotheses about the origin of life. At the same time, and perhaps this is a contradiction, Conway Morris is convinced that life must have begun through a step-like process, (53), although he rejects Graham Cairns-Smith’s hypothesis on clay as the origin of life as without the reality check of experimentation. (342n33) It’s beyond my competence to pronounce on this matter, still, some biologists come close to denying any gradual emergence of life from non-living material. For example, in 1953, the same year as Stanley Miller and Harold Urey tried to produce life experimentally, James Watson’s and Francis Crick’s discovery of the role of the DNA molecule in all living things indicated an extraordinary complexity in living cells, making a chance emergence of living organisms from chemicals appear less likely. Nobel prizewinning biologist Jacques Monod remarked that:
the simplest cells available to us for study have nothing ‘primitive’ about them....the major problem is the origin of the genetic code and of its transitional mechanism. Indeed it is not so much a ‘problem’ as a veritable enigma. The code is meaningless unless translated. The modern cell’s translating machinery consists of at least fifty macro-molecular components which are themselves coded in DNA: the code cannot be translated except by products of translation. It is the modern expression of omne vivum ex ovo [all that’s living comes from an egg]. When and how did this circle become closed? It is exceedlingly difficult to imagine. [Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Modern Biology, 134f.] [Author’s emphasis].
And Francis Crick, co-discoverer of the structure of DNA noted that:
An honest man, armed with all the knowledge available to us now, could only state that in some sense, the origin of life appears at the moment to be almost a miracle, so many are the conditions which would have had to have been satisfied to get it going. [Quoted in: Michael Denton, Evolution: A Theory in Crisis, 268.]
Conway Morris in Life’s Solution, reflects that despite fact that most [scientists] presume there’s ‘unbroken continuity’ between prebiotic ‘soup, clay, clouds…’ and the origin of life, such a hypothesis presumes there’d be aeons of time for life to emerge—but ‘there probably were not.’ He goes on in chapter 5 to suggest that life’s emergence is very rare, or maybe unique to our Solar System.
Daniel Dennett quotes Stephen Gould somewhat dismissively for recognizing the intrinsic limitations of biology (even if those limitations can hardly be overcome by passing them on to chemistry):
Evolution, in fact, is not the study of origins at all. Even the more restricted (and scientifically permissible) question of life’s origin on our earth lies outside its domain. (This interesting problem, I suspect, falls primarily within the purview of chemistry and the physics of self-organizing systems.) Evolution studies the pathways and mechanisms of organic change following the origin of life. (in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 310)
Few biologists, in fact, are more aware of the contingency of their subject-matter than Gould—the final chapter of Wonderful Life is a reflection on the contingency of the biological world. Yet he does not seem inclined to move beyond contingency. But contingent existence is existence by definition requiring an existing, non-contingent ground. And while the heat in Dennett’s attack on Gould’s ‘punctuated equilibrium’ revision conveys something of the inquisitor’s fire, as if Gould had been guilty of lèse majesté for daring to criticize Darwin’s theory at all, what’s even more striking is that neither Dennett nor Gould seem to advert to the philosophical question of existence as such. (Ibid., 282–312. Gould’s own riposte to what he calls the ‘fundamentalism’ of Dawkins and Dennett is to be found in his essays, ‘Darwinian Fundamentalism’ (New York Review of Books, June 12, 34–37; ‘Evolution: Pleasures of Pluralism’ (NYRB, June 26, 47–52.)
Since Gould has been fiercely attacked by those he would be driven to call ‘Darwinian Fundamentalists,’ the reason why a gradualist as opposed to a saltatory approach to evolution was adopted, is perhaps, as Thomas Nagel seems to think, due to a ressentiment not only towards a first cause, but towards philosophy. Such a ressentiment ill serves biology as a natural science:
My guess is that this cosmic authority problem is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism of our time. One of the tendencies it supports is the ludicrous overuse of evolutionary biology to explain everything about life, including everything about the human mind. Darwin enabled modern secular culture to heave a collective sigh of relief, by apparently providing a way to eliminate purpose, meaning and design as fundamental features of the world. Instead they became epiphenomena, generated incidentally by a process that can be entirely explained by the operation of nonteleological laws of physics on the material of which we and our environments are all composed. There might still be thought to be a religious threat in the existence of the laws of physics themselves, and indeed the existence of anything at all—but it seems to be less alarming to most atheists. [The Last Word (1997), 131]
Voegelin too, in his Hitler and the Germans lectures (1999), 144f., commented on the non-observational core of Darwin’s evolutionary theory. Voegelin’s reference, from the viewpoint of the natural sciences, to the givenness of ‘the epiphany of structures in reality’ accompanied by a pneumopathological fear of the underlying mystery, may be one of the factors making any debate on biological or zoological emergence such a heated one in our culture.
However, as we’ll see, Neal C. Gillespie in his Charles Darwin and the Problem of Creation amply discusses the anti-intellectualism Darwin had to deal with in certain religious circles, along with his own internal religious struggle—a struggle perhaps more cultural than religious in fact. The whole issue of closure to scientific inquiry by a school of apologists in the name of a literalizing reading of Scripture makes one sympathetic to writers like Dennett’s and Dawkins’ exasperated desire to fend them off, however polemically..
iii) Evolutionary-Developmental (‘evo-devo’) Theory
The more recent breakthrough in the early ’90s, called ‘evolutionary-developmental’ or ‘evo-devo,’ seems in many ways to correspond at the molecular level to Eldredge and Gould’s punctuated equilibrium hypothesis, which in turn is supplemented by Berg and Groves’ insight into nomogenesis as underlying the macro-evolutionary shifts Eldredge and Gould were trying to deal with. Gould’s last great work, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002) is a massive attempt to marry both his revisionary Darwinism with evo-devo.
The basic discovery, made in the early 1990s, was that the sudden emergence of the 35 phyla or major zoological groups (chordates, crustaceans, mollusks, etc.), around 550m years ago showed a common deep genetic structure. Each phylum had the same genetic instructions for its top/bottom axis, front/back polarity, head, and sensory organs. To get some of the flavor of what evo-devo involves, I’ll quote from Raff’s The Shape of Life:
Higher taxonomic groups, most notably phyla, possess suites of anatomical features that distinguish them from other groups. Such an underlying anatomical arrangement is called a body plan…no new phyla appear to have originated since the Cambrian….(xiv)
Wallace Arthur in his The Origin of Animal Body Plans: A Study in Evolutionary Developmental Biology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 81], gives his opinion that:
there was no multicellular animal life prior to 600 my ago; there was an explosion of body plans in Ediacaran times, with many becoming extinct, and a second body-plan explosion in the early Cambrian; evolution in Vendian and Cambrian times was much more ‘experimental’ than it is now; and internal factors such as developmental constraint (or early lack of it) are important in evolution as well as considerations about niche space and external adaptation.
So it’s no surprise that Sean Carroll discusses this Cambrian event—in one of its most famous expressions, the Burgess Shale in Alberta, of 510m years ago (along with the related Ediacaran in South Australia [545m years ago] and the recently discovered Chengjian fauna in China [520 m years ago]) in chapter 6 of his Endless Forms Most Beautiful: The New Science of Evo Devo and the Making of the Animal Kingdom (New York: Norton, 2005)—as ‘The Big Bang of Animal Evolution.’ He asks, ‘What ignited the Explosion? Why did large and complex animals first appear at this time? Why did these particular forms succeed?’ (138)
What’s amazing are the jellyfish, or cnidarians, belonging to a 36th phylum which may have originated with the first Ediacaran fauna originating 50m years earlier without the two-sided body-plans of the other 35 phyla: although they lack a brain, they still seem to have the same genetic plan for eyes that they share with the other phyla.
The most primitive animals with eyes are the cnidarians. Some have simple eyes lacking lenses, but other medusae [type of jellyfish] have well-developed eyes on the edges of their bells. The Cubomedusae (box jellies), whose highly toxic stings are such a notorious threat to swimmers on Australia’s north coast, have up to 24 eyes that are linked to the nerve net and enable them to orient accurately in light. These eyes are complex, with an epidermal cornea, a spherical lens, a multilayered retina, and a region of nerve fibers. There are about 1,000 sensory cells in each eye. As [these jellyfish] are the deepest [=earliest] branch of the metazoan tree, the complexity of their eyes is surprising. If cnidarians were indeed part of the Ediacaran fauna, it suggests that eyes long predate the Cambrian radiation of bilaterian animals. [Rudolf A. Raff, The Shape of Life: Genes, Development, and the Evolution of Animal Form (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 376–77.
This early origin of eyes, or at least organs sensitive to light are mentioned by Simon Conway Morris, in Life’s Solution, 165f. He writes of eukaryotic visual sensation: ‘Despite the absence of a nervous system,’ its eye-spot is ‘strikingly convergent on the animal eye.’ So he argues for evolutionary co-option and redeployment of these pre-existing capacities rather than a sudden emergence of the eye. He points out that even bacteria have eye-spots, though this doesn’t mean sight, along with later protistan [mobile eukaryotic cells] eye spots. (171f; cf 381–82nn101–111) The time for the evolution from eye-spot to eye, would then be less than 1m yrs. (387n182)
Raff notes that:
‘If externally applied natural selection is the only force required to produce evolutionary change, then developmental processes don’t matter except as features upon which selection can act. If internal organization and processes govern modes of change, then development must be incorporated into any complete theory of evolution.’ (xviii) [We can suggest a melding of both approaches, with ‘external’ including the properly zoological in interaction with environment.]
‘The major concern of this book is to establish the connection between the developmental processes that produce body structure in each generation and the evolutionary processes that produce new anatomical features and novel animal body shapes.’
‘Because metazoans [earliest living multicellular animals] are monophyletic [belonging to a single phylum, or major group of animals], all animal body plans arose as a result of transformations of a single ancestral body plan. Further, because all bilaterian [= two-sided] animals share a common ancestor, they arose from a common bilaterian body plan. The interesting question then becomes whether there is a set of genetic rules that bilaterian animals share. If there is, the diverse body plans of bilaterian phyla have been built upon shared developmental genetic themes, which might constitute a conserved genetic body plan. Slack and co-workers have called this hypothetical Hox gene-centered genetic body plan for most animal phyla the “zootype”…. [Wallace Arthur has an important correction to this statement, in his The Origin of Animal Body Plans: ‘…neither the “zootype” of Slack et al. (1993) nor any other pattern of gene activity represents a body plan; rather such patterns may form part of the explanation of body plans.’ (28)]
‘The central problem for evolutionary biologists interested in development has been how morphology is transformed in evolution.’ (23) He writes that in 1933, Joseph Needham ‘suggested the idea of dissociability of elements of developmental machinery. He pointed out that it is possible experimentally to separate differentiation from growth or cell division, biochemical differentiation from morphogenesis, and some aspects of morphogenesis from one another. The implication of this idea is enormous: developmental processes could be dissociated in evolution to produce novel ontogenies out of existing processes, as long as an integrated developmental program and organismal function could be maintained.’ (23) [This seems close to what Lonergan has to say on the non-systematic that calls forth correspondence, and we’ve already mentioned heterochrony as a possible agent in evolution] Raff speaks of ‘heterochrony’ as ‘an evolutionary dissociation in timing.’ (24) But Raff warns against it becoming the dominant explanation at developmental level for evolutionary changes in morphology. (24)
‘Because we now have the ability to clone regulatory genes, purely developmental questions have quickly become issues in evolutionary biology as well. The most prominent of the gene domains that has been studied…is the homeobox. This is a sequence that encodes a 60-amino-acid-long protein domain rich in basic amino acids that has been shown…to fold into a helix-turn-helix structure that binds DNA in a highly specific manner. The homeobox was discovered…in homeotic genes of Drosophila. Homeoboxes are highly conserved in evolution and…were very quickly found…to be present in other phyla as well. The surprise was that although homeoboxes are associated with genes that control external body segmentation in Drosophila, they are also present in nonsegmented phyla such as echinoderms and nematodes, as well as in the vertebrates, which exhibit some internal segmental features. In all organisms in which they have been studied, homeobox-containing genes homologous to those of the homeotic genes of Drosophila function in some aspect of developmental specification of aspects of the body axis.’ (26)
‘The phylogenetic distribution of homeobox-containing genes indicates a pattern of gene duplication and divergence as well as profound conservation. It is also clear that the roles homeobox-containing genes play in development have undergone significant modification. Homeobox-containing genes in vertebrates establish axial polarity in the central nervous system, but do not set up epidermal segmental patterns as in insects. Additional roles can be shown for them in aspects of vertebrate development and co-option for new functions, such as in neural crest cell patterning…Other regulatory gene families, such as the steroid receptor family…show analogous patterns of evolutionary expansion and co-option to provide genetic raw material for regulatory innovations in the evolution of development. It has happened again and again in evolution within numerous families of regulators. [emergent probability]
The revelation of wide-ranging conservation and co-option of regulatory genes is a new and crucial one for two reasons. First, it presents us with the linkage between an evolutionary continuity of gene structure and the changing function of those genes in the evolution of development. Second, the underlying genomic similarity in the development of highly disparate animals reveals one of the things that makes the evolution of complex forms possible at all.
If each new species required the reinvention of control elements, there would not be time enough for much evolution at all, let alone the spectacularly rapid evolution of novel features observed in the phylogenetic record. There is a kind of tinkering at work, in which the same regulatory elements are recombined into new developmental machines. Dissociability of processes requires the dissociability of molecular components and their reassembly.’ (27)
‘In contemplating the rapid radiation of animal body plans during the Cambrian and their subsequent stability, both Gould and Jacobs have suggested that a form of internal genetic constraint may act as a brake on body plan evolution. They argue that an originally flexible developmental regulatory system allowed experimentation with very basic patterns of development. Once patterns were established, genetic regulatory system became rigidly fixed. After that, a powerful genetic constraint limited evolution to changes within existing body plans.’ (309
#12
Posted 08 October 2006 - 04:00 AM
There's no waaaaaaay I'm reading all that.
I'd rather read something easy like:
God created everything.
There, now, can't we all agree?
I'd rather read something easy like:
God created everything.
There, now, can't we all agree?
You’ve never heard of the Silanda? … It’s the ship that made the Warren of Telas run in less than 12 parsecs.
#13
Posted 08 October 2006 - 09:05 AM
Listening to this debate was painfull. Has anyone ever seen evolution. No. Duh. It must be wrong. Has anyone ever seen God no duh. Their cant be creation.
The arguments he uses to support creation are the very things he opposes when they support the evolution theory.
The arguments he uses to support creation are the very things he opposes when they support the evolution theory.
#14
Posted 08 October 2006 - 03:58 PM
Cause;122722 said:
Listening to this debate was painfull. Has anyone ever seen evolution. No. Duh. It must be wrong. Has anyone ever seen God no duh. Their cant be creation.
There was a guy in my old lab doing some interesting research using bacteria and viruses that attack bacteria. They'd evolve together over a matter of days in a tube in an arms race of infectivity and resistance. But you could halt the evolution by taking the bacteria or virus and sticking it in the freezer. Then you could mix past and future populations and see what happened. So you can see evolution! Which proves creationists are wrong. So ner to them.
Burn rubber =/= warp speed
#15
Posted 08 October 2006 - 06:09 PM
yes for some reason they ignore the bacteria virus thing complety. I guess cause we have not turned a bacteria into a bunny. They make some horrendous claims.
Also no one has ever seen an atom. No one has ever shown the elctrons binding to nucleases forming atoms. Yet the proof of the theories is what we can do with them
Also no one has ever seen an atom. No one has ever shown the elctrons binding to nucleases forming atoms. Yet the proof of the theories is what we can do with them
#16
Posted 08 October 2006 - 10:17 PM
Cause;122853 said:
Also no one has ever seen an atom.
Um, yes they have. People image atoms all the time.
#17
Posted 08 October 2006 - 11:10 PM
What do you mean. Its not possible to see that an atom is a proton nuetron core with electrons surrounding it. But I think the proofs pretty solid anyway. Besides they seem to have issues with scientific equipment so I wonder if they even trust electron microscopes.
#18
Posted 09 October 2006 - 01:12 AM
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TNZCcTcOPV0...related&search=
now watch this...hahahah
this guy's a con artist with lots of phony info!
now watch this...hahahah
this guy's a con artist with lots of phony info!
...┌∩┐(◣_◢)┌∩┐...
Why dont they make the whole plane out of that black box stuff?
Why dont they make the whole plane out of that black box stuff?
#19
Posted 09 October 2006 - 04:56 PM
Fool;122541 said:
If you already know, why ask? :confused:
The biggest problem, i think, is that scientists will happily debate the merits of evolution or whatever else the creationists feel like bringing up, instead of focusing on the real issue. That Intelligent Design is not science and should thus not be thaught in science class. As soon as you start talking about evolution you've already lost, because it is way too comprehensive a theory to have no holes whatsoever, and as long as there are holes there will always be room for the creationists to cast doubt on it.
But scientists, they like explaining things, so when some creationists spouts gibberish they enjoy setting them straight, while the audience falls asleep. When what they should really be saying is: "A scientific theory needs to have these qualities, ID does not have these qualities, thus it's not a scientific theory and has no place in science class."
The biggest problem, i think, is that scientists will happily debate the merits of evolution or whatever else the creationists feel like bringing up, instead of focusing on the real issue. That Intelligent Design is not science and should thus not be thaught in science class. As soon as you start talking about evolution you've already lost, because it is way too comprehensive a theory to have no holes whatsoever, and as long as there are holes there will always be room for the creationists to cast doubt on it.
But scientists, they like explaining things, so when some creationists spouts gibberish they enjoy setting them straight, while the audience falls asleep. When what they should really be saying is: "A scientific theory needs to have these qualities, ID does not have these qualities, thus it's not a scientific theory and has no place in science class."
I felt like asking a rethorical question
Yeah, scientists get embroiled in the actual science of the debate. Thats their job. What I'm talking about is rather than doing just that, start any scientific retort to creationsim with a direct attack on how the creationists argue first.
Like showing how a magic trick is done. Explaining not why the science is wrong, do that later, first showing how its been sold.
I chose this video because its a perfect example: public speaking sells creationism far more than science, this Hovind joker lashes out things that look like facts, but they may or may not be: hes just layering hype and false perspectives on some pictures to make it look like hes making sense. He touts 'predictions' that are retrospective observations, followed by suitable interpretations of sources that he doesnt question. He uses emotional arguments. For example "You dont understand evolution: youre dumb! You dont want to be dumb do you?" = you need to devote significant time to understanding evolution, and if you havent, you obviously dont understand it. i.e. its not easy, and he offers something that is.
I suppose what I'm saying is that creationism is best engaged as what it is: a set of sophisticated methods of persuation that look scientific superficially, but arent because they dont have the rigorous testing, peer approval and open debate based on all other things that have been learned in pertinent fields. Its something dressed up as logic used to try to convert people to christianity. Nothing more.
I think that its best not taken on by scientists at all: precisely because they take it on as they would other science, and its not science at all: its misdirection and propoganda. Its best handled by psychologists, advertising experts, magicians (yes, magicians, they're public figures that have a good understanding of how deceptions are achieved!), politicians and jounalists. Creationism is in thier repetoire. Too many people have been fooled for too long that this crap is something its not. No contest should have ever made it to court in the states: it shouldve been shot down for what it is long before that.
#20
Posted 09 October 2006 - 05:06 PM
I thought it was worth it soley for entertainment value during the parts where he shows how evolution has caused a moral break down in society.