[LinearPhilosopher]

So apparently the Institute for the Study of War publishes daily articles on the status of the war

https://www.understandingwar.org/

Pretty neat reports with tons of maps.

[Abyss]

HoosierDaddy, on 24 August 2023 - 12:28 PM, said:

... All encompassing paranoia is no way to live, even with money.

Counterpoint: when the all encompassing paranoia is status quo, might as well be paranoid and filthy rich.

[Mentalist]

Sounds like a juicy hit on the Kursk airbase (roughly 100 km from the order)
4 jets, several radar and anti-air systems hit by a swarm of 16 kamikaze drones. 3 were intercepted, the rest apparently got through.

In the S, the orcs are bringing in VDV reserves from the NE to slow down the push on Tokmak.

[Werthead]

Russian Telegram sources reporting Ukrainian assaults are underway northwest and northeast of Robotyne, aimed towards Kopani and Verbove. These are obvious attacks designed to "flatten" the salient around Robotyne and prevent Russian counter-attacks.

Several OSINT sources pointing to satellite imagery suggesting gaps in the Russian defensive lines running east from Verbove, where work on the main trenchlines and defensive positions seems to have not yet begun or been left incomplete. Suggestions that Ukraine could score a (relatively) easy breach and turn of the line along the eastern and south-eastern approaches to Robotyne. That helps Ukraine's overall offensive but is not a huge deal, just a nice bonus.

Some Russian claims that Russia is pouring troops into the new lines taking shape between Tokmak and Robotyne, but they are not convinced by the quality of the defensive works there. Ukrainian sources are indicating they believe that the areas behind Robotyne are far less heavily mined than in front, which may make for easier going.

Whoever said a few weeks ago this is like the gruelling bocage/hedgerow-to-hedgerow fighting of Normandy 1944 was dead right. The question is if there is going to be a Falaise moment when a sudden breakthrough takes place.

The Russians deployed the 205th Brigade to the Dnipro islands to "stabilise" the situation but they promptly got swarmed by drones and artillery strikes. The 205th sent out angry Telegram messages, and the Kremlin's response was to film a fake propaganda report from the 205th saying everything was fine, which Telegram tore to pieces within minutes. The 205th continue to be hard-pressed, and the Russians continue to hesitate because they have no idea about what this is, a distraction or a serious military effort?

[Werthead]

US intelligence has offered a very rough assessment that Ukraine has lost 70,000 troops killed in the war to date. That seems on the high side, but there also seems to be an assessment that as many as 50% of these casualties have been sustained since the start of this year, with the bulk falling in counter-offensive operations. Given there was speculation of 30,000-40,000 KIA at the end of last year, this seems to track.

That's obviously horrendous losses, although still far less than Russia (with 250,000+ casualties overall, maybe 150,000 KIA). However, it indicates that Ukraine has moved out of the favourable 3:1 KIA ratio with Russia (which tracks with the respective populations of the two countries) more towards 2:1, which whilst still good, is not good enough to outlast Russia if it pushes things to the wire. Overall casualty figures are not available.

Russia is reportedly planning to mobilise 30,000 conscripts from Crimea, on the grounds that since Crimea is in danger of attack (and is being attacked regularly), Crimean citizens should do their part. The fact it's quite hard to get out of Crimea at the moment and dodge the draft is probably purely coincidental. In fact, Ukraine has been hitting Crimean targets again today, with reports of a large target destroyed on the Crimean steppe but it's unclear what. Possibly another air defence system.

Ukrainian forces have raised a flag on the south (left) bank of the Dnipro. It is unclear where, beyond "Kherson region."

Some analysis of the Robotyne front suggests the 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division was moved to the front over a month ago from the Kherson Dnipro front. The 7th appears to have suffered significant losses and been rotated out, or at least pulled back in favour of the newly-arrived 76th Guards from Luhansk. The 76th appear to have been kept in reserve for a breakthrough on the Kreminna axis when that seemed to be going well. When that did not occur and Ukraine achieved favourable results in the south, the 76th was sent to the front instead.

Both the 7th and 76th are VDV units typically assigned to spearhead offensives. Using offensive units in defence is not necessarily a great idea and may have been forced on Russia due to mounting losses on the front. Despite these reinforcements, Ukraine appears to maintain numerical local superiority along the Robotyne-Tokmak axis, with reserves ready to punch through should a major breach occur. Russia seems reluctant to commit overwhelming reinforcements to the region, fearing counter-attacks across the Dnipro, or on the northern front. Russia has also poured heavy reinforcements into the Bakhmut region to try to hold the city, on the grounds that the political custard pie in the face of ceding the city would lead to many heads rolling.

Also additional indications that the 7th and perhaps now the 76th have been used to conduct offensive action in front of the main trench defence network, which is particularly cretinous (we also need to recall that order allegedly signed by Gerasimov doubting the loyalty of the VDV and indicating a willingness to bleed the entire service to remove it as a potential threat).

Just as I was writing that, some indications that Ukraine has launched a substantial artillery assault on Verbove, directly on the main Russian defensive line. Quite a lot of heavy fire directed at the main line. A few days ago there was speculation that the lines in Verbove were not as substantial as to the west, with far fewer trenches and ditches in front of the main line to break up attacks.

This post has been edited by Werthead: 29 August 2023 - 07:04 PM

[Mentalist]

Werthead, on 29 August 2023 - 06:59 PM, said:

US intelligence has offered a very rough assessment that Ukraine has lost 70,000 troops killed in the war to date. That seems on the high side, but there also seems to be an assessment that as many as 50% of these casualties have been sustained since the start of this year, with the bulk falling in counter-offensive operations. Given there was speculation of 30,000-40,000 KIA at the end of last year, this seems to track.

That's obviously horrendous losses, although still far less than Russia (with 250,000+ casualties overall, maybe 150,000 KIA). However, it indicates that Ukraine has moved out of the favourable 3:1 KIA ratio with Russia (which tracks with the respective populations of the two countries) more towards 2:1, which whilst still good, is not good enough to outlast Russia if it pushes things to the wire. Overall casualty figures are not available.

Russia is reportedly planning to mobilise 30,000 conscripts from Crimea, on the grounds that since Crimea is in danger of attack (and is being attacked regularly), Crimean citizens should do their part. The fact it's quite hard to get out of Crimea at the moment and dodge the draft is probably purely coincidental. In fact, Ukraine has been hitting Crimean targets again today, with reports of a large target destroyed on the Crimean steppe but it's unclear what. Possibly another air defence system.

Ukrainian forces have raised a flag on the south (left) bank of the Dnipro. It is unclear where, beyond "Kherson region."

Some analysis of the Robotyne front suggests the 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division was moved to the front over a month ago from the Kherson Dnipro front. The 7th appears to have suffered significant losses and been rotated out, or at least pulled back in favour of the newly-arrived 76th Guards from Luhansk. The 76th appear to have been kept in reserve for a breakthrough on the Kreminna axis when that seemed to be going well. When that did not occur and Ukraine achieved favourable results in the south, the 76th was sent to the front instead.

Both the 7th and 76th are VDV units typically assigned to spearhead offensives. Using offensive units in defence is not necessarily a great idea and may have been forced on Russia due to mounting losses on the front. Despite these reinforcements, Ukraine appears to maintain numerical local superiority along the Robotyne-Tokmak axis, with reserves ready to punch through should a major breach occur. Russia seems reluctant to commit overwhelming reinforcements to the region, fearing counter-attacks across the Dnipro, or on the northern front. Russia has also poured heavy reinforcements into the Bakhmut region to try to hold the city, on the grounds that the political custard pie in the face of ceding the city would lead to many heads rolling.

Also additional indications that the 7th and perhaps now the 76th have been used to conduct offensive action in front of the main trench defence network, which is particularly cretinous (we also need to recall that order allegedly signed by Gerasimov doubting the loyalty of the VDV and indicating a willingness to bleed the entire service to remove it as a potential threat).

Just as I was writing that, some indications that Ukraine has launched a substantial artillery assault on Verbove, directly on the main Russian defensive line. Quite a lot of heavy fire directed at the main line. A few days ago there was speculation that the lines in Verbove were not as substantial as to the west, with far fewer trenches and ditches in front of the main line to break up attacks.

The flag on the L bank is in the vicinity of the (ruined) Antonivsky bridge, directly N of Oleshky in the Dachi cottage complex on the islands between Dnipro and Konka rivers. Curious that this is only some 7 clicks downstream from the supposed bridgehead by Kozachi Laheri. If they manage to combine the 2, that'll become a somewhat sizeable bit of land from which to launch further DRGs across the Konka.

The orcs have been drawing forces towards the Tokmak/Robotyne from the Dnipro axis, then the Vasylivka sector, and now from the NE (the 76th VDV). Supposedly this is due to the fact that UAF has committed its operative reserves towards Robotyne, so that it's now a "clear" main offensive axis, so that it's obvious where to defend in force.

The Crimean mobilization would be just a teaser to the rumored shitshow that is supposed to happen in late Sept. The rumour mill is ablaze with predictions that the orcs will declare 2nd wave of mobilization, with the goal of rounding up some 5-7 hundred-odd thousands of mobiks via the newly implemented "electronic summons".

We'll have to wait and see how things go. There's still 20 klicks towards Tokmak airbase and the ring road that would allow a (reltively) clear drive down to the coast towards Berdyans'k. Whether we can grind down the defences here in the remaining 2 months before the rains (and before fresh mobik mobs start to show up to plug the trenches) enough to reach that goal.

[Werthead]

The $200 million+ Predel E coastal radar system in occupied Kherson just got blown into a million pieces by HIMARS, removing a major intelligence asset for Russia on the SW front.

[Mentalist]

DeepState figured "if there's a flag video, that means there's a permanent garrison"

So now there's a tiny, cute (340 sqm) blue splotch on the L Bank of Kherson.

EDIT: Sounds like a massive drone hit on the Pskov airbase tonight (680 km from the northernmost UA border).

Muscovite TASS admits 4 damaged IL-76 strategic transports. Can only imagine how bad it has to be, if they're not even trying to say "all targets were neutralized"

EDITAGAIN: also getting vids from Bryansk and Tula. Seems like a major swarm raid. Southern approaches to Moscow and Vnukovo airport being locked down.

This post has been edited by Mentalist: 29 August 2023 - 10:31 PM

[Werthead]

Fuel depot in Kaluga destroyed, microelectronics factory in Bryansk heavily damaged. The Russians launched a massive missile strike on Ukraine in response with 44 missiles, but 42 of the missiles were intercepted and destroyed.

This afternoon, news that Ukrainian forces have pushed past the main defensive lines outside Verbove. It looks like the much-vaunted main line had been stripped of defenders to fight in front of the line who were then killed or forced to retreat altogether. So Ukraine is now behind the main defensive line and tank traps, at least on a small area of the front.

[Mentalist]

Werthead, on 30 August 2023 - 03:44 PM, said:

Fuel depot in Kaluga destroyed, microelectronics factory in Bryansk heavily damaged. The Russians launched a massive missile strike on Ukraine in response with 44 missiles, but 42 of the missiles were intercepted and destroyed.

This afternoon, news that Ukrainian forces have pushed past the main defensive lines outside Verbove. It looks like the much-vaunted main line had been stripped of defenders to fight in front of the line who were then killed or forced to retreat altogether. So Ukraine is now behind the main defensive line and tank traps, at least on a small area of the front.

In Pskov, 4 IL-76 planes are claimed by TASS as "damaged". There's footage of at least 2 of these "damaged" planes fully engulfed in flames, so the extent of "damage" and how it differs from "demolished" is questionable. The airbase had over 20 transport planes a few days ago, and eyewitnesses reported "at least 5" takeoffs after the attack. So it remains to be seen how many targets were hit- the number i"m seeing most often is "6 in various level of damage, but all of them rendered non-functional"

If the UAF takes Verbove, it puts them smack dab in the rear and flank of the big fortification lines- not THE one contiguous line everyone talks about, but still, a major piece of earthworks that becomes incredibly vulnerable from many sides once Verbove itself is cleared. I believe the 82nd Air Assault was seen attacking the settlement- which is the unit given the precious dozen Challengers. We'll have to see how this pans out. Could be big, could become another grind. Reminder that the Right Bank Push on Kherson also developed in stages, starting from late May and culminating in the orc withdrawal from Kherson all the way in November. So we'll have to wait and see if the UAF can repeat the same feat here.

This post has been edited by Mentalist: 30 August 2023 - 06:38 PM

[Werthead]

Russia mining the highway being used by the IAEA inspectors to get to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant is certainly a choice.

[Mentalist]

Today we learned that the SBU is making drones from cardboard (so they cannot be detected by radar) and arming them with armor-piercing shrapnel to shred equipment.

The future is becoming progressively stranger.

[Mentalist]

Making a decent wedge SE of Robotyne, trying to flank Novoprokopivka, which is the next village on the way to Tokmak.

In a few spots, we've reached the big trench, which is the 2nd line of defence. Supposedly fighting is in Verbove, which is a township that stretches for about 8 km in-between the main defensive trenches. If we manage to take that, it's safe to say the second defensive line has been breached. is open to flanking attacks and strikes from the rear.

September is going to be all about this struggle.

[Gorefest]

They are quickly running out of time though. Worrying prospects of another year of war and misery ahead if no significant gains can be made before October. Russia (Putin) seems pigheaded enough to just dig in and persist come what may, whereas Ukraine will increasingly struggle with keeping its western allies engaged and funding the war effort.

[Werthead]

Gorefest, on 02 September 2023 - 07:21 AM, said:

They are quickly running out of time though. Worrying prospects of another year of war and misery ahead if no significant gains can be made before October. Russia (Putin) seems pigheaded enough to just dig in and persist come what may, whereas Ukraine will increasingly struggle with keeping its western allies engaged and funding the war effort.

The main issue is US support, but that should remain solid through 2024. Europe is pretty steadfast in its support, and the UK, Poland, Romania and the Baltics are so pro-Ukraine that they'd have probably already entered the war on Ukraine's side if there wasn't a risk of nuclear escalation. Even countries that early in the war seemed unsteady in their support - France, Germany and Italy most notably - have switched to full-throttled Ukrainian support, I suspect because intelligence confirmed that Putin was already considering a direct attack on Moldova and Georgia to start with and possibly Poland and the Baltics later on once he was successful in Ukraine, which really would trigger World War III. Better he is stopped in a third country without direct NATO involvement. Even Hungary and Serbia, which were happy to be pro-Russian early on, seem to have considered to what degree being pro-Russian clashes with their own desire for sovereignty: Orban enjoys Putin's support and trolling his supposed EU and NATO allies, but he does not want to just be Putin's lapdog in a Russian-controlled Hungary.

If Trump or another war sceptic takes office in January 2025, that'll be an interesting moment. A large contingent of Republicans in both the House and Senate remain very committed to Ukraine because they believe defeating Russia is both a superb use of American resources (America disarms its second-biggest international rival for chump change and the removal of obsolete equipment) and also a deterrent to the likes of China, North Korea and Iran from adventurism at a later date. In fact, there's already been some signs that might be the case (China was clearly strongly considering an invasion of Taiwan in the near future but recent mood music has suggested it is prepared to negotiate or at least consider the outcome of Taiwanese elections next year; Iran is apparently considering a return to the nuclear agreement and North Korea is reportedly weighing a high-level US diplomatic effort behind the scenes), unless that's either gross optimism or smoke and mirrors.

[Azath Vitr (D'ivers]

Werthead, on 02 September 2023 - 06:58 PM, said:

Gorefest, on 02 September 2023 - 07:21 AM, said:

They are quickly running out of time though. Worrying prospects of another year of war and misery ahead if no significant gains can be made before October. Russia (Putin) seems pigheaded enough to just dig in and persist come what may, whereas Ukraine will increasingly struggle with keeping its western allies engaged and funding the war effort.

The main issue is US support, but that should remain solid through 2024. Europe is pretty steadfast in its support, and the UK, Poland, Romania and the Baltics are so pro-Ukraine that they'd have probably already entered the war on Ukraine's side if there wasn't a risk of nuclear escalation. Even countries that early in the war seemed unsteady in their support - France, Germany and Italy most notably - have switched to full-throttled Ukrainian support, I suspect because intelligence confirmed that Putin was already considering a direct attack on Moldova and Georgia to start with and possibly Poland and the Baltics later on once he was successful in Ukraine, which really would trigger World War III. Better he is stopped in a third country without direct NATO involvement. Even Hungary and Serbia, which were happy to be pro-Russian early on, seem to have considered to what degree being pro-Russian clashes with their own desire for sovereignty: Orban enjoys Putin's support and trolling his supposed EU and NATO allies, but he does not want to just be Putin's lapdog in a Russian-controlled Hungary.

If Trump or another war sceptic takes office in January 2025, that'll be an interesting moment. A large contingent of Republicans in both the House and Senate remain very committed to Ukraine because they believe defeating Russia is both a superb use of American resources (America disarms its second-biggest international rival for chump change and the removal of obsolete equipment) and also a deterrent to the likes of China, North Korea and Iran from adventurism at a later date. In fact, there's already been some signs that might be the case (China was clearly strongly considering an invasion of Taiwan in the near future but recent mood music has suggested it is prepared to negotiate or at least consider the outcome of Taiwanese elections next year; Iran is apparently considering a return to the nuclear agreement and North Korea is reportedly weighing a high-level US diplomatic effort behind the scenes), unless that's either gross optimism or smoke and mirrors.

Trump could try to unilaterally end support for Ukraine (US support, that is... of course he could try to bully all the other countries too):

Quote

While the US Congress has approved billions of dollars in support for Ukraine to be distributed over an extended timeframe, as president, Mr Trump could use his executive power to slow down or even stop that support.

He did this before when president, for some congressionally approved military aid.

How Trump presidency could change Ukraine war - BBC News

OTOH, freezing the funds permanently would be illegal:

Quote

whenever presidents want to rescind or freeze congressionally appropriated funds, they must first notify Congress by sending a "special message" that details the amount of money involved and the reasons to rescind or withhold it.

If the president is asking to permanently rescind money, Congress must give its approval. But if Congress does not pass a bill approving the retraction within 45 days, the money must be made available for spending[...]


If the president is only asking to temporarily delay spending, then congressional approval is not required. But the president still has to send Congress a "special message" to let it know. [...]

[...] "permissible" only if the hold provides for unforeseen contingencies, saves money or is specifically provided by law. Spending cannot be stalled through the end of the fiscal year, either.

In 2018, the Government Accountability Office ruled that a president cannot withhold funds through their expiration date, because doing so would effectively amount to rescinding them without congressional approval.

PolitiFact | Did Trump’s freeze on Ukraine aid violate the Impoundment Control Act?

The Government Accountability Office [GAO] also ruled that Trump's withholding of funds from Ukraine was illegal:

Trump administration broke law in withholding Ukraine aid (cnbc.com)

But:

Quote

GAO engages in audits and investigations but has negligible enforcement power. Once a legal determination has been made, GAO has exhausted its regulatory authority.

Government Accountability Office | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute (cornell.edu)

... so it would be up to Congress to impeach and convict Trump if they want the funds to actually go through....

Republicans in Congress might vehemently disagree with him (at least until they come up for reelection), but they're extremely unlikely to convict him. (Unless he starts shooting people in broad daylight on the floor of the Senate---but then it might be a bit too late....)

Italy's future support might not be so certain, though I guess that probably wouldn't even matter much:

Quote

Although Italy’s far-right government is one of Ukraine’s staunchest European supporters, Russian propaganda and disinformation permeates Italian media – something researchers attribute to politics and historical anti-Atlanticism – with openly pro-Russian guests invited on the country’s most popular talkshows. [...] almost 50% of Italians prefer not to take sides in the conflict.


‘A success for Kremlin propaganda’: how pro-Putin views permeate Italian media | Italy | The Guardian

[Werthead]

Some Ukrainian claims that a Russian Shahed drone fell on Romanian territory and exploded last night, with pictures of fire rising above the river on the Romanian side. Romania has so far not confirmed this.

Ukraine's assault on Verbove has intensified, with Ukraine successfully widening its penetration point of the Russian second defensive line and more Ukrainian units operating behind these lines. Russia sent in a large detachment of reinforcements to Verbove but there were spotted and hit with cluster munitions. Verbove's western flank seems to have been firmly secured by Ukraine (not quite as impressive as that sounds, Verbove is a very thin, narrow town stretching from NW to SE).

Russia is protecting Tu-95 strategic bombers at its airbases by...covering them in truck tyres?

Erdogan has arrived in Sochi for a meeting with Putin. He will propose a plan to end the war, although the details are not clear. Erdogan had previously suggested Russia will have to leave all Ukrainian territory, including the Donbas and Crimea, although he knows that will probably not fly.

Apparently around half a dozen Russian servicemen have been killed in Mariupol: locals pretend to be pro-Russian, singing patriotic songs, talking in Russian and welcoming local troops as liberators, get them blind drunk and then kill them, preferably on the beach so the bodies are disposed of (at least until they wash up again).

This is a solid analysis of the conflict as far as it goes, although it's worth noting that both Kofman and Lee (despite good theoretical knowledge) have been generally pessimistic about Ukrainian progress throughout the conflict to date.

However, there are some signs of a possible culmination of the Ukrainian effort, with it drawing on reserves that were supposed to not be needed until a major strategic breakthrough. Their early employment may suggest that Ukraine does not believe it can achieve its overall long-term goals and may now choose to culminate their effort early, at or even before Tokmak, rather than at Melitopol as previously hoped.

However, Kofman and Lee are correct in that the key factor is not territory but force degradation, and the attrition inflicted on both Russian forces and Ukrainian forces is key. Russia has now redeployed key forces from elsewhere to try to hold Zaporizhzhia, suggesting that Russia's numbers are also culminating.

The writers note that Russia lost possibly four times as many troops as Ukraine did in taking Bakhmut, but this was actually something of a disappointment for Ukraine, whose positioning prior due and during the battle likely denied them a much stronger chance to degrade Russian numbers (during the battle some sources were suggesting that Russia lost seven times as many troops, at least on some individual days).

[Mentalist]

Werthead, on 04 September 2023 - 07:03 PM, said:

Some Ukrainian claims that a Russian Shahed drone fell on Romanian territory and exploded last night, with pictures of fire rising above the river on the Romanian side. Romania has so far not confirmed this.

Ukraine's assault on Verbove has intensified, with Ukraine successfully widening its penetration point of the Russian second defensive line and more Ukrainian units operating behind these lines. Russia sent in a large detachment of reinforcements to Verbove but there were spotted and hit with cluster munitions. Verbove's western flank seems to have been firmly secured by Ukraine (not quite as impressive as that sounds, Verbove is a very thin, narrow town stretching from NW to SE).

Russia is protecting Tu-95 strategic bombers at its airbases by...covering them in truck tyres?

Erdogan has arrived in Sochi for a meeting with Putin. He will propose a plan to end the war, although the details are not clear. Erdogan had previously suggested Russia will have to leave all Ukrainian territory, including the Donbas and Crimea, although he knows that will probably not fly.

Apparently around half a dozen Russian servicemen have been killed in Mariupol: locals pretend to be pro-Russian, singing patriotic songs, talking in Russian and welcoming local troops as liberators, get them blind drunk and then kill them, preferably on the beach so the bodies are disposed of (at least until they wash up again).

This is a solid analysis of the conflict as far as it goes, although it's worth noting that both Kofman and Lee (despite good theoretical knowledge) have been generally pessimistic about Ukrainian progress throughout the conflict to date.

However, there are some signs of a possible culmination of the Ukrainian effort, with it drawing on reserves that were supposed to not be needed until a major strategic breakthrough. Their early employment may suggest that Ukraine does not believe it can achieve its overall long-term goals and may now choose to culminate their effort early, at or even before Tokmak, rather than at Melitopol as previously hoped.

However, Kofman and Lee are correct in that the key factor is not territory but force degradation, and the attrition inflicted on both Russian forces and Ukrainian forces is key. Russia has now redeployed key forces from elsewhere to try to hold Zaporizhzhia, suggesting that Russia's numbers are also culminating.

The writers note that Russia lost possibly four times as many troops as Ukraine did in taking Bakhmut, but this was actually something of a disappointment for Ukraine, whose positioning prior due and during the battle likely denied them a much stronger chance to degrade Russian numbers (during the battle some sources were suggesting that Russia lost seven times as many troops, at least on some individual days).

Some are suggesting the UAF is already ast the 2nd line between Verbove and Novoprokopivka; if the UAF can break through the last line, they can have a clean run at the primary railway junction at Upper Tokmak, and possibly down to Berdyans', becuse once that final line is done, the front is essentially collapsed.

I don't think they'll try to take either Tokmak or Melitopil' without beeing able to surround them. In that sense, making the push to the coast is more sensible, b/c as Mariupol shows us, coastal cities are easier to siege. And the road to Berdyans'k has next to no visibe fortifications on it, unlike the road from Tokmak to Melitopil'

[Mentalist]

A shahed kamikaze drone aimed at Ukrainian ports in the Danube delta was shot down and fell and detonated on Romanian soil.

Mayor of the community that's located 300m across the river from Izmail is urging his residents to evacuate; reception to this idea is lukewarm.

NATO continues to not see any intent from the orcs to target/endanger its territory.

The servicemen of the Azov regiment that defended Azovstal' have been upstaffed and reconstituted into a full brigade, which is spearheading the counter-thrust against the orc push in the forests SW of Kreminnna. 3rd Assault brigade (the other unit composed of old Azov members) is doing good work with the ongoing push S of Bakhmut- even DeepState is now demonstrating Klischiyivka mostly blue.

Not sure what's the progress in the S- Khodakovsky and other z-heads were whining that UAF was pushing the frontline b/w Vuhledar and the Vremivka bulge- but unclear what that came to. The push from Robotyne is "ongoing", but where this is at in terms of deepening the bulge between Verbove and Novoprokopivka-Pshenychne is also unclear. If the orcs are bringing in reserves to plug the holes, it may take some time to maul them enough to maintain tempo. The worry here is that once they are done with their "elections" this weekend, they may ramp up mobilization/conscription measures.

[Azath Vitr (D'ivers]

Quote

Economic frustrations are growing and recent opinion polls indicate that the leader of France's far-right opposition party, Marine Le Pen, would defeat incumbent Emmanuel Macron if a presidential election were held today. [...]

In Germany, the once marginal right wing opposition party "Alternative for Germany" is now the second largest party in the country and is polling ahead of Chancellor Olaf Scholz's Social Democrat Party.

Only one issue unites these diverse outcomes—all of these nations are struggling economically due to the sanctions placed on Russia. Those sanctions have been strikingly ineffective. [...]

Once European voters perceive that their economic sacrifices have been in vain, we expect more governments to fall. Ultimately, the most enduring effect of NATO's war with Russia may well be the rise of conservative, nationalist-populist governments in much of Europe.

Europe's Leaders Are Paying a High Price at Home for Supporting Ukraine | Opinion (msn.com)

Next French presidential election isn't until 2027, but that doesn't bode well for legislative elections. Le Pen has 'distanced herself' from Putin (or pretended to) but opposes supplying Ukraine with weapons:

Quote

“If we continue to slowly deliver weapons to Ukraine, as we are doing now, then we are facing a new Hundred Years’ War [a long-running medieval conflict between England and France], which, considering the human losses, is a terrible drama.”

Marine Le Pen: ‘If Russia wins the war, it will be catastrophic... if Ukraine wins, it will mean WWIII has been unleashed’ | International | EL PAÍS English (elpais.com)

Quote

Leader of German AfD party speaks of war's ending, compares Ukraine to Nazi Germany

[...] suggesting that Ukraine "will emerge from this war as a loser, just like Russia! Again there is only one winner, and that winner’s name is USA," as well as complaints that Germany can no longer buy Russian gas profitable for it and buys "dirty shale gas from America." To the indignation of his opponent, who was shocked by his indifference to the death of Ukrainians, Chrupalla said that people also died in Iraq and Afghanistan, so with that logic they cannot buy energy resources from the United States either.

Leader of German AfD party speaks of war's ending, compares Ukraine to Nazi Germany | Ukrainska Pravda

But the first article fails to mention that the AfD is being outpolled by the CDU/CSU, 21% to 27%:

POLITICO Poll of Polls — German polls, trends and election news for Germany – POLITICO