[Mentalist]

orcs are trying to wipe out food distribution centres to force food shortages.

The mutual sea war in the Black Sea forced both sides to effectively halt grain exports. This means farmers have to sell on the domestic market, below cost, which is really bad news for their bottom line. And expect big problems for global food security, since, y'know, top 2 wheat exporters are locked out.

Kirishy was muscovy's second largest refinery, that recently reported coming back online after the June strikes. Hopefully the fresh hit shuts it down for a while.

At this point, we REALLY need to hit Omsk again, which is running at partial capacity. If it can be shut down, the fuel shortages could become critical.

UA hit Blegorod and Bryansk hard last night, targeting power infrastructure. Only a miniscule response to the onslaught that's been pouring on Kyiv and other cities. The new jet-engine Shaheds are currently outpacing drone interceptors, and the next gen that can catch them is yet to be produced in sufficient capacity. We're hearing less about ballistic missiles, which suggests they are stockpiling them for the winter. The current intel is that this time they want to aim not at power/heat, but primarilty at water/sewage infrastructure, to try and make big cities un-livable.

Macron floated the idea of next round of sanctions targeting any country that will

*checks notes*

sell fuel to Moscow.

So, we went from trying to embargo orc exports, to making sure they can't import fuel anymore.

"Gas Station with nukes" superpower, everyone.

[Werthead]

Russia's Starlink alternative is going well. The first launch batch reached 500km and have not been able to maintain a stable orbit, with several burning up. The rest are maintaining an orbit by using their thrusters but fuel is limited and will run out in the near future, probably resulting in the loss of the entire constellation. The second batch has only reached 300km and most of them appear to have already been destroyed.

Reporting from Russian sources that Putin was overheard telling someone he could not withdraw from Ukraine with the Donbas not completely taken as he would be "hanged."

On 28 June, Putin said that Russian forces were 10.5km away from Sumy city. Today, he said they were 12km away. The actual distance is 17.5km, and has remained so since May 2025. He also said today that Russian forces were approaching the ring road around Sumy. Sumy doesn't have a ring road.

Zelensky has suggested Ukraine could start targeting Russian civilian airports, not to kill civilians but to drive the insurance costs for flying to Russian airports so high that the remaining foreign operators will halt all travel to Russian cities. Zelensky has confirmed that Ukraine has abided by American requests to stop targeting Moscow whilst American diplomats are present. It also sounds like Zelensky has also agreed to suspend such attacks during visits by Chinese and Indian diplomats.

This post has been edited by Werthead: 01 September 2026 - 09:55 PM

[Werthead]

Russia hit the SBU Headquarters in central Kyiv, in a rare direct attack on a Ukrainian government building. Russia has refrained from doing this for fear of Ukraine simply responding, and the PR damage from seeing bits of the Kremlin on fire would be incalculable. Ukraine is considering its response.

Ukraine hit Sochi overnight, destroying fuel storage tanks at a local refinery and hitting an S-300 AA battery. It looks like they scored a direct hit on the launcher with a missile locked in, destroying both launcher and missile, which is unusual.

Witkoff and Kushner will be in Moscow over the weekend and then Kyiv. Apparently they may travel by plane directly from Moscow to Kyiv in the first journey of its type since before February 2022. However, a Russian drone hit Kyiv's airport (despite the airport being effectively closed since the start of the war), casting doubts on this idea.

Marine le Pen has indicated if she wins next year's French Presidential election, as is possible, she might try to suspend French aid to Ukraine. She is pressing now for France to host peace talks.

Air Tanzania has suspended all flight operations to Russia, citing the danger as being too great.

Russia has passed 1,400,000 casualties, with 450,000 dead. This is more than all the US casualties across all of WWII (a planet-wide conflict with heavy fighting on four different continents for the US).

Witkoff and Kushner were in Moscow today and apparently talked "tough" with Putin on a deal to end the war. They have left Moscow by plane, it's unclear if they are flying direct to Kyiv or flying to Poland and then taking a train to Kyiv. Russia and Ukraine have agreed not to hit each other's capitals for the duration of the visits.

This post has been edited by Werthead: 05 September 2026 - 11:06 PM

[Werthead]

Extremely enthusiastic reporting from less-reliable sources that Ukraine has collapsed the Lyman salient. The entire Russian-controlled front north of the town has broken, with Russian forces pulling back to the Zherebets River. If true, this would be around 151 square kilometres retaken and the northern front threat to Lyman itself and the Slovyansk-Borova area would effectively be destroyed. Some sources also suggested Ukrainian infiltration and recon elements have re-entered Luhansk Oblast in multiple places, further eroding Russian control of the one oblast they've claimed that they, at one point, controlled in full.

The more reliable sources are being more cautious, but have allowed that Russian forces seemed to have suffered heavy losses in this sector and Ukraine does seem to have advanced in around five settlements.

Two Russian Su-35s managed to fly into one another in Kursk Oblast for reasons that are still unclear, with both airframes destroyed.

[Werthead]

Multiple, much more reliable sources now reporting the collapse of the Lyman salient and even claiming the scale of the victory is larger than initially claimed, with over 200 square kilometres liberated. Ukrainian forces are still advancing into Luhansk Oblast, and some units may be turning south-east to try to push the Russian units quite close to Lyman's eastern side back as well. Russian reinforcements to this sector appear to have been diverted to the central front in the Donbass, so it's unclear how quickly the Russians can shore up this area.

Romanian Intelligence has neutralised a Russian sabotage operation targeting critical infrastructure in Romania.

A Russian jet-powered drone overflew Transnistria, Moldova and Romanian airspace before flying back over Moldova and vanished. Investigators are trying to determine if it crashed in Moldova or reached Ukrainian territory.

Ukrainian military intelligence assesses the growing probability of a renewed attack into northern Ukraine, potentially from Belarus, towards Kyiv. Ukraine has extremely heavily fortified these approaches and do not believe Russian forces could penetrate more than 10-20km into Ukrainian territory. Heavily fortifying the border itself is difficult because the area is within easy glide bomb and artillery range. Ukraine also assesses the autumn mobilisation may have been downsized to 300,000 troops after it became clear that a larger mobilisation risked damaging the Russian economy too badly.

[Mentalist]

DeepState still not updating their map.

I'm hoping the success of this attack (the Lyman salient) means the remaining garrison in Yampil' will be deblocked now.

Major strikes on Novorossiysk last night. Magyar claims that Admiral Essen was set on fire (again). There were some claims of additional "sunk vessels" of the Black Sea Fleet, but I think those were probably exaggerations (hope to be proven wrong, but we'll need receipts on that).

UAF appears to be diverting assault regiments into the area between Konstyantynivka and Dobropillya to stabilize the line and prevent the orcs from enveloping Druzhkivka from the SW.

One thing we are not hearing about is reinforcements on the Sivers'k axis, that would halt the enemy infiltrations directly towards the eastern outskirts of Slov'yans'ks and Kramators'k. Which is a bit concerning. their 2 big "unexpected" gains last year were the relatively effortless captures of Sivers'k and Hulyaipole. And if in the latter's case they couldn't really capitalize on it with a major push on Orikhiv (due to the counter-strikes in their flank), after taking Sivers'k they've been able to make steady pushes directly westward, making it about half-way to the "fortress belt"

EDIT: oh, and FirePoint claims to have hit the Gas Condensate plant in New Urengoy, the heart of Muscovy's gas producing land, the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District.
2850 km from Sumy or Kharkiv as the crow flies, but FirePoint says their plotted course was over 3300 km.

new record, I think.

This post has been edited by Mentalist: 09 September 2026 - 04:10 PM

[Werthead]

The United States fired 60 PAC interceptors at Iranian ordinance last night in one salvo.

One Ukrainian commentator going ballistic because some of the incoming ordinance did not warrant that level of response (though Iran did use several multi-warhead missiles which did).

[Werthead]

A Ukrainian drone flew over 3300 km to strike targets in Siberia. Ukraine now says they have the capability to lay waste to Russia's western Siberian gas fields. Potentially huge gamechanger.

Ukraine is testing its FP-7 and FP-9 ballistic missiles but has run out of room to test them due to their long range. FP-9s launched from western Ukraine basically run out of space over eastern Ukraine for their range and accuracy to be fully assessed. Some discussion of asking neighbouring countries for help (which might be controversial if the missile malfunctions) or just test-firing them into Russian territory.

The Russian missile frigate Admiral Essen has been crippled by direct hits at port in Novorossiysk. An accompanying cruise missile carrier has also been hit and may have been effectively destroyed, with the rear half of the ship completely devastated.

John Ratcliffe reportedly impressed Trump with his ability to talk tough to the Russians, whilst Trump has lost faith in Witkoff and Kushner. According to rumour, Witkoff and Kushner will move to talking to American allies in the Gulf, whilst Ratcliffe may take a stronger role in Ukrainian-Russian talks. The White House has played down the reports.

Some reports also saying that Ratcliffe was supposed to meet Putin directly, but the other Russian officials panicked and cancelled the meeting after Ratcliffe turned up with accurate maps showing the limits of recent Russian advances, which contradict the Russian military's account.

[Mentalist]

I wonder if anyone told putler that the frontline has been pushed from 10 km to Svyatohirs'k to about 30 now, with the collapse of that salient.

To clarify: on the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, putler made another bunch of fantastical statements about the orcs' progress. In particular, he claimed they controlled the monastery town of Svyatohirsk, which is located on a hilltop over the Siversky Donets, roughly 20 km upstream from Lyman. It was one of the objectives of the salient, since it was enveloping the city from the N, and hoped to cut off supply lines by reaching the river further westward. But at their farthest extent on the Nitrius river (which also flows into the Donets, and is located between Zherebets and Oskil) the orcs were still 10 km away from it, as was plainly stated by all the Z-heads who had to comment on these pronouncements. Andriy Biletsky, commander of the 3rd Assault Corps then recorded a video from Svyatohirsk, indicating that it is the rear of the Corps, and no enemy presence there (obviously).

Now that we know the salient has collapsed and the orcs are falling back towards the Zherebets, putler's statements sounds exceptionally ludicrous.

This post has been edited by Mentalist: 10 September 2026 - 03:56 PM

[Werthead]

Some reports that the Russians pulling back north of Lyman have actually crossed Zherebets River to find no supplies or fortified positions waiting for them as had been indicated, so they're either having to try to dig in best they can or keep running. The Ukrainians are pounding this area with everything they have (though the Russians are also flying dozens of glide bombs in, but these are less effective against mobile targets). Some recon elements of 3rd AFU Army Corps are already across the river and exploring the possibility of a wider-scaled strategic breakthrough, though Russian reinforcements are apparently already being shifted north to reinforce the 144th Division, which is suffering heavy losses.

Ukrainian forces south of Lyman are also moving, and Russian infiltration groups which had been causing trouble in Lyman for months may be pulling out of the town altogether and also falling back.

Unfortunately, further south, Russian aviation has brought Slovyansk and Kramatorsk within glide bomb range and are now hitting both the fortress cities with dozens of glide bombs on a daily basis. Apparently there are strong arguments about Kyiv giving the civilian evacuation order for the two cities, which are key to holding the rest of Donetsk Oblast, but a voluntary request for evacuation has already gone out. Kostyantynivka is still being contested to the south, though Russia now appears to have secured about 75% of the city. The Lyman front collapsing eliminates the threat of the fortress belt being enveloped from the north as well, at least for now.

[Mentalist]

It would be ironic if this time the counter-attack manages to actually reach Kreminna. But I'll believe that when I see it.

Fun fact, it was exactly this moment (the recapture of Lyman and the push towards Svatove-Kreminna ridge along the Krasna river that prompted the mobilization order 4 years ago. It were the hundreds of mobiks haphazardly thrown in to man the trenches and hold the line that stopped that advance.

4 years and half a million deaths later, we seem to back to the exact same place.

EDIT: big hits by UAF last night.

Saratov- another strike on refinery + Ozon Warehouse (muscovy's second largest e-retailer) burned down completely. This one's 13th largest on the bingo card.

Volgograd- missile strike on a defence enterprise manufacturing ballistic missile components

Perm Krai- 2 chemical enterprises (manufacture both fertilizer and explosives) hit

Dagestan- the flotilla base in Kaspiysk was hit. Some reporting that the Tatarstan, the flotilla's lead ship, was damaged.

Meanwhile, besides hitting shopping centres and some warehouses in broad daylight, the orcs have started to hit gas stations in Kyiv.

This post has been edited by Mentalist: 11 September 2026 - 10:25 PM

[Werthead]

The Freyja anti-ballistic missile system starts testing in a matter of weeks, possibly early December. Interesting to see how effective that will be.

Possibly a historical moment. A Russian unmanned surface vessel and a Ukrainian unmanned service vessel engaged in combat on the Black Sea, the first-ever recorded such engagement. The Ukrainians won, with the Russian vessel destroyed.

Some of the more excitable OSINT sources are claiming a Ukrainian counter-attack in and around Kostyantynivka, pushing some Russians back. This is the central lynchpin of the Russian offensive, so is more important than the recent successful Lyman counter-offensive. The more reliable sources are not really talking about this at the moment, so take with a pinch of salt for now.

This post has been edited by Werthead: 13 September 2026 - 04:23 PM

[Werthead]

Seeing a report that the Polish government has convened an extraordinary meeting of security officials, the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of the Interior and Administration.

Polish intelligence is reporting that Russia may carry out an attack on Polish or Hungarian border positions under the pretext of it being a mistake whilst trying to hit Ukrainian positions near the border. This follows an attack on a Ukrainian train yesterday less than 800 metres from the Polish border.

[Mentalist]

Werthead, on 12 September 2026 - 10:54 PM, said:

The Freyja anti-ballistic missile system starts testing in a matter of weeks, possibly early December. Interesting to see how effective that will be.

Possibly a historical moment. A Russian unmanned surface vessel and a Ukrainian unmanned service vessel engaged in combat on the Black Sea, the first-ever recorded such engagement. The Ukrainians won, with the Russian vessel destroyed.

Some of the more excitable OSINT sources are claiming a Ukrainian counter-attack in and around Kostyantynivka, pushing some Russians back. This is the central lynchpin of the Russian offensive, so is more important than the recent successful Lyman counter-offensive. The more reliable sources are not really talking about this at the moment, so take with a pinch of salt for now.

We've seen these counter-attacks into contested cities before. (See: Torets'k, Chasiv Yar, and (sort of), Pokrovs'k).

Typically, they delay the complete capture of said city by a number of months.


(Kup'yans'k wouldn't fit this pattern, b/c the counter-strike took place outside the city, cutting off the infiltration path first, and then moving in for clean-up of the encircled forces)


Wouldn't really put much stock into it, the enemy focused most of their forces on the Konstyantynivka and Dobropillya axes, so taking back significant territory here is... unlikely.

[Werthead]

Some reports that Russia has exhausted its primary reserves on the Donetsk front and has had to withdraw combat units from the front further south to plug the Lyman gap. However, Russian units arriving piecemeal without time to regroup would be cut to pieces, complicating the time it takes for Russian forces to intervene. In the meantime, Ukrainian forces continue to gain ground. It should be noted this is still a relatively restrained breakthrough, it's not comparable to the recapture of Kharkiv Oblast or pushing the Russians out of Kherson west of the river, and might only now be matching the success of the western Zaporizhzhia offensive earlier this year. It's still a huge boost to the Ukrainian tactical position, especially if they can take advantage to advance on other fronts.

If units are being pulled from the main front in Kostyantynivka that may explain Ukrainian forces seeing less Russian activity and have been able to counter-attack on that front as well. However, I'd hold on ordering the champagne just yet. Russia still has significant manpower and could pull troops from other, far less active fronts, as well as formalise the mass-mobilisation that's clearly coming. An extra 300,000 Russian troops, even rubbish raw recruits, would complicate things for the Ukrainians.

I suspect someone somewhere is taking bets on Ukraine re-attacking Chasiv Yar as well, for the sheer hell of it.

[Werthead]

Apologies for a Twitter-link, but this is the best summary of the current order of battle I've seen for the entire front.

This is actually pretty startling, Russia has been forced to concentrate a colossal amount of its total firepower in the Ukrainian theatre on a front about 30 miles wide. Meanwhile, the rest of the roughly 750-800-mile long front is covered by considerably fewer troops-per-mile. This would be more encouraging if Ukraine did not have to focus the majority of its strength in the same way (or risk the entire centre collapsing). Still, Ukraine has managed to achieve its moderate breakthrough (so far) north of Lyman and is focusing on exploiting that advantage whilst Russia is struggling to fully mobilise against it.

Certainly on the Russian side, they have very limited reserves, what you see is what you get, so whenever Ukraine pressures elsewhere on the line, Russia has to dip into the middle for reinforcements, which weakens the middle. This is why Russia is considering the risks of mobilisation because they need fresh bodies but not civil society descending into chaos at the same time.

Girkin was correct, Russia should have switched from attack to defence in 2026, remaining on the offensive has seriously damaged their ability to hold geographically unfavourable sectors of the front and any secondary or tertiary fronts where Ukraine can establish local superiority can be compromised. Fortunately, nobody listened to him.

The main problem here remains Ukraine being unable to convert local and tactical successes into more widespread strategic ones, but with their manpower situation (though improved over 2025) still strained it's hard to see where they can do that. One small possibility, but some Russian commentators have panicked over it, is that Ukraine can exploit the Lyman breakthrough into a larger-scaled breach into the Russian rear, where the impressive array of fortifications and dug-outs the Russians left some time ago are empty, and they haven't even laid substantial minefields. That could trigger a massive problem leaving the Russian centre vulnerable to a sweeping flanking attack. I consider that highly improbable at the moment.

The USA has just put massive sanctions on VTB Bank for doing business with Iran, that could be huge. VTB is not doing well anyway. US analysis that Russian diesel exports have just dropped to 0.

Ukraine has captured five Colombian POWs. Apparently they were hired by the Russians to operate in rear-echelon areas but within days had been moved to the front. The first Colombian POW convinced the others to surrender, saying none had an urge to die for Russia.

Russian forces have pressed closer to Orikhiv on the Zaporizhzhia front, that could be a critical blow if the town is taken.

[Mentalist]

 Werthead, on 14 September 2026 - 09:35 PM, said:

Apologies for a Twitter-link, but this is the best summary of the current order of battle I've seen for the entire front.

This is actually pretty startling, Russia has been forced to concentrate a colossal amount of its total firepower in the Ukrainian theatre on a front about 30 miles wide. Meanwhile, the rest of the roughly 750-800-mile long front is covered by considerably fewer troops-per-mile. This would be more encouraging if Ukraine did not have to focus the majority of its strength in the same way (or risk the entire centre collapsing). Still, Ukraine has managed to achieve its moderate breakthrough (so far) north of Lyman and is focusing on exploiting that advantage whilst Russia is struggling to fully mobilise against it.

Certainly on the Russian side, they have very limited reserves, what you see is what you get, so whenever Ukraine pressures elsewhere on the line, Russia has to dip into the middle for reinforcements, which weakens the middle. This is why Russia is considering the risks of mobilisation because they need fresh bodies but not civil society descending into chaos at the same time.

Girkin was correct, Russia should have switched from attack to defence in 2026, remaining on the offensive has seriously damaged their ability to hold geographically unfavourable sectors of the front and any secondary or tertiary fronts where Ukraine can establish local superiority can be compromised. Fortunately, nobody listened to him.

The main problem here remains Ukraine being unable to convert local and tactical successes into more widespread strategic ones, but with their manpower situation (though improved over 2025) still strained it's hard to see where they can do that. One small possibility, but some Russian commentators have panicked over it, is that Ukraine can exploit the Lyman breakthrough into a larger-scaled breach into the Russian rear, where the impressive array of fortifications and dug-outs the Russians left some time ago are empty, and they haven't even laid substantial minefields. That could trigger a massive problem leaving the Russian centre vulnerable to a sweeping flanking attack. I consider that highly improbable at the moment.

The USA has just put massive sanctions on VTB Bank for doing business with Iran, that could be huge. VTB is not doing well anyway. US analysis that Russian diesel exports have just dropped to 0.

Ukraine has captured five Colombian POWs. Apparently they were hired by the Russians to operate in rear-echelon areas but within days had been moved to the front. The first Colombian POW convinced the others to surrender, saying none had an urge to die for Russia.

Russian forces have pressed closer to Orikhiv on the Zaporizhzhia front, that could be a critical blow if the town is taken.

That speculation about a "massive flanking attack" is pure hopium, b/c the Lyman axis is isolated from the main theater (Slov'yans'k to Dobropillya) by the Donets' river.

The absolute best you could hope for would be to push to Kreminna, and (maybe, if things go extremely well) Rubizhne, but without applying more pressure northward toWard Svatove, you'd just create an extremely vulnerable salient. And if you focus the effort to the NE, you may collapse the offense that's trying to take Kup'yansk and Borova E of the Oskil, but eventually you hit a dead end, unless you push past the border to seize Valuyki to isolate the whole axis along both banks of the Oskil.And that'd take you over 100 km north from the main theater.


Trying to retake the Northern half of Luhans'k Oblast by pushing E out of Svatove (if you can get past the Krasna river) is inherently risky, b/c you're clearing territory into a huge salient, with the official border to the N and E, and pre-2022 LNR south of the Donet's.

Granted, if you do make that eastward push to Kreminna-Rubizhne, you can use the flank beyond the river to set up drone teams (back in Serebryansky forest) to harass logistics between Alchev'sk and Bakhmut, isolating the main axis from further supply; but the river would prevent you from doing personnel infiltrations in any meaningful numbers, so I dunno if it could be a good exchange. And Lysychansk would still be the dominant height in your way.

I get the need to collapse the salient from Zherebets to Nitrius, b/c it threatened to envelop Lyman; but moving E of the Zherebets too far can also be risky, unless you can achieve enough width to make it meaningful.

[Werthead]

Yup, personally any claim that the Lyman counter-offensive is the "beginning of the end" for Russia in Ukraine is quite hyperbolic and not rooted in any kind of imminent reality.

Russian mil-blogger Rybar has indicated mobilisation is likely in the near future, and said that Russian men should not anticipate being well-equipped or receive adequate training. He's suggested Russian men begin preparations now in terms of training and amassing equipment.

Death notices being published in Russia confirm a very serious Ukrainian hit on a command post may have eliminated half a dozen or so senior officers with responsibilities for the front. Interestingly, both Ukraine and Russia kept quiet about this at the time.

Ukraine has successfully shot down at least one jet-powered Shahed variant with a new anti-jet drone interceptor. Ukraine will scale production to try to deal with the increasingly large number of jet Shaheds used in combat.

A Russian vessel in the Baltic fired flares at a Danish military helicopter, leading to Denmark summoning the Russian ambassador.

One claim that Ukraine fired over 700 drones at Russia during a 24-hour period, an all-time record and larger than most drone swarms fired by Russia at Ukraine. However, sources seem to be disputing how accurate this was.

Elvira Nabiullina, head of the Russian Central Bank, has been quoted as saying that the Special Military Operation and associated funding has to end by mid-January 2027 or "the bad processes will begin, which will be impossible to stop."

I'm waiting to see good sourcing on that outside of several OSINT sources on the more excitable end of the spectrum.

This post has been edited by Werthead: 15 September 2026 - 09:52 PM

[Tsundoku]

Thoughts?

https://www.youtube....rts/0M3ZnsoZ9fg

[Mentalist]

Tsundoku, on 17 September 2026 - 10:29 AM, said:

Thoughts?

https://www.youtube....rts/0M3ZnsoZ9fg

HQ assigns bonuses and equipment to units based on footage and intel (such as comms intercepts) confirming claimed casualties inflicted.

Since they are subject to oversight, they have to keep their figures fairly plausible.
With the shift to most casualties being inflicted either by drones (or artillery that is being spotted for by drones), most things are documented with video footage.

We are seeing the impact of enemy manpower shortages in the fact that UA's been making gradual counter-pushes on multiple axes since spring (in the south, both along the Dnipro and in the SE on the Olexandrivka axis; N of Kup'yans'k along the Oskil; N of Lyman). The suggestion that UAF is inflicting casualties at a higher rate than they are replenished by recruitment is also consistent with this.


In and of itself it does not mean we are about to see a breaking point. But we're inching up to 2k/day. I continue saying that if we get to this rate, and it can be maintained for a few months, then we could see critical breakdowns.

Which is why second wave of mobilization feels inevitable to continue prolonging the war at its current pace.