[Mentalist]

"Tavriya" is the general name for the southern operational theatre, from Kam'yansk'e to the Vremivka Bulge/Vuhledar.

The remarkable thing about the freighters loading/unloading in the Black Sea ports is that (according to Ukrainian sources), they are also picking up iron ore, which is Ukraine's secnd most important export commodity. Meaning Ukraine basically doesn't care about the orc attempts at a "naval blockade" in any way, shape or form.


The thing about the conscripts is tricky. First of all, they can legally serve in any region of the RF. Which, based on their constitutional amendments, includes Donbas and the 2 Oblasts in the South- they may not have internally approved borders, but they are in the Russian Constitution.
Secondly, the way things work is that conscripts aren't supposed to be sent to the frontlines; but if they sign a contract with the MoD on the second day of their basic training, the restrictions no longer apply. And there's good reasons to believe tehy will be strongly incentivized to sign contracts with the MoD from the get-go.

[Mentalist]

The orcs have been reshuffling the 1st GTA and several other units off the Kup'yans'k axis in preparation for their next "masterstroke"- an all-out assault on Avdiyivka- a large satellite city of Donets'k that's been the anchorpoint of the Ukrainian frontline against the city since summer of 2014.

This week they tried a pincer move to complete the encirclement of the city. It went remarkably poorly, as at least 3 armored columns were annhihilated.

Rumors of a patrol ship getting hit in Sevastopol, but very speculative atm.

The grinding push in the S continues, slow paced due to very extensive earthworks and a lot of ATGMs. Also, rains disrupting drones from spotting.

[Werthead]

Putin has proposed that Russia host Armenia-Azerbaijan peace negotiations. However, Armenia and Azerbaijan are already discussing formats for negotiations and both have rejected Russia as an interlocutor. Armenia wants Germany to act as mediator, Azerbaijan wants Turkey and both sides seem to be moving to a possible compromise, which excludes Russia.

Wagner mercenaries have been offered contracts by Hamas to fight in the Gaza Strip. They are "considering" the offer (note: they are not considering the offer).

The new Russian offensive completely stalled out on the southern front of Avdiivka, but made some headway on the western side of the town. The Russians are still trying to force a breakthrough but Telegram reports are gloomy: the operation required them to take the town hard and fast before Ukrainian reinforcements could be committed. Because the reinforcements have already arrived, they now have low expectations.

Meanwhile, Russia's Tatarstan oblast is...planning to colonise the moons of Jupiter.

ETA: Better late than never, but GLSDB ammunition for Ukraine's HIMARS launchers should be in Ukraine within a matter of weeks. This will effectively double Ukraine's HIMARS range.

This post has been edited by Werthead: 14 October 2023 - 10:51 PM

[Mentalist]

The orcs tried to cut Avdiyivka from the N by taking the slag heap from the coking plant that overlooks the railway. They failed.

Their epitaph is as follows:

"Our boys were at the summit at one point. In that glorious moment, the only things above them were the sky, God, and the drone spotting for the Ukrainian artillery"

Polish exit polls show that the anti-Ukrainian far-right party did worse than expected, which may lead to PiS not being able to keep their coalition. How you feeling about this, Gothos?

Arestovych is now starting to criticize Zelesky and co, stating the war is a stalemate that will not be won, and the government needs to start being realistic with the population. He is gearing up for an electoral run, which worries me. He is good at psychology and i wouldn't underestimate his chances. He is also an ambitious narcissist, and I do not trust his motivations. But he may have enough enfluence to cause some real discord. And I still don't really think trying to run elections next spring in a war situation is a particularly good idea.

[Mentalist]

It appears cluster ATACMS have arrived.

All eyes on sat pics of Berdyans'k airbase, as the Z-heads are mourning "possibly the most significant equipment loss since the war* started". That's where they parked those ka-52s that were the biggest threat to our southern push by mech forces

Juicy news.





*technically for using the word "war" the Z-heads are supposed to be arrested for violating Criminal Code article "Discrediting Russian Armed Forces or knowingly disseminating false information regarding the activity of Russian Armed Forces" *

[Werthead]

Some large Ukrainian drone formations buzzing Russian rear positions along the Sea of Azov, triggering air defences. In some areas apparently the Russians did not fire as they did not want to give away the position of AA systems to ATACMS. They now know the entire shoreline is in Ukrainian missile range.

Whilst that was going on, Ukrainian marines probed the south bank of the Dnipro in a second position near Kherson. The Russians believe they are planning a large-scale assault in the near future to establish a permanent bridgehead on the south bank, then bring up German and French-made pontoon bridges and try to invade the southern front from the west. They are iffy on if Russian defences can hold them, as some strength was transferred east to the Tokmak front and the Donetsk offensive.

Ukraine has been threatening a cross-Dnipro offensive for months and the logistics always seemed too challenging, so unclear if this is psyops or a real threat. Their failure to break through the lines spectacularly further east (despite significantly reducing Russian military equipment and eliminating large infantry formations) may make an assault in this sector more attractive.

[Macros]

Reports saying they have a bridgehead?

[Mentalist]

Macros, on 19 October 2023 - 09:44 AM, said:

Reports saying they have a bridgehead?

Raids up to about 4-6 km deep from the river bank.

They've had control over the river bank for about a month now, but the delta is swampy, and there's smaller rivers flowing parallel to the main river bed- the Konka is a small river about 2 km inland that winds and serves as basically a moat. Previously, UAF was contained behind it, but now it seems they were able to cross it, and reach the coastal road.

All this info comes from the orcs whining about it, though. UAF's been keeping quiet. The orc reports about UAF taking and holding settlements seems far-fetched, though.

In other news, Romania and Bulgaria are trawling their coastal waters for mines, to keep the new grain corridor that Ukraine created unilaterally, safe from mines. More grain ships are on their way to Odessa harbors.

This post has been edited by Mentalist: 19 October 2023 - 02:26 PM

[Werthead]

Macros, on 19 October 2023 - 09:44 AM, said:

Reports saying they have a bridgehead?

It's an interesting situation. Ukraine has been raiding this area for months, alarming the Russians, but then they calmed down and they seemed to dismiss the idea of any offensive here as a sideshow, a distraction and a feint. However, the area now presents various opportunities to Ukraine others do not: it can put Ukrainian forces very close to Crimea, it can shut off the land bridge, and, due to defences in the area being denuded to reinforce other areas, it's not as heavily defended as other areas. It also appears that Russia may have been over-relying on the river as a defensive bulwark and the heavy mining and defensive lines we've seen elsewhere are not present in this area, at least not on the same scale as between Robotyne and Tokmak. There's also some suggestion that defensive works that were completed in the area were destroyed when the river flooded. This area may be a significant weak spot in the Russian lines (Ukraine will, of course, have thoroughly investigated the idea of it being a trap).

Ukraine is also aware that it has not produced the same kind of "spectacular victory" in 2023 that they did east of Kharkiv in the autumn of 2022, which may start to eat away at their support, especially if they fear a risk of having to compete with Israel for US support and attention. Therefore risking a lot more than they might have been prepared six months ago to achieve a "spectacular" might now be a more pressing concern, even if the conventional military wisdom is that it's a bit of a stretch.

Factoring into this is the onset of winter, and the perceived need to establish as much ground as possible to dig in against a possible Russian counter-attack in the spring (Ukraine has also noted that its current tactic of small, mobile forces backed up by artillery and tanks in a medium-range fire support role is much less dependent on good weather than its prior, more conventional tactics).

[Mentalist]

Werthead, on 19 October 2023 - 09:37 PM, said:

Macros, on 19 October 2023 - 09:44 AM, said:

Reports saying they have a bridgehead?

It's an interesting situation. Ukraine has been raiding this area for months, alarming the Russians, but then they calmed down and they seemed to dismiss the idea of any offensive here as a sideshow, a distraction and a feint. However, the area now presents various opportunities to Ukraine others do not: it can put Ukrainian forces very close to Crimea, it can shut off the land bridge, and, due to defences in the area being denuded to reinforce other areas, it's not as heavily defended as other areas. It also appears that Russia may have been over-relying on the river as a defensive bulwark and the heavy mining and defensive lines we've seen elsewhere are not present in this area, at least not on the same scale as between Robotyne and Tokmak. There's also some suggestion that defensive works that were completed in the area were destroyed when the river flooded. This area may be a significant weak spot in the Russian lines (Ukraine will, of course, have thoroughly investigated the idea of it being a trap).

Ukraine is also aware that it has not produced the same kind of "spectacular victory" in 2023 that they did east of Kharkiv in the autumn of 2022, which may start to eat away at their support, especially if they fear a risk of having to compete with Israel for US support and attention. Therefore risking a lot more than they might have been prepared six months ago to achieve a "spectacular" might now be a more pressing concern, even if the conventional military wisdom is that it's a bit of a stretch.

Factoring into this is the onset of winter, and the perceived need to establish as much ground as possible to dig in against a possible Russian counter-attack in the spring (Ukraine has also noted that its current tactic of small, mobile forces backed up by artillery and tanks in a medium-range fire support role is much less dependent on good weather than its prior, more conventional tactics).

UAF also caught a few senior recon officers on their raids recently, so they have a very good idea of what the defences in the sector are like.

The elephant in the room is obviously the difficulties with bringing heavy armor across the river. Though I've seen some cryptic hints that this is also being taken care of. Artillery can currently stay safely on the R bank, since they have the entire shoreside covered.

OSINTERs are doing the math on the satellite pics, and coming up with TWENTY-ONE helicopters that were either destroyed or damaged in the initial ATACMS strike.

If we can get 3-4 more juicy strikes like this, tehy can kiss their air superiority good-bye.

This post has been edited by Mentalist: 20 October 2023 - 12:36 AM

[Cause]

Hard to believe this war is still going. Can you guys tell me what the current thinking is on how this could end? Will Russia be exhausted and have to stop. Will Ukraine now that American support is becoming shoddier.

Looked like Putin was having serious political issues a while back but he seems to have weathered the worst of it and survived.

[Werthead]

39 Russian vehicles lost in a renewed attack on Avdiivka. One Russian milblogger says that by his estimate Russia has already expended more lives, more vehicles and more munitions in two weeks on that front than the Ukrainians have for their entire summer offensive, for much smaller gains.

Cause, on 20 October 2023 - 04:13 PM, said:

Hard to believe this war is still going. Can you guys tell me what the current thinking is on how this could end? Will Russia be exhausted and have to stop. Will Ukraine now that American support is becoming shoddier.

Looked like Putin was having serious political issues a while back but he seems to have weathered the worst of it and survived.

Putin did a walkabout thing yesterday and as security precautions, every single manhole cover his car travelled over was welded shut and had explosive-supressant foam sprayed over it, the whole route was covered with snipers, nearby garages were welded shut and all attendees were thoroughly searched before being allowed anywhere near Putin. I think it's fair to say a degree of paranoia over his personal safety remains intact.

As for the overall course of the conflict, it's debatable. Russia achieved limited successes during the early invasion and its secondary summer 2022 offensive. It lost 50% of that territory in Ukrainian counter-attacks. It then expended tens of thousands of lives to take one (1) town, Bakhmut in early 2023, only for the military unit that accomplished that task to rebel and go on a death drive to Moscow. As soon as that unit withdrew, Ukraine moved back in and retook much of the countryside surrounding the town and now have it partially besieged again. Two significant Russian counter-attacks in the north and south were also beaten off. Russia has also had to withdraw its navy from near the Ukrainian coast due to steadily increasing anti-naval power (despite Ukraine's navy being sunk or neutralised in the opening days of the war), and its aircraft still cannot operate over the front without fear of losses (five aircraft were lost last week alone when commanders tried to use them to break through at Avdiivka).

However, Ukraine has achieved relatively modest gains in its own summer and autumn counter-offensive, due to very heavy Russian defences. They achieved more than what the Russians expected - they got through the initial massive minefields and reached several key towns, including Robotyne - but not as much as they wanted, which was at least a breakthrough to Tokmak, if not an advance towards Berdyansk on the coast. This renewed river offensive in the west might represent their last chance this year to achieve a strategic breakthrough. If they don't, that's not disastrous, but it's not optimal.

Entering 2024, Russia has a Presidential election which is a formality, but Putin will want to use fear of Ukraine and NATO to shore up victory, probably followed by a renewed summer offensive. His medium-to-long term plan is likely to try to freeze the front line until Ukraine's backing collapses and Ukraine has to sue for peace, or possibly Trump wins the next election and negotiates a ceasefire advantageous to Russia. Maybe longer in term, Putin may be considering the advantages Russia can gain from China invading Taiwan, or the breakout of a larger Middle-Eastern conflict where American boots are on the ground and the eye is taken off Ukraine.

Ideally, Ukraine will breakthrough to the coast, either via the Tokmak or Kherson directions, and retake Bakhmut and put Russia on the back foot, and make much of the front Russia is currently holding nonviable. Then, once Crimea is under firm fire control, they can negotiate a peace from a position of strength or equality.

Russia is certainly far more politically brittle than thought, and Russia's allies seem incredibly unhappy with it (Armenia most vocally, but Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are not in love with Russia's current activities either), and China is basically treating Russia the same way Russia treats Belarus. The ducks are lined up for massive internal problems in the Russian Federation, but it's also pretty likely that nobody wants to be the first to stick their neck out. Relying on Russian political collapse is very optimistic.

More likely both Russia and Ukraine will agree to a ceasefire to rearm and regroup, if not next year then in 2025, if neither side establishes a breakthrough.

[Mentalist]

Ukraine is not going to agree to an unfavourable ceasefire w/o a major defeat. Sunk cost fallacy and all, and Zelensky and co know they will become the target of domestic frustration and will be finished politically if they do not deliver a "victory"- which in the context would be at least 2022 borders.

Putler can sell anything as a "victory", but he's also driven by his own messianic sense of destiny, and feels he has the population to spare.

The West can cut off weapon supply to Ukraine to force it to not attack; but at this point I do not see the popular sentiment that would endorse a cease-fire. Because ceasefire would be tantamount to abandoning the people in the occupied parts of the South, as well as northern Luhans'k Oblast'. So it's unclear what the most likely outcome would be.

[Chance]

From following the war fairly closely since its begining I'd say the war won't end, there may be ceasefires and even peace accords but they will not last. Not while the Russian goverment has the attitudes it currently does and that extends far further than the insane Czar and well into the entire current political class. Ukraine will have to be on guard towards its larger neighbour for at least a few generations and will probably fight more wars with Russia if I'm to guess.

Ukraine would probably be wise to not end the war before they have recovered Crimea from a strategical standpoint and they are probably able to do so if they are ready to grind on but it may well be 1-2 years if Russia doesn't fold like a card house at some point which is possible but unlikely. Everything I see also imply that the military of Ukraine is no where near a breaking point much unlike the Russian one which is strained to say the least. As long as Ukraine get the most crucial supplies from the west they will be able to do it and a lot of of what is sent there is basically military surplus being renovated and sent not stuff from active units. The only thing this does not apply to is artillery ammunition and missiles for those upcoming F-16's which is a lot scarser especially if another major conflict erupts somewhere. Sad but true if the military aid to Ukraine gave what they need instead of what could be spared the war would already be over. I'm a bit frustrated with this since Ukraine is currently systematically demolishing the only real foe the EU nations could be facing in the next few decades so giving Ukraine all it needs is simply smart.

This post has been edited by Chance: 21 October 2023 - 05:25 AM

[Werthead]

Mentalist, on 20 October 2023 - 09:20 PM, said:

Ukraine is not going to agree to an unfavourable ceasefire w/o a major defeat. Sunk cost fallacy and all, and Zelensky and co know they will become the target of domestic frustration and will be finished politically if they do not deliver a "victory"- which in the context would be at least 2022 borders.

Putler can sell anything as a "victory", but he's also driven by his own messianic sense of destiny, and feels he has the population to spare.

The West can cut off weapon supply to Ukraine to force it to not attack; but at this point I do not see the popular sentiment that would endorse a cease-fire. Because ceasefire would be tantamount to abandoning the people in the occupied parts of the South, as well as northern Luhans'k Oblast'. So it's unclear what the most likely outcome would be.

Yes, I agree that Ukraine would be particularly unwise to concede anything whilst it is winning or at least enduring. The unpredictable and volatile situation in Russia is potentially extremely beneficial: if some general or the FSB (who are very, very unhappy with Putin) rebelled against Putin tomorrow, shot him and his coterie in the head, and agreed to withdraw to February 2022 borders, I would not be surprised. I don't think it's likely, but it wouldn't be coming out of left field as it was before Prigozhin's death drive. Also, the response to that tells anyone harbouring thoughts of taking on Putin that they have to go 100% for it and not stop halfway through.

Also, ending the war now simply gives Russia a much better springboard of territory from which to attack next time, and they will attack next time without massive internal change in how Russia sees the rest of the world and its place in it. That might only happen if Russia is defeated and given a wake-up call (Ukraine could be to Russia what Suez was to Britain, only with a far, far vaster death toll).

Chance, on 21 October 2023 - 05:04 AM, said:

From following the war fairly closely since its begining I'd say the war won't end, there may be ceasefires and even peace accords but they will not last. Not while the Russian goverment has the attitudes it currently does and that extends far further than the insane Czar and well into the entire current political class. Ukraine will have to be on guard towards its larger neighbour for at least a few generations and will probably fight more wars with Russia if I'm to guess.

Ukraine would probably be wise to not end the war before they have recovered Crimea from a strategical standpoint and they are probably able to do so if they are ready to grind on but it may well be 1-2 years if Russia doesn't fold like a card house at some point which is possible but unlikely. Everything I see also imply that the military of Ukraine is no where near a breaking point much unlike the Russian one which is strained to say the least. As long as Ukraine get the most crucial supplies from the west they will be able to do it and a lot of of what is sent there is basically military surplus being renovated and sent not stuff from active units. The only thing this does not apply to is artillery ammunition and missiles for those upcoming F-16's which is a lot scarser especially if another major conflict erupts somewhere. Sad but true if the military aid to Ukraine gave what they need instead of what could be spared the war would already be over. I'm a bit frustrated with this since Ukraine is currently systematically demolishing the only real foe the EU nations could be facing in the next few decades so giving Ukraine all it needs is simply smart.

There are potential break-points along the front. Behind the main front line, the secondary lines are less well-defended. Russia also keeps getting its troops to leave the heavily-defended lines and fight in front of them, which is incredibly stupid. At least in some areas along the Robotyne-Tokmak front, the Russians sent troops ahead of well-defended strongpoints, they all died fighting in open fields, and the Ukrainians were able to occupy the then-empty strongpoints because there was nobody manning them, whereas they might have been kept out indefinitely, or at least for a lot longer, if the Russians hadn't been idiots. If that keeps happening, Ukraine will be able to keep grinding forwards (if slowly).

That's why there's also this shift to the west at Kherson. If Ukraine can breach the lines there, there is not much between them and the opposite side of the isthmus above Crimea, and that creates a massive strategic problem for Russia: it also effectively cuts Crimea off from any hope of resupply or evacuation apart from the Kerch Bridge, which is suddenly extremely vulnerable, and the western half of the land bridge, if not all of it, becomes incredibly hard to resupply as well (everything has to come via Kursk and Rostov, which are hundreds of miles out of the way compared to Crimea). Russia would have to do what it did north of Kyiv and later north of the Dnipro and either withdraw or starve. That kind of "spectacular" (which would cost Russia 30-50% of their currently-held Ukrainian territory) is entirely possible within a short timeframe. Again, it may not be overwhelmingly likely to happen, but if it did I don't think it would be a shock.

[Chance]

Werthead, on 21 October 2023 - 11:58 AM, said:

There are potential break-points along the front. Behind the main front line, the secondary lines are less well-defended. Russia also keeps getting its troops to leave the heavily-defended lines and fight in front of them, which is incredibly stupid.

Yes it is mind boggling, insane even, to build serious fortifications and then not use them. Someone must have lobotomized most russian officers maybe it's done in officer school? Likely it is a deadly fear of being the one who has to call his superiors and say the line broke in my sector, so best not let Ukraine get anywhere near the line after all their future promotions are on the line.

Werthead, on 21 October 2023 - 11:58 AM, said:

That's why there's also this shift to the west at Kherson. If Ukraine can breach the lines there, there is not much between them and the opposite side of the isthmus above Crimea, and that creates a massive strategic problem for Russia: it also effectively cuts Crimea off from any hope of resupply or evacuation apart from the Kerch Bridge, which is suddenly extremely vulnerable, and the western half of the land bridge, if not all of it, becomes incredibly hard to resupply as well (everything has to come via Kursk and Rostov, which are hundreds of miles out of the way compared to Crimea).

Personally I don't see much hope of reaching Crimea this year maybe cutting it off but even that is a stretch, Ukraines logistics over the river will be at least as precocious as the Kerch Bridge unless they can be sure the air defense over the ponton bridges are rock solid which I simply don't think they can. Maybe by spring when they have some F-16's but even then it would be much riskier than establishing a land corridor. Is there permanent load bearing ice on the rivers that far south during winter?

This post has been edited by Chance: 21 October 2023 - 01:04 PM

[Werthead]

Chance, on 21 October 2023 - 12:56 PM, said:

Werthead, on 21 October 2023 - 11:58 AM, said:

That's why there's also this shift to the west at Kherson. If Ukraine can breach the lines there, there is not much between them and the opposite side of the isthmus above Crimea, and that creates a massive strategic problem for Russia: it also effectively cuts Crimea off from any hope of resupply or evacuation apart from the Kerch Bridge, which is suddenly extremely vulnerable, and the western half of the land bridge, if not all of it, becomes incredibly hard to resupply as well (everything has to come via Kursk and Rostov, which are hundreds of miles out of the way compared to Crimea).

Personally I don't see much hope of reaching Crimea this year maybe cutting it off but even that is a stretch, Ukraines logistics over the river will be at least as precocious as the Kerch Bridge unless they can be sure the air defense over the ponton bridges are rock solid which I simply don't think they can. Maybe by spring when they have some F-16's but even then it would be much riskier than establishing a land corridor. Is there permanent load bearing ice on the rivers that far south during winter?

They'd have to use pontoons and either withdraw them when not in use or deploy new ones if destroyed. A lack of Russian precision attack platforms (they have nothing as good as HIMARS, and their precision aerial units require their aircraft to be dangerously exposed) make this less of a risk than it is conversely, where Ukraine can zero any area on the Russian side to within a few metres.

[Chance]

Might be, but they where able to hit the bridgehead earlier this year with reasonable precision a few times so it probably depends on how many bridges they are willing to lose.

Also seems like the Russians are continuing to obliging the Ukraines wildest dreams of military incompetence. Yesterday was probably the worst day for the Russian military since WW2. Around 1400 soldiers, 120 AFV's and 55 Tanks...insane for modern warfare. Sadly however their reserves of equipment seems to be endless with one rapport I heard calling it 2-3 more years at the average loss rate before they actually run out of armored vehicles. It is insane how much old soviet material there is stored all around Russia but they might run out of men willing to man these death traps before actual vehicles. I've previously said neither side really committed enough resources to the offensive well...the russians have over the last week and it has been a disaster probably proving that armored breakthroughs are no longer a thing without air superiority and/or a disorganized foe. Something that was predicted during the cold war but hasn't really been tested until now

This post has been edited by Chance: 21 October 2023 - 10:27 PM

[Macros]

How does the commander not fall out of a hotel window after losses like that?

[Chance]

Macros, on 22 October 2023 - 08:18 AM, said:

How does the commander not fall out of a hotel window after losses like that?

He was probably a driving reason behind Putins in person visit to the main HQ at Rostov on Don, losses that basically wipe out several Russian brigades over a week are harder to obfuscate than the normal incompetence.

This post has been edited by Chance: 22 October 2023 - 09:29 AM