Morgoth, on 20 May 2019 - 07:55 AM, said:
Grief, on 16 May 2019 - 11:13 PM, said:
Having said that, there's a very fair argument to be made that the EU is severely lacking in the democracy department. It's one of the reasons that I'd consider more legitimate in terms of opposing the EU when it's made in good faith.
In what way is the EU severely lacking in democracy?
The lack a truly European political sphere and weak democratic institutions ultimately culminates in a very low level of public-sphere political contest in a manner very removed from citizens.
1. Lack of a European political sphere
Election participation is persistently low. 2014 saw an EU average of 43% voter turnout, with national turnout dropping as low as 13% (Slovakia).
1 Basic knowledge about the EU is similarly lacking. To quote the Eurobarometer "the number of Member States making up the euro area remains largely unknown". Barely over half of survey respondents correctly identified that MEPs are directly elected by the citizens of each member state.
2
European politics is very low salience for citizens. Even the people who vote tend to do so on
national factors rather than on European personalities or politics. European elections are not defined by European issues,
3 nor does Europe generally have a strong presence in national politics.
4
2. Weakly democratic institutions
The European Parliament is the only directly elected part of the EU's four chief institutions and although it has been gradually gaining ground it nonetheless remains arguably the weakest. While some have argued that this isn't a problem for EU legitimacy because each Member State is democratic
5 - in a similar way that people argue that the UK retained complete sovereignty because at some point down the line it signed the treaties that passed powers to the EU - this is a rather indirect conception of democracy when we consider the everyday functioning of a powerful governance structure. Vital positions such as Commissioners hold very little direct accountability to citizens and opaque trialogue negotiations play a key role in the legislative process. Over the 2009-2014 term, 85% of legislative proposals were simply adopted at first reading
6 and this term looks to have been the same. As of December there has yet to be
any legislation going to third reading or conciliation.
7
3. Lack of political contestation8
The above points both contribute to a lack of democratic contest over EU policy. Rather than being contested in the public sphere, the political process is more a question of internal manoeuvre followed by rubber-stamping. Around three quarters of parliament decisions over the last term were agreed between all of the biggest parties, and only one in ten issues had a margin of less than 50 votes.
9 It is entirely typical for decisions to be adopted with 600+ votes on first-reading because of consensus being reached before the issue even reaches the floor.
10
To sum-up, European politics has little salience for voters and is defined by national rather than European issues, the institutional setup remains indirectly democratic at best, and there's a lack of political competition at the European level. While I've separated these points out they shouldn't be seen in isolation; rather, they feed into one another. How are voters meant to vote (or care to vote) on European issues when the major European parties just vote the same way the vast majority of the time? How is a European political sphere meant to develop when the political actors negotiate behind closed doors rather than contesting the issues in front of the public - and when the (few) recognizable political actors aren't directly accountable to the citizenry anyway?
1DG COMM post-election survey (2014).
2Standard Eurobarometer 88 (2017).
3Hix & Marsh (2007, 2011), Schmitt & Toygur (2016).
4Green-Pedersen (2011), Miklin (2014).
5See Moravcsik (2002) for a prominent example of this line of argument.
6Europarl.
7European Parliament, Facts and Figures for the 2014-2019 term.
8See particularly Follesdal & Hix (2006) which responds to Moravcsik.
9Votewatch.
10See Bowler and McElroy (2015) for analysis using roll-call data.