[Mentalist]

Macros, on 25 January 2024 - 10:01 PM, said:

How long before Boris Nahadzhin wakes up dead?

Signature collection ends Jan 31st

After that Central Electoral Committee has to vet them to decide whether he is allowed to continue his campaign.

Most likely, he will be rejected at this stage,

[Azath Vitr (D'ivers]

Trump seems to have killed US aid to Ukraine (at least until after the election). Will Ukraine's other allies be willing to increase their aid to compensate effectively? How much of an effect will the withdrawal of US support have over the next year?

Quote

The strange idea to link Ukraine aid to controversial changes to U.S. immigration law and border policy [...] The ballots cast by voters in [the Republican primary] then put Donald Trump on a seemingly unstoppable path to the Republican presidential nomination; Trump's telephone calls to Republican senators, telling them to kill the Ukraine/border legislation, suddenly mattered. His motives are blatantly selfish: He wants the U.S.-Mexico border to remain chaotic so that he can use the issue in his campaign. He doesn't want Biden to benefit from any perceived solution or progress. And he doesn't care if Ukraine runs out of ammunition as a result. [That's being overly generous....]

To the outside world, none of the logic behind any of these decisions makes sense. All they can see is that the American political system has been hijacked and rendered dysfunctional by a radical, pro-Russian faction led by Trump

Is Congress Really Going to Abandon Ukraine Now? - The Atlantic

Quote

Ukraine can produce first-person-view strike drones in large numbers, but they require funding and ammunition for them, which is a problem that is much easier to solve with Western help than the slowly increasing production of 155mm rounds. European nations could fund drone production facilities in Ukraine or in bordering states.

[...] Western artillery production capacity [even with US support] is not sufficient to meet Ukraine's expenditure rates even just for defensive purposes, necessitating continued deliveries of cluster munitions from stockpiles to close the gap this year. [ and European stockpiles are already mostly empty? US stockpiles will apparently no longer be available? ...]

[... Ukraine's] strategy should begin with a hold to hedge against Russian offensives this year [...] more fortified defense-in-depth, which will make it easier to defend the nearly 1,000-kilometer front line, allowing Ukraine to rotate forces, free up its best units, and reduce the ammunition required to defend. Ukraine has started to dig in, but these efforts are nascent when compared to the defense-in-depth fortified positions established by Russian forces. Russia has dedicated engineering brigades that construct and improve fortifications, whereas in the Ukrainian military, defenses are the responsibility of each maneuver brigade. Stronger defenses, including underground bunkers and tunnels, will also compensate for Russia's advantage in artillery and glide bombs.

Hold, Build, and Strike: A Vision for Rebuilding Ukraine's Advantage in 2024 - War on the Rocks

This post has been edited by Azath Vitr (D'ivers: 27 January 2024 - 06:43 PM

[Azath Vitr (D'ivers]

So this may transition into a war of tunnels? Or not so much?

Old article but I'd assume it's still accurate:

Quote

A secret weapon helping Ukrainians fend off Russia? Subterranean mazes

[...] Putin’s hesitancy to send his forces into a sprawling network of tunnels under the complex hints at a truth in warfare: Tunnels can be an effective tool in resisting an oppressor.

[...] Such networks allow small units to move undetected by aerial sensors [...] For an invader who does not possess a thorough map of the subterranean passages, this can present a nightmare scenario[...]

Ancient besieging forces used tunneling operations as a means to weaken otherwise well-fortified positions. [...] Collapsing the tunnel weakened the fortification.

[...] To counteract the significant air and satellite advantage held by the United States and NATO, the Soviet military dug underground passages under major population centers.

[...] allowed for the movement of military forces unobserved [...]

These same tunnels serve to connect much of the industrial infrastructure [...]

Other Ukrainian cities have similar systems, some dating back centuries. [...]

For example, Odesa[...] there is no documented map of the full extent of the tunnels.

In the event of a Russian assault on Odesa, the local knowledge of the underground passages might prove to be an extremely valuable asset for the defenders. The fact that more than 1,000 entrances to the catacombs have been identified should surely give Russian attackers pause

A secret weapon helping Ukrainians fend off Russia? Subterranean mazes (fastcompany.com)

From October:

Quote

invading forces have started digging tunnels for camouflage [but I'd guess they might also be used for weakening, or getting past, fortifications? or possibly entering preexisting tunnel networks?].

The underground infrastructure is being built to enable the Russians to emerge somewhere closer to their enemy’s positions and catch them off guard.

The tactic is appropriate for surprise assault since drones cannot detect soldiers moving several feet below the ground.

Ukraine Says Russia Now Using Evolved Tactics Including Tunnels, Robotics (thedefensepost.com)

Russia digging tunnels to get past Ukrainian fortifications (as well as past the drones)? Ukraine using the existing tunnel networks, maybe extending them or creating new ones....

From 5 days ago:

Quote

Ukrainian troops moved into Zenit in the early days of Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine back in 2014. They’ve been there ever since, lodging in the complex’s tunnels.

[...] The hilltop Zenit complex is “critically important to the defense of the city, and for keeping the roads to the city open,” [...] while [Russian forces] haven’t been able directly to capture Zenit, they very nearly cut it off during furious fighting [...] “If unable to capture the area, bombard it with artillery, dispatch the light infantry and capture the rubble.” In that way, the Russians might still succeed in cutting off Zenit. Possibly soon.

[...] If House Republicans had voted for aid when Biden first proposed it, back in October, Ukrainian forces would not be running low on ammunition today—and Zenit might not be at risk of falling.

One Thing Can Pry Kyiv's Troops From The Avdiivka Bunker: Republicans (forbes.com)

So unfortunately the tunnel network isn't extensive enough to move supplies to Zenit from further away.

But I'd guess that if fighting happens within the tunnel networks, that could make Ukrainian ammunition much more efficient? Closer quarters, harder to miss? And if Russian forces don't find an effective way to map the tunnels and monitor what's going on in them, Ukrainian forces should have a major advantage there. OTOH Russia could reduce the cities to rubble and try to collapse the tunnels under them.

[Azath Vitr (D'ivers]

Today:

Quote

Russian forces might have abandoned their plans to encircle the city of Avdiivka and plan to fight through it "block-by-block," [...]

Russian forces are reportedly attempting to bypass Ukrainian fortifications by trying to enter the city's edges using service tunnels.

Russia Changes Tactics, Could Fight Through Avdiivka 'Block-by-Block': ISW (businessinsider.com)

From yesterday:

Quote

Because Russia has suffered such heavy personnel and armored vehicle losses against Ukraine, the Russian troops will attempt to enter Avdiivka through service tunnels, a plan designed to cut down on drone attacks from Ukraine. However, Russia has been attempting to infiltrate Avdiivka via the tunnels since October

Putin Falsely Claims 'De-Nazification' of Ukraine as Pretext for War (voanews.com)

So the war has already transitioned to the tunnels. And if Russia does manage to occupy Avdiivka presumably Ukrainians will try to continue to defend it from tunnels that Russia hasn't occupied, in a form of urban warfare similar to what's been happening in Gaza. Though Russian forces could decide to pull back, reduce the city to rubble, and lay siege to whatever tunnel networks there they haven't managed to occupy.

No mention in either article of Russia or Ukraine trying to dig new tunnels / extend existing tunnel networks though. Or of Russia trying the ancient tactic of collapsing tunnels underneath the fortifications....

[Garak]

I'm certain both sides are working on tunnels. Not doing so would be dumb.

[Mentalist]

They're going to try their hardest to capture at least the admin center of Avdiyivka prior to their "election" in March to have a big, fat symbolic victory to dangle in front of people.

At the current rate of ammo supply, I can't rule out they'll succeed. DeepState map is showing that they've managed to get into the residential outskirts in the S. It's maybe only 600 m or so, but once they have that toehold, dislodging them becomes incredibly difficult and costly. And once the fighting shifts to street-by-street and block-by-block, the casualty numbers no longer look advantageous.

[Azath Vitr (D'ivers]

 Mentalist, on 29 January 2024 - 07:06 AM, said:

They're going to try their hardest to capture at least the admin center of Avdiyivka prior to their "election" in March to have a big, fat symbolic victory to dangle in front of people.

At the current rate of ammo supply, I can't rule out they'll succeed. DeepState map is showing that they've managed to get into the residential outskirts in the S. It's maybe only 600 m or so, but once they have that toehold, dislodging them becomes incredibly difficult and costly. And once the fighting shifts to street-by-street and block-by-block, the casualty numbers no longer look advantageous.

I'd guess that, unlike the Hamas tunnels, the Cold War-era tunnels probably weren't designed with urban warfare in mind... then again if they were designed before the end of WWII maybe they were? Perhaps they've been modified or added to though in anticipation of invasion....

IDK about the pre-Soviet era tunnels under other cities---the ones under Odesa were apparently for mining.

Wonder if Russia has anything like the giant earthworm robot the US military commissioned for rapidly digging tunnels in war zones. From 2021:

Quote

The next frontier for robots is underground and the military is spending big bucks on autonomous diggers.


[...] rapidly constructing tactical tunnel networks to provide secure logistics infrastructure to pre-position supplies or resupply troops as they move through an area.

[...] also [...] "seeks novel approaches to rapidly map, navigate, and search underground environments during time-sensitive combat operations or disaster response scenarios."

GE made an earthworm robot | ZDNET

DARPA official declared project Underminer successful in 2022, though IDK whether the giant earthworm robot is actually ready to be deployed (or more of a proof of concept).

Russia did develop a robot snake prototype for potential military applications back in 2019:

Quote

Designed for slithering through difficult-to-reach places, the snake robot [...] "Such a robot can prove very valuable in urban and subterranean combat — it can crawl where other small tracked or wheeled UGVs cannot. No doubt, Russian military will want to test such a robot given that in Syria, the [Ministry of Defense] has encountered subterranean tunnels used by anti-Assad forces,"

Will this reptilian robot lead Russian soldiers in cave battles? (c4isrnet.com)

Quote

the small IRIS robot that soldiers call a "throwbot", with its ability to drive down tunnels relaying pictures back to its operator, using specialist sensors to detect objects and people.

It is also understood that Israel has developed a robot similar to the US Marines' Gladiator tactical tracked drone [to send into the tunnels] that has sensors and carries a 7.62mm squad automatic weapon.

The robots will also be able to use their sensors and equipment to find and potentially detonate booby-traps planted by Hamas.


Defence analysts also believe the Israeli army could develop tactics used by Ukraine in its fight against Russia by deploying airborne drones inside the tunnels, some equipped with small bombs.

Robots and attack dogs: What Israel brings to tunnel combat (thenationalnews.com)

... so the airborne drones might also be effective in the tunnels? Though if they're using explosives, the tunnels might collapse....

This post has been edited by Azath Vitr (D'ivers: 29 January 2024 - 02:44 PM

[Garak]

Well collapsing enemy tunnels was a thing in WWI tunnel fighting. As for what Russia has developed, take it with a spoon of salt. A lot of the stuff they've been bragging about over the last decade has turned out to be a big fat lie.

[Werthead]

Perun's latest analysis is pretty decent.

He points out how things have not gone Ukraine's way, but he also points out the absurd cost/benefit ratio Russia is continuing to pay for places like Bakhmut and Avdiivka, generally strategically insignificant locations but which have become resource-significant for tying up vast amounts of enemy manpower. The cost that Russia is paying to take these places in lives, time, equipment and money even in areas where Ukraine is fiercely conserving artillery and ammunition remains unsustainable. If they have to expend the same number of lives to finish taking Avdiivka (even if they do seem to finally be making progress on the SE front of the town) and the next city, and the next, and the next one after that, they'll burn through their total pool of possibly-recruitable manpower in the next few years, possibly without ever achieving a major breakthrough, and even if Ukraine only continues to receive dribs and drabs of support from Europe and bugger all from the US. That said, he doesn't rule out major shifts in progress from either side, possibly coming from unexpected technological breakthroughs on the drone front.

Particularly interesting is the use of Patriot as an offensive weapon and how Ukraine is shaping the battlefield specifically to complement the arrival of F-16s (and also the recent return-to-service of MiGs in deep storage for decades).

It also looks like Ukraine will finally cross the 1 million threshold early this year for total mobilised forces in-country, which is quite impressive. I know some were sceptical they'd ever do it.

Ukraine also seems to have achieved a breakthrough with its REB EW system, which can scramble incoming missile telemetry and shunt them off-course. This is effectively free (once R&D and setup is done), unlike spending interceptor missiles costing thousands to hundreds of thousands of dollars per hit. This should help them conserve their AA stocks against higher-value targets (like Kinzhal).

[Werthead]

Putin's new palatial residence just 31km (within HIMARS range) from the Finnish border suggests he might not be thinking about attacking NATO any time soon.

This post has been edited by Werthead: 31 January 2024 - 10:59 PM

[Azath Vitr (D'ivers]

 Werthead, on 31 January 2024 - 07:18 PM, said:

Putin's new palatial residence just 31km (within HIMARS range) from the Finnish border suggests he might be thinking about attacking NATO any time soon.

Of course you mean 'not' I'd assume....

[Mentalist]

Missile corvette in Lake Donuzlav (W coast of Crimea, just N of Yevpatoria) promoted to submarine, with epic footage from sea drones.

EU finally broke Comrade Orban and approved the 50 billion aid package. This will at least make sure Kyiv can keep the economy running, paying out pensions and salaries.

[Azath Vitr (D'ivers]

Quote

Ukraine is limited to firing 2,000 artillery shells a day, roughly one-third of Russia[...]


[...] urged the bloc to fulfill its commitment of one million artillery shells [...]


[...] Increasingly, reports suggest that in some cases Ukrainian forces can no longer fulfill all their combat operations. [...]


[...] small groups of Russians[...] not worth the expense in ammunition.


Ukraine Limited to Firing 2,000 Shells a Day Against Russia: Official (businessinsider.com)

But a Ukrainian official estimated (see my post in Ye Big Politics thread) that AI targeting they plan to install in 'self-propelled artillery' will decrease the need for ammunition by 30%. So for those cases at least, if the 1/3 Ukraine:Russia would otherwise hold, then (1/3)/0.7 = 0.476, or just under 1/2 Ukraine:Russia. And there's also the risk that Russia will install similar or better AI targeting, and if they're not too concerned about wasting ammunition perhaps supplement it with AI firing as well, to gain a significant speed advantage.


And Slow Biden has finally started using some of his more obscure presidential powers to get more weapons to Ukraine, though what he can do is apparently comparatively limited.

[Werthead]

Ukraine has destroyed a Tarantul-class missile corvette off the coast of Crimea. This was a big hit, and will likely continue to keep Russian ships clear of the western Black Sea.

Russia launched a significant mechanised attack south of Novomykhailivka, but it never really got close to the Ukrainian lines. Ukrainian drones tracked the column and destroyed it with FPV munitions, artillery and ATGM fire. Thirteen vehicles reported destroyed. Some Russian channels already describing this as a huge disaster.

Fighting on the Krynky front still quite fierce. Russian resupply and movement has been compromised by a new Ukrainian tactic, deploying high-yield mines dropped by drones behind their lines. One Russian source is claiming a second crossing has been successful, south-west of the existing one, and Ukraine has established a second foothold. No confirmation yet.

Apparently a Russian artillery shortage on the Avdiivka front, which seems surprising. Russian offensives in the last couple of days has proceeded without artillery cover, which have gone as well as you'd expect. Some Russian soldiers furious and refusing to advance until artillery cover resumes. One Russian unit apparently driven back with heavy losses by Ukrainian artillery and infantry with no answer from the Russian guns. Interesting if that's a systemic issue or a short-term supply problem.

Russian glide bombs meant for Avdiivka seem to be falling short of the front, sometimes landing well behind the lines and hitting Russian-controlled territory. Ukrainian military intelligence believes that they have been rattled by recent aircraft losses so are dropping their bombs from too great a distance to be effective. Given the importance of glide bombs on the Avdiivka and Krynky fronts to make up for a shortage of drones and apparently now artillery (however temporary that proves to be), that's not ideal for the Russians.

The Ukrainians seem to be making excellent use of the Swedish Archer self-propelled artillery gun, with its ability to move fast, target Russian hardpoints and artillery at range and then scoot off quickly being highly praised.

Russian gasoline exports have dropped by 37% in the first month of 2024, blamed on Ukrainian drone strikes on oil refineries.

Meanwhile, the Russians have deployed the M-46 cannon, a 130mm piece produced from 1946 to 1950, and the ammunition for which is no longer manufactured in Russia. North Korea does have some ammunition for it, which is probably why they decided to pull it out.

France and Britain are pushing hard for formal candidate status for Ukraine to join NATO to be extended; the US and Germany are hesitant, but other European NATO members are pretty firm that they want this to happen. Interesting to see what happens there.

Apparently GLSDB ammunition is expected to finally be deployed in Ukraine in the near future after a year of delays. These are rocket-assisted artillery weapons that can be fired from the air or from HIMARS launchers. In the latter case, they have a range of over 150km.

This post has been edited by Werthead: 02 February 2024 - 05:46 PM

[the broken]

Huh. A month ago 7,000 shells per day was a record low for Russia, now they're on 6,000.

[Werthead]

Yeah, definitely something weird going on with the shells. It might be Russia has ordered conservation of shells in preparation for an offensive elsewhere.

[the broken]

That, or their logistics are in trouble. It's just interesting in light of all that journalism not very long ago about how Russia can produce so much artillery, and now they seem to be struggling. Even if they were conserving shells, they should still want to keep up pressure across the front.

[Azath Vitr (D'ivers]

Quote

Russian troops tried infiltrating [...] Avdiivka through a sewer but were immediately hunted down by attack drones[...]

[...] emerged from the sewer smeared in feces [...] and tried to run into the suburbs.

[...] footage shows a soldier running into [...] a ruined house before a strike hits

Russian Troops Emerged From a Sewer Only to Be Struck by a Drone: Report (businessinsider.com)

Wonder if it would be feasible to save ammunition by attacking while troops emerging from tunnels/sewers are bunched together---if they're all coming out of the same exit at least. Perhaps there are too many tunnels and exits to booby trap or have drones/artillery near each one? But I'd guess AI surveillance is helping to speed the response....

the broken, on 02 February 2024 - 11:14 PM, said:

Huh. A month ago 7,000 shells per day was a record low for Russia, now they're on 6,000.

An article from yesterday is claiming Russia's using 10,000/day:

Quote

Ukraine is firing just 2,000 rounds a day compared to Russia's 10,000 daily shells [...]

"For artillery, that means initially not firing at suspected Russian targets, but firing only at known positions," [...]

"You need artillery to suppress the enemy — not just to kill defenders — but to suppress others who may come to their aid," [...]

"Without artillery, they're not going to be able to maneuver,"

Ukraine's Ammo Problems Hinder Ability to Fire at Russian Targets (businessinsider.com)

... not going to be able to maneuver above ground, perhaps, though that leaves the tunnel networks... and any additional tunnels they can add linking those networks....

But following their citation links, the 10,000 / day figure appears to be based on a January 22nd New York Times report:

Quote

Last summer, Ukraine was firing as many as 7,000 artillery shells a day and had managed to damage Russia's ammunition supplies to the point that Russia was firing about 5,000 rounds a day, according to U.S. and other Western analysts. Now the Ukrainians are struggling to fire 2,000 rounds daily, while Russian artillery, augmented by the North Korean shells, is reaching about 10,000 a day, analysts said.

North Korean Missiles in Ukraine Prompt New Concerns - The New York Times (nytimes.com)

... so that's probably just outdated, though several experts were apparently interviewed for yesterday's article. OTOH the NYT article does indicate that 7000 is far from a record low for Russia....

This post has been edited by Azath Vitr (D'ivers: 03 February 2024 - 04:45 PM

[Werthead]

the broken, on 03 February 2024 - 12:27 AM, said:

That, or their logistics are in trouble. It's just interesting in light of all that journalism not very long ago about how Russia can produce so much artillery, and now they seem to be struggling. Even if they were conserving shells, they should still want to keep up pressure across the front.

I'm wondering if GLSDB has already been deployed and they're suddenly hitting the ammo storage facilities that had been moved back out of HIMARS range but are in the extended range of GLSDB. That could explain quite a lot. Though I'd expect more video footage of that to be available.

[Werthead]

Interesting analysis of Russian artillery platform stockpiles after two years of war. Russia has lost over a third of its self-propelled guns and over half of its towed artillery systems. This doesn't include it's TOS-1 thermobaric systems, which it has now lost 50% of from its 2022 stockpiles. And this is all their platforms anywhere, in storage and ready for action. They are building new ones, but this is slow going. It turns out getting 2 million crappy shells from North Korea isn't much help when you have half the weapons needed to actually fire them that you did under two years ago. It's likely the Ukrainian strategy last year of destroying Russian artillery with drones and HIMARS was very successful.

A Volgograd oil facility was attacked by a Ukrainian drone, but fortunately (for the Russians), their AA systems spotted it before it could attack. Unfortunately, for reasons unknown, they waited until it was too close, so the falling drone wreckage hit the facility and cause a substantial explosion.

Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil facilities have been incredibly successful, resulting in a near-40% drop in exports in January 2024, sparking major alarm in the oil sector if this was to continue, which it appears it will.

Ukraine is deploying small and medium drones in vast numbers, with Ukrainian civilians assembling lighter drones as flatpacks through the post before sending them onto the front. In some cases, Ukraine had such a huge number of drones and nothing to do with them, so were sending them after individual Russian soldiers around Avdiivka (culminating in the scene of using seven drones to blow up one room, even though there only three or four Russian soldiers in there). This has also occurred simultaneously with the advent of the Baba Yaga drone, which is causing a serious case of Russian forces shitting themselves. The BY drone apparently uses a new communication and control system that the Russians have not figured out how to jam, and can apparently act as both a carrier for smaller drones and also drop serious explosive warheads and mines powerful enough to take out MBTs. This advantage is likely temporary, but for the time being Ukraine is clearly winning the drone war. (ETA: Ukraine has apparently fielded a new drone type that can drop PG-7VL HEAT grenades onto targets from above, which should be able to almost obliterate anything in the Russian inventory at relatively close range).

Several Russian milbloggers warning of a renewed Ukrainian push on the Zaporizhzhia front. They believe that Ukraine did not engage half or more of their offensive forces in the region last year and these forces could resume the attack whilst Russian efforts are focused on Avdiivka. However, even the most rabidly pro-Ukrainian sources seem to think this is improbable: Ukraine does not have the shell stockpiles available, and will likely not resume an attack in that sector until the have more reliable means of clearing the mines. Also, the Ukrainians practised rotation during that offensive, so a lot of the troops in that sector have seen combat and need refreshing before they can even think of attacking again. Also, attacking just before the mud season would seem unwise.

Excellent analysis of how the EU got Orban to fold on his opposition to the Ukrainian deal.

Better footage of the Russian defeat at Novomykhailivka, which Russians are calling one of the most calamitous single-battle defeats of the war. Two T-72s crashed into one another and then the remaining tanks advanced into a solid wall of drones and artillery. Apparently they'd already attacked in this sector a few days earlier, so the Ukrainians had the area pre-zeroed.