[Tiste Simeon]

I'd love it if China fully turned on Russia. Won't happen of course they're more clever then that but it might ease tensions in Ukraine for a bit.

[Werthead]

More than one source now saying they believe Ukraine has the capacity to launch an offensive in the spring or summer of 2026. Ukraine was unable to undertaken offensive operations in 2025 due to manpower restrictions in the early part of the year and then the difficulty in fending off the Pokrovsk attack later in the year, but thanks to manpower problems easing mid-year and Russia now experiencing significant manpower issues instead, that may shift the balance of power. Whether Ukraine can retake significant territory in the face of Russian defences remains a major question.

400 power generators from Poland's strategic reserve have been sent to Ukraine to help it weather the attacks on its energy infrastructure.

Russian forces in Kupyansk are now surrounded in a single downtown block, but are refusing to surrender. The Ukrainians are weighing negotiating with them or just flattening the block. Their patience with door-to-door fighting  at a heavy cost seems to be at an end in this area.

Putin possibly making a dig at Epstein Island, by talking about Denmark selling the Virgin Islands to the US.

[Mentalist]

Despite some "constructive" developments in the Abu Dhabi negotiations, the orcs continue to try to keep Kyiv blacked out during a minus 20+ coldsnap.

At the same time, UAF struck power infrastructure in Belgorod, Bryans'k and Taganrog. Perm' and Murmansk are dealing with power outages due to un-assisted infrastructure failure.

UA's new MoD is the former Minister of Digital Transformation, the one who pushed drone development, and introduced many control systems into it. His goal is increase orc casualties to 50k+ a month, which is causing moral outrage and panic and commentary about "dehumanizing and bloodthirsty Ukrainians".
He's also striving to remove all reporting paperwork by integrating real-time status updates that commanders can monitor from all their units, eliminating the opportunities for false reporting, and removing admin paperwork. Which has the Z-head voenkors even more sppoked, b/c this efficiency is likely to make things a lot more impactful.

[the broken]

Even having the capability for an offensive, is it the right move, or is it better to strengthen the defences for longer term bleed?

[Mentalist]

the broken, on 25 January 2026 - 11:43 PM, said:

Even having the capability for an offensive, is it the right move, or is it better to strengthen the defences for longer term bleed?

The strategic goal, given hostile attitude from the US, is to force a ceasefire. Muscovites are demanding UA cede all of Donbas, and their basis is "we are on the offensive and we will grind it down eventually anyhow, so give it to us to stop further losses".


If there's a real opportunity to regain significant ground and reverse this offensive momentum, then it would make their demands more blatantly unreasonable.

The way things are going, UA is aiming for an attrition win. if their battlefield advantage becomes obvious, putler will be forced to start another mobilization. This could potentially be disastrous for his economy. Ultimately, Ukraine wants to force him to this move, but they need to increase enemy losses exponentially first, while keeping steady replenishment rates and reducing dependencies on weapon systems (and components) from allies and "neutral" 3rd parties (such as China)

It depends. They would need to get to the point where they completely stop an offensive in a sector b/c they are shifting forces to other frontlines to create a situational advantage that would allow for a counter-offensive operation of at least tactical-operational level. Right now, the orcs are still trying to push basically everywhere, so I find it unlikely; but I'm not part of the UAF HQ, so all I can do is speculate.

[Werthead]

The Ukraine-Russia conflict can currently be characterised as an attrition of resources, with Russia's primary resource being lives and its massive stockpile of Soviet-era equipment, which was meant to be its trump card in any war against NATO. Ukraine's primary resource in this exchange is territory.

The idea is that Russia's resources being drained are irreplaceable (you can't train a new Russian from birth to combat readiness in under 18 years; you can't magic 10,000 new tanks into existence in the blink of an eye) and Ukraine's are not. Ukraine's territory is still there, and can be regained at a later date (even potentially a much later date).

This doesn't mean that Ukraine's casualties are negligible or unimportant - very much not so - but Ukraine has managed to sustain far less casualties than Russia (even given the 3:1 population disparity) and most of its casualties are injured, who can either return to service later or can pursue other tasks in support of the war. More than 50% of Russia's casualties (recently, anyway) are KIA and are of no further value.

This creates a difficult problem for Ukraine because every time it's attempted a full offensive, it's either taken advantage of poor Russian defences or deployments (in the Kharkiv offensive of 2022, or the Kursk Offensive of 2024) to achieve significant breakthroughs with light casualties, or it has seen its favourable kill:loss ratio shift dramatically against it (as in the 2023 counteroffensive). This has encouraged Ukraine to remain on the defensive to inflict massive casualties on the Russians even if the Russians eventually do seize the territory.

The golden ticket for Ukraine to win the war on the battlefield is to find a way of breaching a sector on the front without incurring massive casualties, having forces ready to exploit such a breach and then reinforcements available to start creating irresistible momentum that can sustain a large-scale strategic victory that encourages local Russian forces to give ground. This is difficult for Ukraine given its normal numerical inferiority to the Russians, the Russians having had, in some areas, almost four years to build defences and the Russian tendency to shoot people trying to retreat. Still, there have been various ideas on how it might be possible, through greater use of drones or perhaps fighting along the coast which gives them only one flank to worry about (several probing attacks and reconnaissance along the Black Sea coast has only yielded questionable results; this involves crossing the mouth of the Dnipro under heavy fire, which the Russians have found impossible in the other direction, or landing on the easily-cut-off Kilburn Spit).

Otherwise it feels like Ukraine is either holding out for a peace deal or trying to outburn Russia's resources to either force Russia to retreat or to come seriously to the negotiating table. With Russian casualties at a very high level and its recruitment rate possibly at its worst rate of the war (some suggestions Russia lost four times as many troops dead, let alone injured, in December alone as it was able to recruit), this may be possible.

This post has been edited by Werthead: 26 January 2026 - 10:07 PM

[Werthead]

Ukraine has set a target of producing 7 million drones in 2026, almost double the number they produced in 2025. They plan to expand the "denial area" along the front from 20km to almost 100km, which would make resupply virtually impossible for front-line Russian units.

Hegseth is apparently being "wooed" by Ukraine to greenlight Tomahawks based on a ground-launch system, apparently similar to systems already field-tested by British and Ukrainian engineers for the Nightfall project. This would remove the technical difficulties with naval or air-launched Tomahawks that some American engineers had cited as a major obstacle (as it would require more direct American involvement in targeting and launching).

Russia has withdrawn in full from Qamishlo Airport in NE Syria and returned the base to Syrian government control.

A Russian assault squad attempted to use an open top, unarmored truck to charge Ukrainian lines near Dobropillya. This went about as well as you could expect.

Perun on some of the challenges faced by both sides in 2025 and what they'll face in 2026, especially economically.

[Werthead]

According to Trump, Modi has agreed to halt purchases of Russian oil and switch to American supplies. In return, Trump has lowered tariffs from 25% to 18%, whilst India is planning to cut its own tariffs to zero.

Whether Modi's readout on that is different remains to be seen.

Combat operations on the front continue, with a notable focus on the Kupyansk and Chasiv Yar fronts, but at a lower tempo due to the lower temperature. The so-called "energy ceasefire" Trump suggested might last a week or two has already ended, with Russia targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure near Kyiv and Kharkiv, whilst Ukraine has responded with attacks on Russian infrastructure near Belgorod.

Russia has dropped a FAB-250 fuel air bomb on a residential area in Donetsk Oblast, with no military utility at all, killing two civilians. Bizarre.

A Ukrainian Patriot missile intercepted and destroyed a Zircon "hypersonic" missile in the upper atmosphere. This isn't the first time a hypersonic has been shot down over Ukraine, but the first time the interception seems to have been caught on camera.

After a heavy strike on Ukraine's power grid knocked out power to 1,000 apartment buildings, Ukraine responded with a significant strike on Russia's power grid that left huge chunks of Kursk, Bryansk and Belgorod Oblasts in darkness.

This post has been edited by Werthead: 03 February 2026 - 08:20 PM

[Werthead]

Ukraine has hit one of Russia's major ICBM launch sites, hitting the prelaunch preparation complex at Site 105, Kapustin Yar with at least four Flamingo cruise missiles. Unconfirmed reports they were looking to disable an Oreshnik or similar-class missile being prepped for a (non-nuclear) strike on Ukraine.

The US and Russia have resumed their high-level contacts over military deployments and nuclear tests that was abandoned a couple of years ago. Apparently the first priority is to extend the New START treaty for a year or two until the US and Russia can discuss a replacement treaty (which both countries want to expand to include India, China, the UK and France).

The Giada III shadow fleet vessel has suffered engine damage after possibly being hit by drones in the Gulf of Finland.

A Russian fuel train in Tambov Oblast appears to have been completely destroyed, a huge explosion that will take days to clean up.

Russia's oil and gas revenue in January 2026 was less than half what it was one year earlier. Revenues are down over 12% over last month. Multiple Russian economists, including some previously keeping quiet, are now saying urgent action is needed to shore up the Russian economy or risk a major problem within six to nine months.

Estonia has seized a Russian shadow fleet vessel off its coast.

A Ukrainian Antonov An-124 has flown directly from Ukraine to Travis Air Force Base, California to pick up over 35 tons of military equipment and flew it directly back to Ukraine. Unclear, but this might be the first direct US-to-Ukraine air shipment of the entire conflict (everything else usually going into Poland by air and then by train or truck into Ukraine proper).

This post has been edited by Werthead: 06 February 2026 - 07:50 PM

[Werthead]

Russian milbloggers are also just starting to sound the alarm about a reported troop concentration of Ukrainian forces near Kharkiv, with some saying 50,000 Ukrainian troops are amassing between Kharkiv and the Belgorod Oblast border. Some of the units identified are ones that have not been in heavy combat for a while and have been withdrawn for the line for replenishment, reinforcement and training. The 82nd and 95th Airborne Assault Brigades and the 148th Artillery Brigade have also been reported in this area by some Russian sources, and elements of 3rd Corps.

Ukrainian sources are saying this is dubious at best (if not outright garbage): the 82nd and 95th have recently been in combat in Pokrovsk and the 3rd Corps has been active on the Lyman front. They're not sure what the Russians are talking about.

The Belgorod border has been identified as a weak point for a while, and Ukraine did seize ground on the Russian side of the border but it was tenuous and they never did much with it. One of the reasons for Ukraine to operate on this front is a relative lack of Russian heavy defences and the desire to destroy forward drone positions used for strikes on Kharkiv itself. However, the Ukrainian assault on Kursk, though ultimately tactically successful (it halted a Russian offensive on that sector and cost Russia - and North Korea - over 40,000 KIA in return for ~15,000 Ukrainian casualties), did not strategically achieve much and apparently the Trump administration has discouraged Ukraine from a similar operation in favour of retaking Ukrainian territory. If Ukraine can regain a significant amount of lost territory, that could change the calculus in American support and arguments on where to draw the line on territory.

It is certainly the case that multiple OSINT sources and commentators on both sides have suggested that Ukraine could undertake an offensive in 2026 (unlike last year), but this particular report sounds a bit like a mirage.

Ukraine has launched a counter-attack on the Zaporizhzhia front, retaking Prydorozhne (which is a tiny settlement, this wasn't a major fight) and fighting their way into Ternuvate next door. This front was a cause for serious concern last year so Ukraine rolling it back (if only modestly so far) is a good thing.

India has taken control of three Russian shadow fleet tankers, to the surprise of Moscow (and everyone else), apparently as part of a security cooperation agreement with the United States.

80,000 people in Belgorod are without power and the oblast governor is advising people to evacuate or leave, as he does not think they can repair the power system in question. That's certainly something.

A couple of bullish comments from Ukrainian politicians including People’s Deputy Roman Kostenko saying they're sensing a swing in Russia's economic and political fortunes, and if Ukraine can hold through the spring and into summer, they believe more favourable battlefield conditions could develop to allow them to negotiate from a stronger position.

This post has been edited by Werthead: 08 February 2026 - 10:31 PM

[Werthead]

The Zaporizhzhia front assault may be expanding into a general counter-offensive, with multiple addition Ukrainian units joinining the assault from the north. Ukraine has deployed seven assault regiments and three assault brigades, which is significant manpower. Some have been transferred after successful counter-attacks at Kupyansk and Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian objective may be to penetrate a weak spot in the Russian line (as this is relatively newly-acquired territory without strong defensive fortifications) and then drive into the rear of the Russian Vostok grouping. This would encourage a general collapse of the front and a pushback of several miles, pushing Russian forces away from Huliaipole.

The initial attack has had success by combining the strike with Russians losing Starlink and bad weather causing problems for the Russian forces not used to conditions in this area. Russian forces have been pushed back near Orestopil and Sosnivka, and have engaged around Berezove. Ukrainian forces are also continuing to push in Ternuvate, but not as strongly; this may have been a feint to draw Russian forces forwards and then hit them from the flank. Russian analysts are somewhat alarmed about this.

Ukrainian forces also advancing in Kharkiv Oblast, and impressively have retaken Chuhunivka, which means they've rolled back the front almost to the international border. This is right at the northern tip of the eastern salient into Ukrainian territory (which widens much further south into the same front that's been rolled back from Kupyansk). Ukraine has also retaken Popivka in Sumy Oblast, again pushing the front right back to the international border. These are not massive advances, but solid achievements.

A rather interesting report that three Russian units deployed to the Ukraine-Russia border in Belgorod with orders to reinforce the northern front in Ukraine have straight-up mutinied. At least some elements of the Russian 22nd (presumably the 22nd Army Corps, not the whole thing I imagine), 1st VKS (presumably the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the VKS) and 1427th Motorised Rifle Regiment (recently active in Kupyansk) have refused orders to move. Apparently at least one soldier said that losing Starlink was the last straw. A disciplinary force from 22nd Corps has reportedly moved into the area and some of them have gone missing as well.

Interesting. Maybe not too significant but worth keeping an eye on.

Meanwhile, the number of residents in Belgorod without power has grown to 100,000. The governor Gladkov has blown up and blamed Putin for not supplying Belgorod with enough air defences. A Kremlin spokesman said, "these are the words of a traitor."

The Russian regulators have moved to restrict the use of Telegram by everyone, including the military. Heavy pushback by milbloggers, who rely on Telegram to reach their audience, and even some Russian troops, who use it to contact one another in the field.

Unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian units may have reached points in Russian-controlled territory over 14km east of Ternuvate, leading to panic from Russian units on the front line. If this is true or not is highly debateable. The situation is rather unclear at the moment, but Ukrainian forces did firmly push Russian units back from Orestopol and Sosnivka, with even Russian maps showing them now firmly back in Ukrainian territory and out of the "grey zone."

Ukrainian armor has now been seen in the area, with Abrams tanks directly engaging Russian forces. Russian drones seem to be MIA, with some Russian sources claiming the loss of their pirated Starlink connection has led to the current situation. 

However, Russian forces have manged to cross the frozen Siverskyi Donets River to enter the settlement of Zakitne. This is south-east of Lyman and, critically, north-east from Slovyansk. It's been known for a while that Russia has been trying to find a way of enveloping both Slovyansk and Kramatorsk simultaneously rather than fighting for one city and then the other, which would be long and bloody (probably taking two years). Ukraine has some reinforcements in the north, apparently, so these may be redeployed to help counter-attack. This situation could become dangerous, as Slovyansk and Kramatorsk falling would effectively complete the Russian conquest of Donetsk Oblast and the Donbas, and would represent Russia's largest strategic victory since the capture of the twin cities of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in the first summer of the war.

This post has been edited by Werthead: 10 February 2026 - 06:35 PM

[Mentalist]

It'll likely take at least a week before DeepState and UAF HQ starts confirming any gains.

I'll be pleasantly surprised if it's something significant, but we'll have to wait and see.

[Werthead]

NATO assessment is that Russia has passed 350,000 people KIA, which is likely lagging several months behind current figures. There is also the assessment that Russia lost 400,000 killed and wounded in 2025 alone, out of a total casualty count of 1.3 million since the invasion started in 2022, a third of the total in less than a quarter of the time.

Ukraine has received an extreme long-range over-the-horizon radar from Spain, worth €37 million. Ukraine has been asking for these from the USA and been rebuffed, so Spain decided to step up.

This post has been edited by Werthead: Yesterday, 08:56 PM