[Mentalist]

Lots and lots of BS this week. I'm getting news overdose. The hype build is way too much, it really hurts my work productivity. I want Sunday to come and elections to be done, so that I ca start a withdrawal. I went through a similar phase during Maydan, but I quickly dropped to "casual interest" once Crimea started. I'm expecting a similar burnout once the results are tallied here.

so, a quick recap of major talking points:

1) elections: the last allowed polls were in yesterday (for the last 3 days prior to the election it's illegal to publish any sociology results). The big news: BPP (the Pres' party) is shedding its massive lead--they're down to low-mid 20s. The big winner in this is "Samopomich"--they've made a gain that makes them an "almost definitely in" party, with up to 8% of the popular vote. Right Sector supposedly still out, as is "Svoboda" in most polls. However, in 2012, all polls were putting "Svoboda" as a loser and they got almost 11%, so they're reminding everyone of that fact to mobilize their electorate. There's been some losses from Lyashko's Radical party due to both a smear campaign on 1+1 (UA's most popular TV channel, owned by the oligarch Kolomoyskyj), as well as due to legit investigative journalism, revealing what a fake the party is. However, there's also those voters who think "Well, if this oligarch is throwing so muchdirt at them, they must be good!". Coincidentally, Lyashko's biggest supoporter, the channel "Inter" has been conducting a simial smear campaign against parties nominally supported by Kolomoyskyj (such as the National Front), and recently switched their efforts @ Samopomich, which may also account for their recent popularity spurt.

On the Internet, Samopomich and RS dominate any polls. Most commenters I encounter swear that out of 100s of people they know "maybe 3 or 5 want to vote BPP, the rest are mostly for Samopomich". this is subjective as hell, but I'm getting a sense that Samopomich has picked up a lot of support in Kyyv, which will certainly help them to get in. My other favourite-Civil Platform is bouncing on the verge of passing the 5% barrier, but they are below in rating than the pro-Russian "Strong Ukraine" and Opposition Block.

The impression I'm getting is that the nominal "National-Democrats"--the cumulative "anti-russian, pro-western" parties will hold sway in the traditionally pro-Russian oriented Dnipropetrovsk and Kherson oblasts, with possible strong gains in Zaporizhya and Mykolaiv. The rump part of Uki-held Donbass, as well as Odessa, and, regrettably, Kharkiv are the areas which I expect to still have the "Blue" (pro-russian) majority still, which is what will allow those parties to squeeze into the parliament. Commies are a cointoss.

As for FPTP, I'm not optimistic. According to my digging, there are about 100 seats where former PR members, and regional "princes" are running for seats, which they are likely to get, barring a miraculous growth of political conscience in all of UA's voters. They probably won't get all of those, but that is the potential WCS, encompassing all of East, South and most of Central UA. I'm fairly confident about the West (except for Zakarpattya, which was given away to a local "Family"), and Kyyiv. Realistically, as long as the "National Democrats" can keep the number of "old Guard" that make it in the Centre to below 30% of the avaialble seats (and there's roughly around 70 out of the 200-something (still not sure how many districts will hold elections on Donbass) total there), I will be extremely satisfied. Poroshenko has been doing a lot of talking recently, and his rhetoric is increasingly more authoritarian--BPP's key message is that "in order to make reforms, the Pres needs a loyal parliamentary majority"--which is causing A LOT of backlash, since many people feel that this is the first step down the same road to absolute power the last Pres Yanukovych took. Add to this Poroshenko's less than stellar record of appointing officials to key positions who are loyal to him but less than stellar professionals, coupled with the poor handling of the whole war thing (his constant preaching of his "peace plan" isn't winning him many friends), and there's a LOT of hostility, a lot of suspicion BPP will attempt to falsify the elections to up their result (and consequently, a ton of activity to observe the elections and prevent fraud). Oh, and if BPP tries to make friends in parliament with any ex-PR deputees, there may well be riots again.


On the global scale, we've had the Milan summit, which didn't accomplish much, and UA and Russia are apparently "close" to hammering out a gas contract for the winter, at least so as to ensure EU doesn't get its gas cut off. Sweden is still looking for Russian subs and told Russia it's dropping military cooperation w/ Russia. Amnesty international made a report on Donbass. Apparently, there were "some" atrocities from both sides, but "Russia's portrayal of the conflict is greatly exaggerated". Well, thanks for that, at least. The oil price is fluctuating. Ruble is dropping. Russia's stock market is dropping. Russian central Bank has spent over 14 billion this month alone to keep the ruble steady, and about $66 billion since beginning of the year. Oh, and Russia's biggest money stash--the "Future Generations Welfare Fund" is being used up--about a third of it is being paid out to Rosneft this year to keep is afloat, with other creditor lining in the queue for a bailout.

War-wise, the war goes on. Poroshenko has mentioned smth again about an "artillery silence" regime, but Russians don't really give a damnt. The heaviest firghint is still @ the Donetsk airport- the "cyborgs" continue to hold it. A lot of fighting around Debl'tseve, and last weekend and early in the week there was a lot of activity north of Luhansk by Schastya, where Russians have attempted to surround a Uki checkpoint and held it beseiged for about a day before being repelled by reinforcements.

The word of the week is; PARTIZANS. Apparently, in Donetsk there is now an "Anti-DNR resistance" group. On Tuesday, Donetsk was rocked by an incredible explosion. It originated from a local chemical factory, used to produce, among other things, explosives (miners use a lt of dynamite). It's estimated to be several kilotons. DNR blamed UA for shelling with tactical missiles. Ukraine denied it, citing that it was likely DNR themselves causing an accident. But later that day, a group of "Anti-DNR resistance" took responsibility for the bombing, and left an encryption of another set of coordinates, sending DNR on a "bomb quest". Apparently, they failed as another explosion was reported today at one of the biggest DNR checkpoints in Makyivka.

As we draw closer to the election, rumors abound about a supposed Uki offensive. There's also increased reports of Russia bringing in tanks and other equipment in large numbers. There's a fear that Russians will use the Sunday election as a convenient time to relaunch their offensive. Apparently now the terrorists are evacuating their families from main cities in anticipation of "something big".

As much as criticise Poroshenko for pretty much most decisions made in this war, I pray to God he doesn't try to pull off some kind of a blitzkrieg as a last minute PR stunt. This weekend is certainly building up to be crazy.

[Gust Hubb]

On the lighter side (and great toilet paper picture): http://www.bbc.com/n...ewhere-29507775

Only thing that would give me pause is having that bastard anywhere near my ass, anti-gay agenda or no.

[Mentalist]

Election happened. turnout 52%

Exit for the PR part give the Pres' party BPP 23%-ish, the NF (PM's party) 21-sh (there are indications that may end up first-the 2 are going neck in neck rite now)., then "Samopomich" with 13-ish, then "opposition block"-the pro-Russian bastards get from 8-10%, converting in about 20 seats. Then there's Lyashko, "batkivschyna" and "Svoboda" crossing the 5% threshold and their results vary but they hover around 6% with Lyashko being closer to 7 or 8.

"Civil Position" didn't make it which is sad (around 3.3%). Neither did the pro-Russian "Strong Ukraine" or the Communists (hooray). Right Sector got about 2.5%, which makes many people who voted them cry foul, but the Internet isn't super-representative, so the RS gracefully accepted defeat. Their leader+their spokesperson are both making it in the FPTP districts, though, so hooray.

At this point, everyhting hinges on the FPTP districts. so far it looks like the pro-western parties partially got their shit together in the Centre--still a big chunk of quite odious characters making it.
As I've predicted, major gains for the "Orange" in the South--all of Kherson districts are anti-Moscow,a nd most of Mykolayiv. Odessa's half and half, and a few seats in Zaporizhya. Good gains in Dnipropetrovsk as well, though it doesn't look like a total victory. Expected pro-Russian results in Donbass. Kharkv prelim results make me fume with righteous anger--if there was a unified anti-Russian candidate instead of 7, their total votes would be higher than the pro-Russian one. ugh.

Too early to talk coalition just yet (need to get a better picture of who's in from FPTP districts), but BPP+NF as core looks most likely. Most of the FPTP leaders in the South are from BPP, which is less than great imho, since I dislike the Pres having a "personal majority"

Geographically, NF has majority in the West (with Batkivschyna and some BPP sprinkled in), in the center it's a split between BPP and NF (with some Batkivschyna sprinkled in), and in the South and East, BPP rules where the Opposition Block doesn't. curiously, according to the exit polls, "Samopomich" won Kyyiv, go figure.


To sum up, The turnout looks like a combination of "best case" and "realistic" scenarios I've proposed earlier. BPP does look like they'll sweep the FPTP part, and they'll form a coalition together with Samopomich", Svoboda and the other "democratic" parties, with the pro-Russians being a staunch opposition. I'm sure the "independents" will form their own "MP group", which will vote with the Pres when pushed, but on paper the coalition will be made up of purly "pro-Western", democratic parties. Also, 2 RS MPs + the "Azov" commander Biletskiy beat the supposed favourite Stolar (who was accused of corruption with the City Council) in Kyyiv, afer the district was basically "given away" by BPP. which is good, because he' Biletskiy is another uncompromizing vote in the parliament.
Anyhow, more tomorrow, though probably not in the morning.

[Mentalist]

Update: about 82% of the vote is tallied.

on the PR part, "Svoboda" is out. sadly, they are missing out, look like they've only hit about 4.7% of the popular vote.

on the FPTP part: things aren't "quite" as bad as I've expected.
There were a grand total of 133 old MPs that voted for the so-called "Dictatorship laws of January 16", which sparked the violent phase of the Maydan, when the old govt tried to curb civil liberties of people to protest, and tried their luck again in this parliament. 94 of them tried their luck in FPTP, and the rest were split up among the PR lists of 3 parties- Strong Ukraine" (11 people), CPU (13 people) and "Opposition Block" (15 people). Of these, only the latter gets in, and only 9 of those make it. but on the FPTP... there's about 58.

well, the biggest single change on FPTP: "Svoboda" lost HUGE. they went into the election with 11 seats from FPTP. right now it looks like they'll keep 6. Of these, 1 is a gain, and 1 is a thrice-disputed seat against an incredibly odious old regime functionary in the centr of Kyyiv. Coupled with `Svoboda`being left out of the parliament on PR part, it means they are effectively destroyed as an effective political force. Likewise, Batkivshyna looks to keep 3 FPTP seats (though in their case, a number of its MPs have defected to join the NF, taking their voters`sympathies with them).

the overall winner is unquestionably BPP. they`ve made incredible gains in the South, as BPP took 5/6 FPTP seats in Mykolayiv, 3/5 seats in Kherson (the other 2 also going to "anti-Russian" candidates), as well as 4/9 seats in Zaporizhya (the rest, sadly going to pro-russian incumbents). In Dipropetrovsk BPP took 3 seats, with 1 more going to the Right Sector Leader, Yarosh, and 2 going to *apprently* his RS associates, though they ran as BPP, with the endorsement of the local governor-oligarch Kolomoyskyj. It's a bit shady, as there'sa lot of conflicting info on where these two MPs loyalties will lie, so I won't include them in the RS total (which is 2, btw--Yarosh+ the RS press-secretary Bereza who took a seat in Kyyiv as an independent). long story short, of the 17 Dnipropetrovsk seats, the "old regime" only got their hands on 8, and only 5 of those are incumbents--the other 3 are men of the local ex-party of regions honcho, Vilkul. Vilkul runs Kryvyj Rih, which is the second largest city in the region,and one of the biggest "smelting cities" in the world. Vilkul and his clan run the organized crime, which is always strongest in the most industrialized parts of UA. in this election, the Pres actually tacitly allied himself with Vilkul (former governor of the oblast during Yanukovych's time), by ordering the prosecution to ignore attempts of the new governor's team to prevent vote-rigging in Kryvyj Rih, and other large cities of the oblast. As a result, 5 evil bastards who should be jailed with enjoy parliamentary immunity. sigh. at least it's 5/10

Things got better in the Center-somewhat. In kyyv oblast, only 1/3 "Jan 16" MPs are making it, though there's 2 more ex-regime folk picking up seats there. in Kirovohrad, 2 odious ex-MPs decided to compete fro the sme seat, and 1 is the current leader there. Cherkassy is tragic. 4 ex-PRs are making it, it seems.

overall, there's about 76 FPTP MPs whom I'd call "highly questionable", regardless which way they declare their loaylties to lie. that isn't exactly terrible, but it's still a sizeable resource for the Pres to wield when he needs an antidemocratic decision to pass.

Thankfully, it looks like thre'll still be a sizeable group of very patriotic MPs to oppose. now that I look closer, Svoboda sems to have picked up a few more seats (where a party member ran as independent) + a few smaller nationalist parties grabbed random seats. Add to that a sizeable number of ATO veterans turned MPs, and there's a sizeable right group to keep the war rhetoric on the agenda even despite Svoboda's absence.

[Mentalist]

For the interested English-speakers:

https://www.youtube....YtxvMJZobCjqBC-

Hromadske TV started doing an international segment in English. May require some Youtube fiddling.

[Mentalist]

long time since last update. Will do one over the weekend.

[Mentalist]

The weekend's come and gone. And now I WILL write smth.

It won't be as long and as detailed as the previous entrys, i don't think. If anyone has any additional questions, feel free to ask and i will endeavor to respond. And pretty soon I hope I'll be able to point you to an available source of more info, but I can't as of yet.

So, it's been nearly 2 weeks. The CEC has finally published the official results of the popular vote part of the election result. MOST of the 196 FPTP MPs have also been named, though there are still issues on a few "problem" districts, where courts were involved and recounts are in progress, each with their own drama.

On the grand scheme of things, however, we are now in the grips of the next step of the political drama--after the election come...... the coalition negotiations, which is an epic saga in its own right, as sides are picked, people are recruited, government posts are traded back and forth, and all this is done behind closed doors, while the people wait.

and "waiting" is really the best way to describe Ukrainian society right now. Unless your second job is a civil activist, or you're a volunteer directly involved with supplying the ATO troops, you are waiting. YOu are waiting to see if the national currency will stop its speculatory plunge, taking the tattered economy down the drain with it. You are waiting to see if, against all odds Russian Gazprom keeps its word and there will be heat in the winter and not the usual "economic blackmail". You are waiting to see if the newly "elected" leadership of DNR and LNR will start making good on their threat to "liberate the rest of the People's Republics' occupied territory" (aka, the uki-held parts of Donetsk and Luhan'sk oblasts).

But most of all, you are waiting, patiently and sceptically, to see if the new parliament is capable of seeing past its own immediate interests and realize that it's on razor-thin ice, and there are a lot of tired, angry people watching its every move, waiting for any sign of unwillingness to carry on with reforms to take the whole system apart by force, with anarchy to follow. No one really knows what exactly will be after "Maydan-3", but it's a thought that's never far from anyone's mind. Tires are kept ready, and the politicians know it.

there's an incredible amount of uncertainty. It irritates, and it brings apathy and near despair. so many people are tired of it all. We are finally begging to realize the deep wisdom in the ancient Chinese curse "may you live in a time of change". Change is draining. Especially when it's accomapned by war. War which is all the more deadly and unfair because it's unrecognized.

about the war: the fighting goes on. Every day brings with it news of more casualties--on average 3-5 per day. The fighting rages in the same areas--the ruins of Donetsk airport, along the Sriver Siverskyj Donets' up in Luhansk oblast (main thrusts being either at Schastya directly north of Luhansk, or from Slav'yanoserbs'k to Lysychansk), as well as towards Volnovakha through Dokuchayevsk, north of Mariupol'. The war goes on, people die. Although I realize how poorly equipped for winter the ATO remains, I wish for snow, because i have a tiny glimmer of hope that winter will mean that for sure Russians won't continue the offensive.

There are some minor positive shifts in MoD. The new minister, while far from a military genius, appears to be at least passably capable when it comes to logistics. Most volunteers and journalists who've had to deal with him give their guarded approval. HE actively involves volunteers in collating frontline intel, he's taken steps to crush through the beurocratic red tape concernign supply purchases, and most importantly, he's been firing MOD civillian bureaucrats and offering key jobs in supply to volunteers involved in supplying the ATO, as well as asking fo their feedback to nominate talented ATO officers for such jobs. no matter how small the steps, no matter the enormous inertia of the huge machine they have to fight again, there are small, incremental signs that things might be gettign better. Just praying it's not too late.

Politicians keep talking. The negotiations now involve all 5"democratic" parties--BPP, NF, samopomich, Lyashko's Radical party and Bat'kivschyna are all trying to hammer out a "Coalition agreement". As of right now the only truly certain things are that
1) Yatseniuk (leader of NF) will stay the PM.
2) all parties will vote on removing parliamentary immunity ASAP (possibly at first session).

beyond that, it's hard to say. there's a lot of common declarations, but it's not gonna be an easy parliament to make work. different parties have very diffrent priorities. BPP will be fighting to make the least amount of changes possible, but at the same time the "business" part of the party will be under internal criticism from the 10 or so percent of "new faces" civil activists and journalists, as well as the more progressive and reformists MPs representign Klytchko's UDAR party in the block.

NF will likewise be looking out for the interests of its leaders, but at the same time they are the "party of war", havign the largest percentage of ATO-personnel and officers, and they will be pushing through army reforms and their MPs will probably not shy away from physical coercion when necessary to geth things done.

Samopomich has 2 main agendas--continuing "lustration"--that is, rooting out corrupt odious members of national and local governments, and pushing through a decentralizing administrative reform with the aim of becoming a truly national power through nation-wide local elections which are tentatively to take place in the spring, after the said reform.

Lyashko's radical party is the one without a set agenda, its leaders' declarations's aside. they will vote on "patriotic" decisions to suit their image of rabid nationalists, but their votes will also be there when Big Business needs a bill passed.

the last "democratic" faction is "Batkivschyna" led by Yuliya Tymoshenko. The election showed they are perilously close to becoming political has-beens, so they are currently doing their best to stay under the radar in the negotiations. They've decalred they have no demands for govt positions, and basically their rhetoric is "Implement association agreement, abolish legislative neutrality + start moving towards NATO, abolish immunity for MPs and judges" They also have a strong anti-Russian card to play since their number 1, Nadiya Savchenko is an ATO volunteer who's currently held as a political prisoner in Russia on trumped up charges of being involved in the murder of 2 Russian journalist who were shelled at a terrorist checkpoint outside Luhansk. Batkivshyna wants to make Savchenko a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of Europe, which would convey onto her special status and may assist in her liberation.

There's a lot of talks about how the 96 "independent" MPS will be split. The oligarch Yeremeyev, who was a former MP and was re-elected, who was formerly the head of an MP group "sovereign European Ukraine" has declared that he intends to reform said group in the new parliament and that it
ll be if anyhting even bigger than before and "we will not be part of the opposition". given that Yeremeyev and his "business associates" were all part of the group that woted for the January 16 laws, it's highly unlikely he will be welcomed into any of the "democratic" parties' factions.

I don't want to talk about the results and final configurations in the parliament until the first session is done and all factions are registered. Then i will endeavor to provide a map showing which districts' candidates ended up in which group/faction.

this was a rambling post. I guess it really reflects well on the fatigue we're all feeling. In 10 days it will be a year since the beginning of Maydan. So much has happened, it often seems surreal. it's hard to handle sometimes, and its gettign harder to think about it cohesively. It's all a mess, and looming in the back of everyone's mind is Ukrainian People's Republic, and Bulgakov's "White Guard", which showed a very similar drama unfolding nearly a hundred years ago, and how tragically it ended. There's a lot of determination not to let it happen again, but there's the fear that we're stepping on the same rakes again and again.

[Gust Hubb]

Saw this on the BBC:

"Russia An Affair to Remember, and Regret - The New York Times's Roger Cohen thinks the US and Russia may be having an affair.

"It goes like this," he writes. "Vladimir Putin's Russia makes nice over an Iran nuclear deal. In return, the United States turns a blind eye to the big Russian military build-up on the Ukrainian border and in areas under the control of Moscow-backed rebel separatists."

Cohen doesn't suggest a formal Iran-Ukraine trade-off between Mr Obama and Mr Putin, but that the Russian leader has a keen eye for American weakness and an exquisite sense of timing.

"The abrupt flaring of new fighting in eastern Ukraine, and the abrupt Russian readiness to help on Iran ahead of the 24 November deadline for nuclear talks, are not a mere coincidence. They are part of a Russian strategy and, for now, the United States is playing along." "




What do you think?

[Mentalist]

Gust Hubb, on 11 November 2014 - 12:59 PM, said:

Saw this on the BBC:

"Russia An Affair to Remember, and Regret - The New York Times's Roger Cohen thinks the US and Russia may be having an affair.

"It goes like this," he writes. "Vladimir Putin's Russia makes nice over an Iran nuclear deal. In return, the United States turns a blind eye to the big Russian military build-up on the Ukrainian border and in areas under the control of Moscow-backed rebel separatists."

Cohen doesn't suggest a formal Iran-Ukraine trade-off between Mr Obama and Mr Putin, but that the Russian leader has a keen eye for American weakness and an exquisite sense of timing.

"The abrupt flaring of new fighting in eastern Ukraine, and the abrupt Russian readiness to help on Iran ahead of the 24 November deadline for nuclear talks, are not a mere coincidence. They are part of a Russian strategy and, for now, the United States is playing along." "




What do you think?

not outside the realm of possibility. Given the usual politicking, bickering and chaos of Uki politics, which makes them less than reliable partners, I can see the West throwing up their hands in dispair and leaving Russia to handle it how they see fit.

However, with a new Republican majority in Congress, the fact that Iran's now allowed to sell oil, and most recently te chewing out Russia gout in the Security Council, I'm not sure that's true.

Also, oil price for Brent crossed the $80/barrel threshold. Ruble is still plunging, and Russian Central Bank told the world it won't try to hold back the "floating rate" anymore. which is goooood, as it causes further panic.

in UA, the PM has made it clear that the areas occupied by terrorirsts will NOT be receiving any pensions and other social payments--not even if the recipients travel to Uki-held areas as "pension tourists" as they did before. This has caused quite an outcry form DNR and LNR, who are both "deeply concerned" by this, and claim that "the ukrainian governemnt is targetting its own most vulnerable citizens". Essentially, they want to be independent, but they want UA to pay for it, "because they've earned it" Naturally, the PM can't back out now, because patriots in the rest of UA will tear him apart should their taxes now be diverted to support terrorists. They are also calling to shut off water, gas and electricity to the occupied parts of Donbass, but apparently, "the cost will be deducteed from their social payments due to them when they are returned under UA control".

Oh, and Sevastopol residents (and Crimea at large) has water supply regimented by the hour, and Sevastopol's most optimistic scenario is they'll be out of fresh water by December 26th. Directly north of them is Kherson oblast, whose governor is willing to sell Crimea water for 1 euro/liter.

All of this means Putin has to make a decision--go big or back off. I don't expect anyhting big untill after the G20, and I' praying for early winter.

[Gust Hubb]

Looks like he's going big unfortunately...

[Morgoth]

He can't back down now, with the Russian economy balancing at the very edge of collapse.

[D'iversify]

Mentalist, just out of curiosity what is your personal assessment of the economic value of the Donbass to Ukraine? Because it's often presented as the industrial heartland but I recall there was quite a heavily circulated article in about March when trouble started flaring up stating essentially that it's a rustbelt still trading on its former reputation as the powerhouse of the nation's economy (the article was by an ostensibly pro-Maidan writer who was suggesting the Donbass was more trouble than it was worth given Russia's traditional interests in the region and that Ukraine as a whole would in some ways be better off without it. Obviously, I'm not saying the Ukrainian government should just let Russia walk roughshod over the region and de facto concede it as Russian territory (plus from a geopolitical standpoint I think Russian expansionism needs to be frustrated to encourage them to throw off the whole imperial/Soviet nostalgia thing and recognise that they're now a second-rate power dependent on oil revenues). But I am just interested in you perspective on the economic value you and your fellows ascribe to the region, as opposed to historical, strategic, sentimental, etc.

[Mentalist]

D, on 13 November 2014 - 10:53 AM, said:

Mentalist, just out of curiosity what is your personal assessment of the economic value of the Donbass to Ukraine? Because it's often presented as the industrial heartland but I recall there was quite a heavily circulated article in about March when trouble started flaring up stating essentially that it's a rustbelt still trading on its former reputation as the powerhouse of the nation's economy (the article was by an ostensibly pro-Maidan writer who was suggesting the Donbass was more trouble than it was worth given Russia's traditional interests in the region and that Ukraine as a whole would in some ways be better off without it. Obviously, I'm not saying the Ukrainian government should just let Russia walk roughshod over the region and de facto concede it as Russian territory (plus from a geopolitical standpoint I think Russian expansionism needs to be frustrated to encourage them to throw off the whole imperial/Soviet nostalgia thing and recognise that they're now a second-rate power dependent on oil revenues). But I am just interested in you perspective on the economic value you and your fellows ascribe to the region, as opposed to historical, strategic, sentimental, etc.

This is anything but an easy question. I'll answer it when I get home tonight.

[Mentalist]

Mentalist, on 13 November 2014 - 05:44 PM, said:

D, on 13 November 2014 - 10:53 AM, said:

Mentalist, just out of curiosity what is your personal assessment of the economic value of the Donbass to Ukraine? Because it's often presented as the industrial heartland but I recall there was quite a heavily circulated article in about March when trouble started flaring up stating essentially that it's a rustbelt still trading on its former reputation as the powerhouse of the nation's economy (the article was by an ostensibly pro-Maidan writer who was suggesting the Donbass was more trouble than it was worth given Russia's traditional interests in the region and that Ukraine as a whole would in some ways be better off without it. Obviously, I'm not saying the Ukrainian government should just let Russia walk roughshod over the region and de facto concede it as Russian territory (plus from a geopolitical standpoint I think Russian expansionism needs to be frustrated to encourage them to throw off the whole imperial/Soviet nostalgia thing and recognise that they're now a second-rate power dependent on oil revenues). But I am just interested in you perspective on the economic value you and your fellows ascribe to the region, as opposed to historical, strategic, sentimental, etc.

This is anything but an easy question. I'll answer it when I get home tonight.

So, getting back to this.

The short answer is, "I really don't know. There's a lot of numbers involved"

Briefly, there's a few points to consider:

1) Donbass isn't homogenous. There are agrarian areas (Western Donetsk and esp Northern Luhansk). There's a heavy machine-building cluster (Basically Slov'yansk-Kramatorsk--the New Kramatorsk Machinebuilding Plant is actually pretty modernized, and it's described by some as "a technical marvel--it's a factory that builds factories"). There's Mariupol, which is a gigantic steel mill complex. There are the big cities of Donetsk and Luhansk which, despite their mining and industrial origins did quite good in becoming proper cities with sizeable (though completely apolitic) middle class--small businesses, rather than "city-forming" enterprises. All of these can be quite lucrative and advantageous, given proper management.

On the other hand you've got the dead mining towns. Entire cities that lived around a single factory that's been privatized, bankrupted and cut fro scrap a decade ago. Dead-end cities, with dead end jobs. Mines, both legal and illegal, that rely on enormous government subsidies.

Going back to the Slov'yansk Kramatorsk--they are also sitting atop one of the 2 big shale gas fields found in UA.

2) The above mentioned subsidies. As well as pensions (miners retire at a young age--either 40 or 45, and their pension is about 5 times the average). As I've mentioned before, for those inhabiting the "mining heartland", this war quite literally IS the war for their way of life--it just so happens that that "way of life" is "entitlement at the expense of the rest of the country". Coal mining is anything but profitable, but it exists, because it gives thousands of jobs to unskilled workers.

Metallurgy....well, it's profitable, but that's based on low coal value, as well as transport costs. In a properly accountable market-based economy, without so many preferences, I don't know if it'd stay competitive.

There's also the fact that Donbass makes up the lion's share of UA's natural gas consumption--both industrial (huge quantities are used by the chemical industry in manufacturing fertilizers and such), as well as in households (Donbass being one of the most populous regions in the country).

3) In addition, these days the economic question also concerns the costs of retaining the region--both in purely military resources, but also in long-term costs. Of particular interst is this map:


This is yet another portrayal of the most recent election results, the PR portion. It's important, because what it does is tally up the votes for all parties as either "Pro-Ukrainian/democratic/Western/Revolutionary" (orange) or "Pro-Russian/order-enforcing/reactionary/"more-openly-big-business" " (blue). And it does a comparison in each region, giving the dynamics change between the 2012 parliamentary election and now. The results are mapped by taking the results form about 30 000 polling stations.
Now, the results are going to be skewed, since this election saw somewhat lower turnout in the South and Eastern areas of the country (traditional "Blue" electorate boycotting the election in part), but nonetheless, the shift is evident, and it's pretty dramatic.

Donbass remains the only exception. Even in the liberated parts, the voting prefrences are still pretty "blue", though less radically so.

The issue is, of course, that any politicans elected by the "blue" voters will dot heir best to stall reforms. Although it remains to be see how effective will the "orange" reformers prove to be this time, there are certain expectations of them, and the people are pretty insistent. Nothing good is expected from the "blues" and keeping the number of their hardcore voters low is actually a net positive for UA right now.

There's also the costs it will take to root out the 20-odd year old system criminal-familial system that permeates all levels of governance on Donbass. It's like trying o root the Mafia out of Sicily. It'd be a gigantic undertaking and not one anyone's truly ready for.

So my net prefrence would probably be to "let parts of Donbass go". Which parts is, of course, fluid. And for many it's a question of both morale and, otoh, perceived appeasement--"if we let russia take Donbass, what's next?

There isn't gonna be an easy answer. But these are some of the big factors in play.

[D'iversify]

Mentalist, on 14 November 2014 - 03:52 AM, said:

So my net prefrence would probably be to "let parts of Donbass go". Which parts is, of course, fluid. And for many it's a question of both morale and, otoh, perceived appeasement--"if we let russia take Donbass, what's next?

Thanks for your reply - I think as a non-Ukrainian who is left of centre but despises the pro-Russian-because-anti-American wing of the far left that your position converges on mine in quite a few places - in general I believe that autonomy for culturally distinct regions rather than a centralised state in which one or two groups dominate and marginalise the rest is generally the best working model for a fair society in a multi-ethnic nation. I therefore think that giving the Donbass autonomy was the right thing to do and Poroshenko's threat to withdraw it may well be unhelpful to the situation. But at the same time I very much recognise that this isn;t really about autonomy for the Donbass on a geopolitical scale - yes, there are definitely a lot of people in the Donbass who feel much closer to Moscow than Kiev, but the fact is that they are being used as part of Russia's attempt to reassert control of its 'rightful' borders (whatever that means - almost all the regions with large Russian populations that are not in Russia proper were effecrtively colonised by settlers throughout the 19th and 20th century, at the expense of the 'rightful' borders of the other ethnicities within the Russian empire). Furthermore, the more Putin is permitted his aggressive incursions into his neighbouring countries, the more it emboldens other authoritarian or pseudo-democratic states around the world to do the same. Western democracy is very far from perfect but I have a lot more sympathy for it than I do a one-party state with irredentist ambitions that cloaks its continued support for a mafia state of billionaires in blood-and-soil nationalistic rhetoric. Ukraine, from my perspective, has a lot of similar problems when it comes to economic egality and tackling corruption, and I am also uneasy about some of the rightist groups within the pro-Maidan grouping (though I'm not deluded from watching Russia Today into thinking that Russia doesn't ahve exactly the same sort of groups, which it moreover happily lets sit in the Duma whilst blabbering about Ukrainian 'fascists'). But the more Ukraine leans west the more likely I think its developing democracy is to survive (though I have some doubts about whether the influence of the EU will do much to address the problems of the oligrachs aside from encouraging some nominal 'competition' to emerge).

[Mentalist]

D'iversify, quick point: the granting of "special self-governing status to certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts" was a goodwiL gesture, in the spirit of the Minsk agreements. A highly unpopular one at that, especially considering that in order to vote, the RADA computer system was shut off, so as to make voting anonymous (so that the voter in the upcoming election wouldn't know who endorsed "the deal with terrorists".

Being a goodwill gesture, it was done expecting reciprocity in the form of cooperation from Russia in closing the border and allowing UA to regain control over its sovereign territory--the occupied part of Donbass was to have their "special status"-- within a unitary Ukrainian state

Following the, Nov 3rd "elections" in DNR and LNR, and seeing that not even Russia recognized them--the "we respect, but we don't recognize" rhetoric of Russia's MFA--UA took the logical step of revoking it's goodwill step--justified given that the "ceasefire" under Minsk agreement resulted in several hundred more dead soldiers and loss of additional territory.

Now the govt is taking a different approach by severing financial support to the occupied territories--in a sense they are forcing Putin to start paying for them or watch them starve and bear the political ramifications for backing off the "russians never abandon their own" rhetoric. At the same time, the UA govt is catering to its own patriot electorate, which feels no desire to pay for those who half a year ago waved Russian flags and invited the war, sometimes by actively blocking Uki troops from repelling those the Donbass saw as "liberators".

Since Donbass' pro-Russian supporters are seen either as those yearning for Soviet nostalgia or opportunists hoping for Russian social assistance or salaries (which are higher than in UA), the patriotic Ukrainians see no reason NOT to let them get what they wanted. Add to this the fact that Donbass residents, with their ravenous slogans that "Donbass feeds all of Ukraine" and that "since everyone else lives off us, they need to LISTEN TO WHAT WE HAVE TO SAY!!!!!!!" quasi-regional nationalism has gotten on pretty much everyone's nerves, and now that they are facing the harsh reality--which is that without the rest of UA pitching in to pay for their "miner pensions" (about 5x the average Uki pension, retirement age 50) people are already starving to death (despite the fact that Russia has already sent 5 "humanitarian aid convoys" there). And many of those partiots whose taxes are supposed to pay for said social assistance and who are currently squeezing all they have to support the rebuilding Uki Army can't help but derive a certain karmic pleasure from seeing the haughty "Donbass breadwinners" take a reality check.

As much as it horrifies me to read about the elderly and home-bound starving to death (which is already happening, though it's still rumours and not too widespread yet), I also grin when I hear multiplying reports of average people in LNR and DNR starting to stage protests over food shortages and lack of promised payments--with the sincere indignation of "this isn't what we voted for!". And in all this UA's position is clear: wherever the Ukrainian flag is put up, there will be pensions, social assistance paid out, and humanitarian aid provided. Wherever terrorists run the show--we take a step back and watch them go.

...And the winter hasn't even really started yet...

This post has been edited by Mentalist: 18 November 2014 - 06:32 PM

[Mentalist]

Briar King, on 20 November 2014 - 04:36 AM, said:

I haven't even seen this issue brought up in over a month when I watch cnn.

I'm not surprised. US has the ISIL war to talk about now--where Americans are dying.

UA stopped being a "hot" war--mere shelling aren't as interesting.

I believe VICE continues to cover it. Most of my English-speaking friends who are interested get their news from there.

Edit: Euronews namedrops UA fairly frequently.

This post has been edited by Mentalist: 20 November 2014 - 02:25 PM

[Mentalist]

New hot discussion topic in UAnet:

One of Russia's biggest propaganda talkshow anchors (also a member of the Board of Directors in either Rossneft or Gazprom, I forget which) has devised a brilliant new strategy for dealing with economic sanctions:




...







"We'll threaten them we'll nuke something, and they'll back off".


This was said at a panel discussion on Russian Channel One, which approximately 80% of Russians use as their primary source of information.


Discuss.

This post has been edited by Mentalist: 20 November 2014 - 07:53 PM

[Gust Hubb]

Sounds like a good plan. If they won't trade with you, who needs em?

[Mentalist]

Stuff's been happening. kind of. Not really. Nothing of huge significance.

Being the keen political analyst that me (and every other Uki that's wasn't living in a bubble for the past year, ) is, about a week or so ago I've made a prediction in a conversation with my father, who's rediscovered his Internet news addiction, much to the chargrin of my mother:

Quote

We're basically waiting to see what he (VVH) will do now. They ( the Uki govt) have made their one move--showing an astounding amount of initiative in their several-months-too-late declaration that they won't be supporting Luhandon (the perjorative used to describe the territory occupied by the so-called "people's republics" of the that ethereal conglomerate Novorossiya), and, with a sense of a job well done they've gone back to their "Coalitiad". In doing so, they've put him in a zugzwang (a position in chess where every move loses/makes the situation worse). And we're all (UA and the West) are waiting to see which option he judges to be "least bad". Either he'll escalate, or he'll "flush" Novorossiya down the drain

And so since then it's been pretty much waiting. War is still on, people are dying. Uki artillerists got some new old toys to play with, as they've restored some of the biggest USSR-era large-caliber guns, and now those are occasionally used to answer fire when some terrorists decide to violate the ceasefire. ATO forces still rarely have a day without casualties, but when we hear about the "returns", the casualties are usually listed in tens or more.

Weather's getting colder, food shortages in Donbass are starting. In UA, the currency after taking a spectacular plunge to almost 16 UAH for 1$USD (8:1 prior to the Revolution, about 12:1 prior to the latest plunge) is slooowly edging its way back down. MoD is sacking more and more of its top staff, with influential people out of the volunteer community being recruited to replace them--which is a huge boost to the efficiency of army logistics.

Russia keeps making schizo statements, less and less attention's paid to them. If there's smth someone wants to discuss, I'll give my comment, but overall, I can't be bothered trying to interpret them. There's increased buzz about the "schism" in Putin's inner circle between the "business" wing and the "top brass" wing, with rumours of a cpossible "palace coup" ro replace him, but I won't believe those until i see it with my own eyes.

overall, it would appear the conflict's dying down soemwhat. The new Uki Rada's due to be sworn in on Thursday, with a shine coalition of the 5 "democratic" factions to follow suit, with a constitutional majority of 300+ votes ginvng them the power to amend the Constitution and thus make reforms happen. I'm not holding my breath about the promises of a "gigantic breakthrough", b/c it's not the laws, it's the implementation with the largely-same corrupt govt functionaries that will be the biggest obstacles--one there's no easy way around, unfortuanately, since the govt is so ridiculously bloated as ti stends it'll require a DRASTIC trimming, which not many are willing to undertake. That being said, the short-term goal is adoption of a "decentralization" legislature to give more power and control over local matters to municipal govts--with the general municipal re-elections due next October. now THAT will be the tru test of just what's changed where.

Oh, this Fri UA commemorated 1 year since the beginning of Maydan--the newly-propnounces "Dignity and Freedom Day". I find it rather sad that the very next day (Nov 22) is the day commemorating Holodomor--the mass forced starvation throug the artificail famine in Soviet Ukraine in the 1930s during the collectivization movement. Nevertheless, that's how the two dates aligned, so who am I to say anything?

So that's the basics of the latest news. DOn't expect much excitement any time soon, tbh. Winter, holidays, and all that. I mean, VVH COULD use that to try to strike while no one's looking, but time's really not on his side on this one, b/c UA's ever so slowly but nevertheless is restoring its defensive capabilities, and at this point there's no objective indicators that there will be "a third Maydan", which will remove the dissapointingly incapable fledgling "democtratic" govt and bring us back to anarchy. While there's a lot of dissaptisfaction with the current govt, it's been (so far) channeled constructively--into insisting they increase transparency (under threat of physical violence for failure to do so), and pay more attention to civil society watchdogs and their expert panels--up to accepting "civil society oversight" as a necessary precondition to the functioning of the new govt.

This post has been edited by Mentalist: 25 November 2014 - 02:55 AM