[Garak]

That comments section is full of conspiracy theories.

[Mentalist]

EmperorMagus, on 01 September 2014 - 06:42 PM, said:

Article

Mentalist, I'm very interested to hear your thoughts about this.

My thoughts? Everyone's got their interests.

The authors of the article obviously don't feel it's in the interests of US to get involved in a faceoff against Russia. it's hardly in EU's interests, either, to be fair. I don't blame them. I would also agree about their pint about Iraq.

As to their questioning the veracity of evidence of Russians being there--I'm undoubtedly biased. But there is no way in hell I will ever believe that Russian paratroopers simply got "lost" during "training exercises" and ended up crossing the border and driving 20 klicks into a sovereign state's territory without realizing it. I just won't. There are eyewitnesses-survivors of the encirclement--those who broke through--several hundreds by now--who all say they were fighting Russian regulars. Most of these aren't
soldiers--they are volunteer battalions, and they have no "political" reason to lie.

IN addition to this, there are facts that no Western analyst will really focus on. Like the fact that if you analyze Russian entertainment media output over the last decade, you will not find a single positive portrayal of a Ukrainian--I'm talking about movies, tv shows, etc. Think back to the NATO summit of 2008 that the article refers to: in a private conversation with Bush, Putin has made it quite clear he does not consider Ukraine to be a sovereign state--it was his firm belief that Ukrainiais motif n state is a "historic misunderstanding" and this motif has been driving Russia's Ukrainian policy for a long time now. So forgive me if I am less than willing to trustanything Russia says.


Yes, there is a certain degree of hysteria regarding the whole thing. I certainly will not refute the statement that certain top officials in UA's govt are more than likely uneder very strong foreing influence. I will not however, refer to them as a "puppet government". IN large part this is because Kyyiv, while it retains formal control, is not well thought of by average Ukrainians. It's great for the West to think of it as "we pulled off a coup d'etat, and now there's a US puppet in power". But the reality is, outside this "pippet"'s residence there is a very vocal, very active and quickly growing civil society--volunteer networks that created an army out of nothing, thousands of volunteers who have joined the fight on Donbass purely out of their belief in the unity of the country, tens if not hundreds of small organizations and local groups that have as their goal rooting out corruption in a particular branch of government, down to taking down a particularly odious official--and all of these disparate groups demand real change. And if the government fails to provide, they already know how to take to the streets to make their opinion count. It may seem like counterproductive anarcy to an outsider, but in Ukraine, that is logic. There is absolutely no piety towards government--it is something that is to be distrusted, unless it proves worthy of trust and respect. And this attitude makes us easy to defeat, but virtually impossible to conquer.

Last comment--as to the "refusal to agree to a ceasefire"--Poroshenko cannot agree to a ceasefire. Because there is no one on the other side--among the "field commanders" of DNR and LNR that would be considered a legitimate representatinve of Donbass by the rest of Ukraine. DNR and LNR are deeply rooted in the criminal element of Donbass, with training, weapons and personnel coming from Russia. There is no "legitimate representation" of the region that would be acceptable to Ukrainians, and if Poroshenko tries to make some kind of a deal with people who ae regarded as Russia's proxies, he will quickly find himself facing a very angry mob in Kyyiv. As I explained earlier, this isn't a classic proxy war where the puppet of a Great power has full control and the backing of the said power to enforce his will and authority. Poroshenko rules not because he's convenient to the West--but rather because Ukrainians still tolerate him, and becasue they aren't yet sick of the excuses he makes to keep the situation from becoming a declared hot war between UA and Russia. There is a steady stream of criticism towards HQ, torwards the Minister of Defense, and towards top army brass. People haven't rioted yet, only because it's seen as counterproductive to the war effort--for now. But given the fact that the bulk of the job on supplying the war effort landed on the private sector which is usually far more efficient at it than any government structure (where corrupt army officers still, even now embezzle money needed to supply their own units), it's a question of time, before the current governement is no longer considred necessary.

What's happening in Ukraine is not a mere "proxy war". It's an unfinished revolution--both an anti-criminal one, and an anti-colonial one, It was hijacked by the geopolitical games since Russia decided to compensate its internal structural defficiencies by funneling all the frustration into a neo-impreialist patriotic fervor, but that does not mean that the goals of the Revolution have been abandoned. Poroshenko is, unquestionably, part of the Reacrion to the Revolution. But this will not last.

[Mentalist]

Garak, on 02 September 2014 - 04:50 AM, said:

That comments section is full of conspiracy theories.

yeah, meant to address that as well. Love the former serviceman who wrote a large wall o' text about a "Neo-Nazi Minister". In reality, he was talking about the commander of the Azov battalion. Yes, that battalion is mostly staffed with members of the "Social-Nationalist Assembly". Yes, they are mostly Pagan White supremacists. Yes, a rather large number of Europe's Far Right radicals join up with them. Do I share their beliefs? No. DO I approve of what they are doing? Right now--very much so. They are an absolutely selfless bunch, and they are fanatics to boot. Their goals are, in order: recapturing Donbass, setting up a guerilla war in Crimea against Russian occupation and, eventually-bringing about the collapse of Russia. While I certainly wouldn't let them anywhere close to real political power, I most certainly believe that their fanatical devotion needs to be used to defend the country against foreign aggression. Because right now they are a valuable resource. And we are at war.

[Garak]

I also heard that our government might start selling weapons to Ukraine but this is unconfirmed so far. Sure it was reported by one of our news channels but these are also the people who think that some local "celebrity" having a spat with her mother and cursing each other is worthy news - so I take everything they say with a grain of salt.

I found a wiki article on what equipment we have (though if we do start selling any to Ukraine, I bet you it won't be the stuff we bought from others): http://en.wikipedia....an_Armed_Forces I have no idea how this compares to what Ukraine has and I have no idea how good/bad any of this stuff is.

EDIT: Btw has anything new been heard about the civilian plane that got shot down over Ukraine?

This post has been edited by Garak: 02 September 2014 - 11:54 AM

[Mentalist]

The committee on the Malaysian Boeing is to present its findings Sept 16th, I think.

I've been very busy at work (it's my last week and I'm training my replacement), so no major updates untill Friday, most likely.

But very good news: France is now gonna stall on the Mistrals "due to the current circumstances" It's a small victory, but a victory nonetheless.

[Nicodimas]

Well this is actually a suprising turn of events..

http://www.themoscow...cle/506370.html

[Mentalist]

Nicodimas, on 04 September 2014 - 07:21 PM, said:

Well this is actually a suprising turn of events..

http://www.themoscow...cle/506370.html

He has a point, you know. With UA now being hellbent on joinging the NATO umbrella of collective security, they will welcome Nato silos at the UA-RU border with open arms.

And I can't really blame them, given that Russians persist, in their majority to adore the man for whom the very existance of independent Ukraine is an unforgivable insult.

It's a whole other question how things got to be this fucked up, but the sad truth is, Russia now has a rather hostile neightbour, with 40-odd million people, and a rather sizeable diaspora in NATO countries, many of whom offer daily prayers to their deity of choice that Russia ceases to exist as soon as humanly possible.

[Mentalist]

Need more info on this "ceasefire"

prelim evaluation: unless there's smth concrete said about UA troops taking control over UA-RU border, it'll be useless and it won't last long.

[Garak]

I haven't seen anything on the BBC but our news channel reported that the ukrainian rebels (this is the term used here) have declared that they want to reach the Romanian border and establish a independent state called New Russia.

[Tapper]

There's been also an incident with an Estonian government official (well, secret service agent) being abducted from a border post (Estonian version) or caught on Russian soil (Russian version) now being paraded on Russian national TV.

It seems getting lost is only an excuse if you're in camouflage gear, armed to the teeth and seated in a military personell carrier while in a warzone.

[Mentalist]

I realize i've been neglecting this thread. The reason being I started a new job last week, and it's a lot more demanding than my previous one. To be honest, I pretty much stopped keeping up with UA news beyond news headlines.

Lots of important stuff happened today in the parliament. Along with many of my former countrymen I now fervently wish that Putin dropped a missile on it this morning, with the MPs, Cabinet and Pres all assembled there so neatly.

I'll try to give an update in the next few days (no promises though).

[Mentalist]

Hokay, so it was my mom's b-day, and we had people over. In the aftermath of a major renovation project, so the weekend was spent making the place look somewhat presentable again. So, not a whole lot of time to write about the UA situation.


The situation is a mess, frankly. problem is, of course, elections. The new Pres Poroshenko doesn't have a strong support in Parliament right now, so he has to play along with those MPs popular opinion (esp in Kyiv) deems straight up "traitors" and Russian sympathisers. teaming up with thee guys they passed a bill on Sept 16th that essentially confirms "special status" of the Russian-occupied part of Donbass for the next 3 years. Insiders are saying the question was presented as "do this now, or Putin will straight up invade", but the fact that the Pres refused to address the people with it, and (more importantly), the Rada computer display, which shows which MPS vote for what was disabled (so there's no way for the public to know who exactly voted for this "surrender" bill), there's a very large number of people seriously pissed off with the "appeasement for the sake of "peace" " strategy the pres and his team seems to have adopted. Add to this the fact that he refuses to sack the MoD, or pretty much anyone else he appointed, despite their demonstrated incompetence in handling a number of issues, plus total inaction wrt a number of incidents of high-up officers embezzling publically donated Army money, and it's not looking too good, considering in April there's a parliamentary election that's supposed to reshuffle the Parliament and make it more supportive of the Pres.
It is my extremely fervent hope that this lack of transparency pisses off a critical number of people and the pro-Pres powers lose the upcoming election horribly, with the more anti-Putin, more radically pro-Maydan parties sweeping majority, despite the media spinsters.


And yeah, the election. As always, the prospect of getting in a position to decide which way the budget cash flows + immunity from criminal prosecution tends to melt politician's brains. Despite immense public pressure, the current crop of MPs refused to change the electoral law. So, once again, the UA parliament is elected with a mixed PR/first past the post system: 225 delutees will be elected via PR vote (party needs to get over 3% of popular vote to qualify), and 225 MPs, (minus 10 seat fro Crimea + 2 seats for Sevastopol + however many Donbass seats fall into the zone occupied by Russians--which is most of them) will be elected 1 per electoral district on a first past the post basis. Now, I absolutely DESPISE FPTP the way it works out in UA every time, so I'm going to be absolutely biased about the fact that I think going back from PR to mixed system was the second most horrible idea in the history of independent UA (the first was giving up nukes) But my absolute problem with it is the fact that when there's roughly 2 "pro-western" parties that each hold 30% of the popular vote in a district and 1 "pro-Russian" that gets 40%, and the "pro-Western" lose due to the inability of "pro-Western" party pleaders to agree to a single "unified" candidate, I simply don't see how a majority can be considered "represented"

And there's LOTS of anti-Russian parties running atm. Whereas the "pro-Russians" are grouped in pretty much a single "Opposition block". A very moderate pro-Russian Serhiy Tihipko is trying his luck again with his party "Strong Ukraine", comunists are trying on their own again (despite an ongoing court case to ban the party), and the other assorted Left are trying to present themselves again (the generally more pro-UA Socialist party has basically destroyed itself when in the aftermath of coalition talks post 2006-election they went with pro-Russian party of Regions and Communists, despite advertising themselves as a pro-president Yushenko's west-oriented left power).

Whereas in the running on the Anti-Russian platform there's:

1) the block of the Pres, Poroshenko (composed in equal part of Yushenko's old "business" crew + the old management personel that was loayl to Yanukovych and other assorted oligarchs--essentially political turncoats who will flock to whomever is in power to keep their positions and the opportunities for personal enrichment). The media that's largely run by pro-Poroshenko oligarchs gives these guys from a quarter to about 40% of the vote. I VERY much hope people see past this BS, because if his people win, we can forget about any structural change. To be fair, Poroshenko DID throw a few civil activists into the "passable" part of his party list, who would make great MPs, because they will vote as their conscience dictates and not as the party sponsors demand. They make up a very small part of the list, however.

2) The newly-erectred party "ukrainian front", led by the current PM Yatseniuk and the current speaker of the Rada Turchinov. They are a breakaway part of Yuliya tymoshenko's "Fatherland" party. I haven't looked into the news that much, so I can't be specific about any major dirt on them--yet. However, purely as a party of who's currently in power they raise all kinds of red flags.

3) The leftovers of Yuliya Tymoshenko's "Fatherland" party--Tymoshenko still thinks she can swing back into big politics, despite her complete failure in the presidential election in May. "Fatherland", or "B YU T" (Block of Yuliya Tymoshenko) as most ppl continue to refer to it, continues to play the populist rhetoric: number 1 in their party list in Nadiya Savchenko, a Uki pilot-turned-volunteer that was captured by LNR terrorists,, taken to Russia where she was "arrested" by Russia in connection with the murder of 2 Russian journalists near Luhansk. Considered a political prisoner by Ukis, Savchenko is just another symbol of the ongoing undeclared war with Russia. The rest of BYUT's top 10 is largely occupied by young, Western-educated specialists--which is a sound and appealing move. But it's really the other numbers on the lists that make people worry-the ones that the parties DON'T focus on.

4) "Svoboda" or "Freedom"--the last of the 3 "Parties of Maydan"--straight-up moderate right-wing nationalists, who lost a big chunk of their political cred due to their participation in the first post-Maydan govt (and making no major strides to curb corruption or win the war--in fact the Prosecutor General-a Svoboda nominate has been the subject of some of the harshest criticism recently for his total inaction towards former Party of Regions bigwigs that supported (and in some cases, continue to support) pro-Russian sentiment and terrorists, since they are potential allies of the Pres. Unlike the "old" nationalist parties (who will probably also run, because they can't not run), they remain pretty current at this time, and I'm expecting to see them in the new Rada.

5) The Radical party of Oleh Lyashko--a very successful populist project that dominates the political talk show scene. Despite being a creation of one of the largest oligarchs, Firtash and his business partner Lyovochkin (who was the head of Yanukovych's Presidential Admin), Lyashko plays the role of a rabid Uki partiot/nationalist. Due to skillful media coverage and ties to some of the volunteer battalions fighting in Donbass, Lyashko remains the darling of the late-night-TV-watching crowd. Which is a shame, since his populism and demagogy is nearly unmatched. The same polls that give Proroshenko the lead tend to put Lyashko second, with 15-10% of the vote.

And then there are the newcomers--the "Maydan parties" that aim to bring a truly new political generation into big politics. They don't get a whole lot of media coverage, their resources are VERY limited, and, sadly, they remain total outsiders.

6) "Democratic alliance"--a small grassroot party that was a loose coalition of a huge number of civil society orgs that sprang up protesting particular aspects of Yanukovych's regime pre-Maydan. They are running in a block with another new party "Volya" ("Liberty"), which is based around ANOTHER group of civil activists that grouped around the Egor Sobolyev, the head of the "Lustration Committee"--a govt organ created as a concession to the Maydan's demands (whose existence was finally legislated at least partially on Sept 16th), and whose gaol is to ban all those politiacians and govt officials whose corrupt dealings can be proven from ever taking up a position of power in the govt ever again.

7) The party "Civil Platform" led by another Presidential Candidate Anatoliy Grycenko (came 4th in the election), a former MOD in Yuschenko's times. Grytsenko has West Point education, advokates a very hard-line anti-Putin approach and is notable for being just about the only MOD who did not give himself a promotion during his time in office-he came to the Ministry as a colonel, and he left as one. His list has a sprinkling of civil society activists (it's important to say, most of the "Big Parties" have at least some of those associated either with Maydan, or with the ATO--in particular, most volunteer battalion commanders figure on in the top numbers of party lists). Personally, Grycenko would've easily been my pick for Pres back in May, so i sympathise with this party, and I sincerely hope they do well. Politics is not really Grycenko's forte, as he's not much of a team-builder, so I remain skeptical--though "Civil Platform should deffo pass the 3% barrier to get some PR seats.

8) The party "Samopomich" or "Self-help"--this is a very interesting one. It's a party led by the mayor of my home city L'viv, which is considered to be the "bastion of Uki nationalism and all things Ukrainian". The party's main stress is on encouraging local communities to take up more responsibility and more control over their local affairs--while at the same time pushing for a unified UA, of course. Given that L'viv oblast was one of the 4 regions of UA (out of 25) that was profitable for the past few years, giving more to the budget than it took, and the fact that L'viv is often shown as an example of a "European city", plus the fact that the party leader, L'viv mayor Sadovyj made TV appearances at proper times with very down-to-the-point, no-nonsense messages, his party has been gettign more exposure. At the same time as the Pres elections, there was an election to the Kyiv city council, and "Samopomich" managed to gain some seats there, despite being a virtual unknown. Sadovyj has also appeared in some recent debates, and he got a strong showing of support. A HUGE plus for his credibility is the fact that in his own party list he, the party leader is number 50--which means his party would need to get 23% of the popular vote (or of all the votes excluding those for parties that don't hit 3%) for him to become an MP. It also helps that as his no 1, he's put up another civil activist, the head of the "reanimation reform packet"--a group of long-sought reforms that have been drafted by a consensus of many Maydan orgs to best reflect the anti-corruption reform sentiments of Maydan. It also helped that semen Semenchenko, the leader of "donbass"-the original volunteer battalion-endorsed "Samopomich" and is in the top 10 of their party list.

9) "Right Sector"--despite their poor showing in the Pres election (Yarosh barely got 1%--and he'll be running for the parliament in a FPTP district in his hometown), they remain somehtign worth talking about--at the very least, becasue the Russian media won't shut up about them--Lavrov can't make a UA-themed speech without throwing in "Right Sector" in there somehow. Being a more radical alterbnative to "Svoboda", it's hard to say just how well they'll do. Though given their local initiatives (in particular their vigilanteism directed @ drug dealers and undercover slot machine operations), I really would not be surprised if they are the ones most capable of capitalizing on the FPTp districts, due purely to their "no BS, straight action" approach to problem solving--a method which gets things done, even if due process might get circumvented now and then.


So yeah, a shit load of parties fighting for pretty much the same electorate. Which would be totally fine (more than that I'd welcome it), if it wasn't for the small matter of the war with Russia. the fact that there's an unrecognized war on, and there are parties running that will collaborate with the enemy really throws a spanner in the works. And should they gain numbers sizeable enough to have influence in the new parliament due to the awesome inefficiencies of FPTP... well, people in Kyyiv will NOT tolerate MPs who refuse to acknowledge the fact that Russia annexed Crimea. I'll just leave it at that.

War-wise, the situation is garbage. After the "ceasefire" was pronounced on Sept 5th, there's been about 20 Uki soldiers killed. Attacks continue on the Donetsk airport, which is still help by UA troops (3rd month in a row). The frontline has been "straightened out" in the south of Donetsk Oblast, with UA troops abandoning the region center city of Telmanove, and holding a defence roughly parallel to the highway from Mariupol to Donetsk, along the river Kalmius. In Luhank Oblast, Uki forces have been pushed from their positions south of Luhansk, abandoning the largely agrarian region of Luhutyno. Russians have pushed north, within shelling range of the city of Schastya (Happiness)--the capture of which began the Uki offence a few months earlier. Schastya continues to be the HQ of the volunteer battalion "Aydar", so its surrender seems unlikely. urther north are entirely agrarian regions, where pro-Russians enjoy very little support.

Elsewhere, Uki retreat allowed Russians to regain full control over the Luhanks-Donetsk Highway up to Alchevsk, with the offensive pushing further north, up to the river Siverskyj Donets' and the city of Slavyanoserbs'k. Directly north of Alchevsk, Ukrainians continue to hold Popasna, checking any possible advance from Pervomaysk to try to recapture the Lysychansk-Syeverodonetsk-Rubizhne agglomeration further north.

Around Donetsk, Ukis have retreated from the areas between Horlivka and Donetsk to avoid encirclement. Donetsk remains blocked from the south, west and north-west. A group of Ukrainian troops continues to hold the biggest ttansport hum in all of Donbass-teh city of Debal'tsevo, but they are being pushed from all sides, and there is a very real danger of tbem being completely surrounded by the Russian advance--especially given that yesterday Ukis have yilded their positions south of Yenakievo, directly to the west of the Debalt'sevo group. despite numerous calls for alarm (just as they did w/ Illovaysk), the Pres and his HQ continues ignore the very real danger of having even more Uki soldiers trapped

Globally, there's been more sanctions (now EU's talking about taking Russia off SWIFT), oil continues to drop slowly, ruble is at an all-time low. Russia is hemorrhaging dollars, but too slowly. even the latest arrest of another Russian oligarch, with the possibilty that his oil company will join the coffers of Rossneft isn't changing things too much-yeah, Russia lost some $4 billion in a week, with stocks plunging. But at this rate, despite 0 growth, Russia can handle 2 years of current level sanctions w/o showing too much strain that might (potentioally, though pretty damn unlikely) lead to public protests from large segments of the population--todays "March of Peace" in Moscow, though a very nice gesture, doesn't mean much, as it just shows how weak and isolated the Anti-Putin segments of the population are.

So yeah. waiting to see how far the Russians can push now that there's an ongoing "ceasefire". The latest round of Minsk talks, held on Fri under the auspics of OSCE had UA and the terrorist "republics" mutually agree to create "buffer zone" with all heavy artillery being removed from within firing range of the frontline. For UA, this is contingent on having all foreign (meaning Russian) troops leave the country, which seems not quite likely in the near future. So the feasibility of this "ceasefire" remains highly questionable, as so far all Ukrainians see is that with Security Council dispatches, the Russian-controlled territory keeps growing, despite the alleged "ceasefire". A very natural question arises: "what's the point of a ceasefire where only 1 side can't shoot back?" I hope that by election day, this message reaches a large enough number of people.

[Gothos]

Curious. The political situation in your parliament reminds be a LOT of what it was like here in the 90s. You've got your first wave "revolutionary" govt running now (Solidarity), but the Imperial Remnant breathing down their necks with a majority vote (our SLD - Democratic Leftist Alliance, more or less)*, while the center and right wing are fragmented into numerous smaller parties (even some party names look similar - we had our own Self-help/Self-defense, and we have our own Civil/Civic Platform). Everything seems to go a lot quicker, understandably, but it looks like you folks actually left he Soviet Union now, for realsies. In several years the situation should stabilize, probably not in time to make a solid stand against Muscovy, but in the long terms that's a huge step forward, even if it looks a bad mess right now.

I'm hoping that all this can shrink the divide between your general population and the "middle" class and higher. Both times I've been to Dnipropetrovsk, I've seen the restaurants where prices would be high in Berlin or London, while going through the southwestern part of the city it was something between Mad Max and Half-Life 2. How the public transport system was so bad it was pretty much inexistant (though the Marszrutki are something of a band-aid for that. also, these drivers are crazy.). I've seen the apartaments for renting for foreign visitors like me, and next to them how the local people live - it's insane. It's like 5% of society moved on in the last 25 years, but the rest are stuck in the past. Maybe it's just the small amount I've seen, but from that - despite any resentment and bitterness I might feel for a certain ukrainian, on the whole I hope you folks can start catching up for real now. But I also hope you folks know it's not going to happen overnight.


Also, bonus round: I've always found it a little weird that L'viv is that bastion of Ukrainity. It was that one city that had a polish majority for most of its history. Over here the "reclaimed territories" we got in 1945 for what the Soviets took are the more cosmopolitan and live-and-let-live parts of the country, while the east and south are traditionally more conservative and nationalist. Conscious effort or just coincidence?

[Mentalist]

Gothos, on 22 September 2014 - 06:49 AM, said:

Curious. The political situation in your parliament reminds be a LOT of what it was like here in the 90s. You've got your first wave "revolutionary" govt running now (Solidarity), but the Imperial Remnant breathing down their necks with a majority vote (our SLD - Democratic Leftist Alliance, more or less)*, while the center and right wing are fragmented into numerous smaller parties (even some party names look similar - we had our own Self-help/Self-defense, and we have our own Civil/Civic Platform). Everything seems to go a lot quicker, understandably, but it looks like you folks actually left he Soviet Union now, for realsies. In several years the situation should stabilize, probably not in time to make a solid stand against Muscovy, but in the long terms that's a huge step forward, even if it looks a bad mess right now.

I'm hoping that all this can shrink the divide between your general population and the "middle" class and higher. Both times I've been to Dnipropetrovsk, I've seen the restaurants where prices would be high in Berlin or London, while going through the southwestern part of the city it was something between Mad Max and Half-Life 2. How the public transport system was so bad it was pretty much inexistant (though the Marszrutki are something of a band-aid for that. also, these drivers are crazy.). I've seen the apartaments for renting for foreign visitors like me, and next to them how the local people live - it's insane. It's like 5% of society moved on in the last 25 years, but the rest are stuck in the past. Maybe it's just the small amount I've seen, but from that - despite any resentment and bitterness I might feel for a certain ukrainian, on the whole I hope you folks can start catching up for real now. But I also hope you folks know it's not going to happen overnight.


Also, bonus round: I've always found it a little weird that L'viv is that bastion of Ukrainity. It was that one city that had a polish majority for most of its history. Over here the "reclaimed territories" we got in 1945 for what the Soviets took are the more cosmopolitan and live-and-let-live parts of the country, while the east and south are traditionally more conservative and nationalist. Conscious effort or just coincidence?

1) only kind of similar. Solidarity was a more or less grassroots movement that came into a power-sharing arrangement w/ the Red directors, from what I understood. The current "Maydan MPs" are reps of a different oligachic parties, whose only difference from Yanukovych was their businesses sold more to the West, and they were more restrained in their equally voracious appetites, being mindful that population can't be bled bone dry, because then they'd have nothing to lose. Despite thieir rhetoric, the bulk of the "orange" MPs (using the 2004) designations here for convenience are no different from the openly pro_putin "blue and whites". It's in the fractured "Maydan parties" where the Solidarity-like grasroot movement lies. However due to our fractious nature, there's a whole lot of splinters there, which makes for good "democracy" but nothing efficient.

2) the line b/w poverty and affluence won't dissappear any time soon. The economy's in shambles, and Association agreement will lead to cuts in social support spendings, while cementing the staus quo of the opulently rich. Moreover, losing the Russian market means even more of the barely surviving industry will go belly-up, leading to growth uin unemployment. The economy right now largely floats up upon billions of dollars and euros that are made by Ukis workibg abroad-both in EU and Russia, often as illegal migrants, who bring money home. In Western UA especially, people use that money to build houses and start up small businesses. In the East, where many are still hung up on the whole "state must provide jobs for citizens" framework, the development is slow. There's a vibrant "lower middle class", which is dirt poor by Euro standards, but is stable. IT sector is big in some cities, prompting growth. However, due to draconian taxes, most businesses operate in shadow, and thus money isn't advertised. And yeah, industrial quarters of Soviet cities are pretty rough. That's not just a UA phenomenon, though.

3) re: L'viv. Despite being owned by Poles for a long time, the city's very much Ruthenian origins never went away. L'viv was the capital of the Great Principality of Halych-volyhnia, which was one of the 3 main successors to the Kyivan Rus' post-Mongol invasion-the other 2 being Muskovy, which was a client state of the Golden Horde and the Great Duchy of Lithuania. Halych-volyhnia continued the line of proto-Ukrainian governance for about 100 years after the sack of Kyiv. Thus it is considered an important symbol.
In addition, in the 20th century, Uki identity was very much forged on the "denial of similarity"--i.e, "we are not a part of Russia" and "we are not a part of Poland". As the place that first had to endure a war against Poland with the collapse of Austria-Hungary and Pidsuldski's repressions, (which gave birth to militant Ukrainian nationalism, which was UPA's precursor), and then later they had to endure Soviet/Russian rule, which came there much later than elsewhere in UA, and thus was far more resisted.
That is not to say that Western Ukis are intolerant of other ethnicities--we are generally quite inclusive. But a necessary precondition for such inclusion is the recognition of Ukraine's right to an independent existence--which isn't a huge hurdle for most.

[Mentalist]

Brief update:

Russian Ruble + stock market keeps plunging. Exxon Mobil pulled out of all its joint ventures with Rossneft about Russian oil. Since most of these require hi-tech that Russia doesn't have, and won't have untill sanctions are lifted, it means russia's losing a lot of oil.

War-wise, the situation is a not-quite-stalemate. Terrorists, with Russian military assistance now control roughly half of donbass- approx everything east of Kalmius river up to Donetsk, and everything south of the Siverskyj Donets river up to the city of Lysychank, held by Ukrainians. The frontline b/w Lysychank and the Uki-held railroad hub Debaltseve is a fluid one, as is the one from the Donetsk airport to Horlivka to Debaltseve from west to east.

In a nutshell, DNR needs communications: rail (Debalt'seve), air (Donetsk airport) and sea (Mariupol). All 3 are held by Ukraine, all 3 are vital. The OSCE-brokered "ceasefire" would see all 3 (including Mariupol, a city with a half mil ppl) become part of the 30-klick wide "buffer zone". OSCE wants everyone to play nice and withdraw all artiller so that it's firing range ends beyond the borders of this "buffer zone". Naturally, all ukrianians consider this to be ludicrous, since no one in their right mind will trust Putin, not to mentions the "fluid" leadership of DNR/LNR. So right now, everyday one of the 3 key points is assaulted by Russians, who get blown to hell and back by artillery. UA's holding, tho barely. Volunteers are now prepping for a winter campaign, collecting items of warm clothing and winter supplies for the ATO.

Politics-wise: ELECTIONS! As usual, politicians go brainless when this happens. The Pres is aiming to bring a lot of his supporters in. All polls published give him about 35-40 percent of the PR vote. I'm yet to find anyone who believes this, as more and more dirt surfaces about his "allies". In many regions, the Pres simply aligned himself with "regional" oligarchs, and there's no indication they're interested in changing the status quo. Of the FPTP portion of Poroshenko's party's candidates, maaaaybe 20 percent are genuine civil activists whom might be able to work for genuine change. If that. And they still need to get in.

The pro-Russian lobby is still running strong: though they don't look like much in PR polls, there are indications a solid chunk of them expects to get in through FPTP-especially in rural electoral districts, where the tactic of "buckwheat" (sending potential voters "care packages", consisting of basic foodstuffs as "gifts"/bribes) is quite widespread.

Meanwhile, the Prosecutor-General is making many people angry--his assistant owns a house larger than the last Pres' mansion (which was supposedly bought by his son-"an honest businessman"), whilst the P-G's own son is put in charge of the SSTATE Property Register. Ignoring any accusations of corruption, the P-G spends his media time accusing journalists of a "smear cmapaign" dodging the uncomfortable questions such as "why is it that 7 months after the Revolution, those MPS and politicians who supported past regime and then Russian separatism/terrorism are still walking free/running for Parliament and whatever charges were pressed against them have since been dismissed "due to lack of evidence"?"

So yeah, people are pissed. There's a growing popularity of the "trash bucket challenge"-instances when a group (or a mob) of people--usually patriots--anti-corruption activists simply grab a particularly odious politician/local govt/law enforcement functionary--and throw him in a trash bin. This trend, dubbed "lustration from below" is public response to the bureaucracy's refusal to implement the newly-passed "Lustration" bill, which calls for a thorough investigation of allformer regime's functionaries and immideate removal from power of all those found guilty of corruption.

Due to the govt's obstinate refusal to acknowledge the people, radicalism is once again on the rise. On Saturday, the police FINALLY broke up the pro-Russian rally in Kharkiv (pro_separatist rallies were forbidden by the court back in April but no one enforced this). Encouraged by this, patriots led by Kharkiv Metalist ultras held a pro-nity march on Sunday, which culminated in a 4-hour struggle to topple the Lenin statue in the city's main square. The conscientious Kharkiv Police has managed to lay charges of hooliganism on those involved, before the governor of the oblast, wisely anticipating the backlash nade public an order (@ 10 30 PM) removing the statue from the cultural heritage registry and commissioning it's removal. The Minister of Interior (himself a Kharkiv native, one time mayoral candidate and a rival of the current Russia-leaning mayor Kernes) ordered all charges be dismissed, while his assistant has made a facebook post to the extent of "police are guarding the square with assault rifle, so anyone trying to provoke the rally will find themselves dead or injured".

And today in Odessa, members of Right Sector and other pro-Unity supporters have "welcomed" an ex-party of Regions MP Nestor Shufrych. Shufrych was one of the most odious pro-Russian public speakers, who has on numerous occasions refused not only to condemn Donbass terrorists, but, moreover, he refused to acknowledge Russian annexation of Crimea, repeatedly saying "we lost Crimea". And now, despite being from Transcarpathia, the westernmost oblast of UA, he decided to run for parliament in Odessa. Now he has a concussion and a head injury.

I don't exactly condone physical violence. But the govt, and especially the Pres' obstinate desire to occupy all key positions with "his people", nevermin their competence is making people angry. Seeing the Pres pave the way for another "election without choice" is making people angry. Seeing refusal to foster reforms, refusal to collapse profitable money-making schemes, refusal to fight against bribery is making people angry. Refusal to condemn those of the old regime who are still actively anti-Ukrainian is making people furious.

And this is pressure that keeps building. I hope and pray that this anger stirs sufficient people prior to the election to make an educated choice. If the election fails to shift the status quo, the people will turn to other methods. There's already a strobg sentiment of "if you start arresting us for throwing you in the trash, we will start hanging you on lamp posts". Which is terrifying. But it seems ever more inevitable.

[Mentalist]

New Job doesn't leave me a whole lot of free time. This weekend's gonna be busy, too, but I'm planning to do a bit of info-digging and a solid update on Sunday or Monday (long weekend here in Canadaland)

[Gnaw]

Mentalist, on 10 October 2014 - 03:45 AM, said:

New Job doesn't leave me a whole lot of free time. This weekend's gonna be busy, too, but I'm planning to do a bit of info-digging and a solid update on Sunday or Monday (long weekend here in Canadaland)

I was wondering what happened to you. Thought maybe you had given up in disgust. I've found your commentary quite helpful in understanding how that is evolving.

[Mentalist]

It would appear every time I plan to sit down and write a lot about UA, something momentous happens, which throws a huge hinge into everything.

Today, the former Internal Forces conscripts (who were renamed into the National Guard--not to be confused with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the National Guard that were recruited from Maydan Self-Defence and other volunteers, and now include the "Donbass" battalion as well as "Azov" (recently upgraded to a regiment).) have "rebelled"--locking up their officers they left their bases around Kyyiv to protest in front of the Pres' Admin building, demanding that they be demobilized and paid. Apparently, they were conscripted in the Spring of 2013, and demobilization is long overdue. In this they were supported by their parents, and some other activists.

Now, the curious part of the story is that this happened out of the blue, it was a coordinated action, as the same was done by smaller groups of former VV (Uki for Internal Forces) in Odessa, Kharkiv, Vynnytsya, and Dnipropetrovs'k. the actions were coordinated through Russian social media, and they just happen to be timed so that they happen the same day the Pres accepted the resignation of the MoD responsible for the Ilovaysk fiasco, and voiced intention to bring the current commander of the National Guard as his replacement.

What makes the story every more interesting is the fact that tomorrow is both a religious holiday, which Ukrainians associate with their armed forces-dating back to the Cossack times, as well as being the official founding date of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which is to be celebrated by nationalists, AND the absolute last working session of the Ukrainian parliament prior to the parliamentary election that are to take place on Oct 26th. there's still a whole pile of bills that MUST be passed tomorrow, and a whole lot of provocations and disruptions are expected, with numerous scenarios being worked out. there's been talks that the Donbass oligarchs have brought in 2000 "miners" to Kyyiv to play their part in stirring shit up, and tomorrow sounds like it will be an intense day.

Going back to the "rebellion"--despite talking big, the VVs didn't actually do much. They certainly didn't have the sympathies of Kyyv residents, most of whom feel that since there's a goddamn war on, there's no excuse for complaining right now. The fact that these local VV boys were teh ones facign down the Maydan protesters during the winter, and in general they haven't been doing much fighting in the ATO, mostly chilling in their barracks, while int he East, people are dying didn't help them in pleading their case. Towards the end of the evening, they were finally led away by their officers, as they were promised to be paid on the 15th, teh demobilization situation will be clarified following the meeting b/w Putin and Poroshenko in Milan this week, which is supposed to cement the "ceasefire" agreement and get the Minsk agreements rolingto de-escalate the situation.

Precisely what is the situation out East? well, I'll just leave 2 links here.

The approximate map as of Aug 23, 2014 (right before the beginning of the Russian offensive, as Uki forces made an ill-advised push for Illovaysk).


http://www.rnbo.gov....4/23-08_eng.jpg

It's mostly accurate, though I doubt we've had any control of the border from Dovzhansky to Stepanivka--however, due to the fact that Ukrainians controlled the mountain Savur-Mohyla, they've had "surveillance" over that stretch of the border.


And now:

http://www.rnbo.gov....4/13-10_eng.jpg

The Minst Agreements "technically" assured that the respective sides halt where they are, and cease fire. Despite this, the Russians continued pushing and in order to avoid encirclement, Uki forces have yielded the territory south and west of Luhansk, including the entirety of the Lutuhyno district and retreated north to the river Siverskyj Donet's which is now the "border". The city of Slavyanoserbs'k remains tentatively Ukrainian-held, but it's shaky. In the Donetsk region, the frontline is likewise deliniaed roughly by the river Kalmius, wit Ukrainians controlling the area directly east of Mariupol, while the Russians have pushed across Kalmius directly south of Donetsk so that the city only remains blocked from the west and north-west, where the ruins of the Donetsk internaitonal airport continue to grind down all Russian efforts to dislodge Uki troops holed up there.

The Donetsk airport is the one source of good news in the otherwise bleak atmosphere post-minsk. Despite all the Russian bravadoa nd daily reports that the airport's been captured coming from the Russian media, the airport's heroic defenders (now dubbed "cyborgs" by the creative and appreciative Uki internet community) continue to hold. The Kirovohrad army Spetsnaz brigade, reinforced with groups from various paratrooper brigades, as well as the absolutely insane and fearless Right Sector volunteers, with the help of the best Uki artillery can provide, continue to deliver death unto anyone suicidal enough to assault them. Donetsk morgues and hospitals are packed with literally hundreds of the hapless attackers, and DNR is quickly losing steam in its offense, as the numbers of available "volunteers" trickles down to a near halt. There are regular suggestions that the airport ight be yielded, in exchange for some territorial concession elsewhere along the front, but it seems less and less likely that may happen while the "cyborgs" still stand. Among the many political jokes being told these days, one of the more popular ones is, "despite all the attempts of Ukrainian leaders to lose the Donetsk Airport, as a birthday present for Putin, the Donetsk airport cyborgs have failed to do so, since they don't watch the news".

The above describes the public sentiment fairly well. Few are happy with the "ceasefire", given that this is Poroshenko's second abortive attempt to treat with terrorist by forbidding the ATO any offensive actions--and the combined death toll from the "ceasefires" has hit several hundred Ukrainian lives, with no real gains to show for it.Less and less people trust the Pres, the only one the majority does trust nearly unconditionally is the army--and particularly the volunteers. Volunteer fighters have spearheaded the early moments fo the ATO and they continue to be invaluable in supporting regular troops. Volunteers back in the cities organize supply chains that allow the ATO forces to forego reliance on the outdated and corrupt Army bureaucracy in getting supplies that are needed to the fighters that need them ASAP.

It's a given at this point that nothing significant will be done by Ukraine war-wise until the elections are done. Only exception to this statmeent would be "barring any more unpredictable insanity from Putin". Given the latter's Sunday order to "terminate the exercised in Rostov Oblast and sent 17k troops back to their winter quarters" that seems unlikely (hopefully). But you never know. Personally, I'm of a firm conviction that Putin won't excalate any further untill the election, because any Russian success right now would mean less vote for Poroshenko's party, with those voters, dissapointed with how he's handling the whole war thing, likely to turn to more radical elements--ones far less likely to be secretly willing to make a hush-hush deal with Putin and go back to the status quo. A military success by Putin now will make it even more likely that new, anti-Russian idealistic faces will fill the parliament, and make the collapse of the current oligarch-dominated system actually inevitable.

I haven't had the chance i was hoping for in analyzing just who and what's going on with the elections--and today was the official last day to finalize candidacies and there was some effort by a few of the "democratic" parties to pick a single candidate on about 20-odd FPTP voting districts where some of the most odious persons of the old regime decided to muscle their way into the new Parliament again. it's too early to say just what are the chances where, and that analysis will probably have to wait till the next weekend.

Internationally, oil continues its plunge. The Independent now suggests it'll bottom out at around $70/barrel, which is bad, bad news for Russia. Nevertheless, can't expect it to collapse just yet, and, sadly, in a head to head competition as to the strenght of economies, Russia's got a huge lead on UA--its reserves would allow it at least a year, even if the Cenral bank is hemmoraging smth like 3-4 billion per week to slow down the Ruble's plunge, which has hit historic lows last week.

The world contiues to condemn Russsia, but really, everyone is playing the waiting game right now. And sadly I don't see a very good ouytcome for UA unless smth changes.

[Mentalist]

As expected, the Milan summit meetup b/w Putin + Poroshenko accomplished shit all. Oh, sure, there's "progress in negotians", but that's not how Poroh tells it.

Mind you, Uki commentators took this as a GOOD sign: "Poroshenko sathe talks were difficult--translating from diplo-speak, it means he hasn't been able to sell any other national interests".

Belorussia's Lukashenko did a brilliant 5h press-conference of Putin-bashing, which was nice, although meh, bc Bac'ka (Daddy) Lukashenko changes loyalty according to who looks more likely to sponsor blr's economy at the particular moment.

This weekend planning to do a rundown on next Sun's election. Stay tuned...

[Mentalist]

Unfortunately, the Ukrainian Central Electoral Commission`s site has been down for the past 3 days straight, so I wasn't able to get as much info as I hoped, since the primary resource, which includes party lists and individual districts' candidate lists.

digging around various news sites, the electoral picture looks pretty grim. mostly because of the election system. Allow me to explain:

here's 2 pictures from the last parlimaentary election 2 years ago:

Party lists:

http://uk.wikipedia....date_okruhs.png

The blue is the party of the last President, Party of Regions-a big-business, "pro-Russian" party. light orange are communists, and the other 3 are opposition parties-all 3 pro western. Brown is "Svoboda" nationalists, orange is Klytchko's "UDAR" (more centrist) and purple is Tymoshenko's "Batkivschyna"--a big-business pro-Western party.

If the election was straight PR, the "Opposition" would've had a clear majority, and things would've been cool, even if they'd have lacked a constitutional majority (300 out of the 450 seats).

But, since some bright minds have picked to change the PR system to a mixed PR/FPTP, this picture meant the "opposition" had a slight majority out of the 225 PR seats (121 v 104 held by PR and CPU)

The other half the seats were assigned via a FPTP election in each electoral district.

Here's how that turned out:

http://upload.wikime...date_okruhs.png

Once again, main parties have the same colours. No single seats for Commies, although one deputee got her eself elected as self-nominated (grey) and then proceeded to join Commies once inside Rada.

SO, what kills me about this is that in that pretty much everywhere outside the ultra-patriotic parts of Western UA (Galychyna + Volyn), as well as Kyyiv, (which accounts for 13 seats by itself), the opposition, which clearly had popular support, was unable to convert it into personal seats. The reason for that is simple: bribery. Majority of the "grey" districts are either rural or small town districts--you'll note that, on average, opposition candidates still won in otblast capitals.

however, in rural districts, either a major local businessman, or an important ruling party official who decided to run would usually reign supreme. both due to the ability to tamper with counting votes, and, more simply due to "buying votes". there were several ways of doing this
1) indirect bribes, where a candidate does somehtign for the community, such as having a road re-paved as a "sign of caring for the people". One famous example was a PR candidate who donated a dozen computers to a local school. After losing, he demanded the school return them.
2) "charity"--aimed especially at pensioners, the candidate's team would either organize a "charitable fund named after a candidate", which would provide help to the poor voters, or, they would distribute "care packages", composed of basic foodstuffs (including buckwheat, of "Hrechka" in Ukrainian, which is gave the colloquial name to the practice of bribery for votes-- "sowing buckwheat"), and include candidate's literature, endorsing people to vote him.
3) The most bold (or most stupid) would actually have people walking door to door, offering to pay for a vote for the "right candidate". Average cost of 1 vote -200 UAH (back then, the exchange rate was about 1USD=8UAH)

And that's pretty much all it took to get elected. Owing a local media outlet helped.

Thing is, once elected, the bulk of these "independents" would flock to whomever was more likely to have power--since they were going into politics in order to further their business interests, there'd be next to no profit in languishing 3 years in opposition.
There was also a lot of dirt and falsifications involved on districts where an opposition candidate managed to win despite the enormous pressure, but they weren't supposed to, because the local "aristo" already made a downpayment to the ruling party--a 5 districts were actually declared such as "where the election result could not be determined", and a "re-election was run there in Dec 2013.

There were also probably 15-20 districts where there'd be the following split

PR candidate: 35%
Opposition part A: 30%
Opposition party B: 27&
everyone else: negligible.

In these cases, due to the legendary inability of Ukrainians to compromise, the will of the people (who were clearly on majority opposed to PR) would be perverted.

As a final result, the opposition cobbled together about 60-odd FPTP candidates--part of whom deserted following the formation of a PR-led coalition.

There were a few independents who were also ini opposition to the govt, it must be said--such as Yuri Derev'yanko, who got elected on the 87th district, in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, and was probably the exemplary MP in this Rada, in terms of his work ethic, his partiotic position, his law -making initiatives and his work together with various civil society orgs. But there's many more cases of very "bad" independents.


And now we come to the same hurdle, again. Except now it's even worse.

PR-wise, this is how things look, according to the latest polls:

1) the unquestionable leader is the party "Block of Petro Poroshenko". The Pres couldn't resist the temptation of having a party named after him. His party includes some long-time "oppositioners", as well as a sizeable number of questionable people, mostly businessmen in some ways connected to Poroshenko and his business associates. He also has some ATO officers, as well as a sprinkling of Maydan activists, including 2 of the most well-known investigative journalists in UA. One of them, Mustafa Nayem, a son of Afgani refugees, was actually the person whose Facebook post commenting on the govt's decision to stop preparations to sign the Association Agreement actually started Maydan. The stated mission of this segment is to "bring new leaders to the Parliament". Right now they are rapidly cobbling together a campaign for a candidate in one of the abovementioned small town districts, to prevent a corrupt ex-secretary of the Kyyiv City Council from winning there, since BPP has previously agreed to "let him have the district", as their nominated candidate there was.... the odious candidate's secretary. Yeah.

Polls give BPP somewhere b/w 30 and 25 of the popular vote. How accurate tehse numbers are remains to be seen. Pres is criticised a lot for his endless mantra about "peace plan", in the face of a continued Russian aggression. But he controls the biggest formerly "opposition" media channel - Channel 5, which was the loudspeaker of the Orange Revolution back in the day, and remains the most "anti-Russian/patriotic channel" out there. so he has a lot of public sway.
In terms of FPTP, there's most literature out there about BPP, so here I can go a bit more in-depth. BPP has put forward maybe a dozen candidates that can be considered "new"--respected local journalists/lawyers/doctors/Maydan activists. There's about as many obviously "odious" candidates, closely connected to the old regime, and with strong ties to corruption accusations. Theres' maybe half-dozen of existing MPs from Klytcko's UDAR, which joined up with BPP, who are running for re-election. There's about a dozen districts where BPP either didn't nominate anyone, or nominated a token nobody--these are districts where there's an important local oligarch running as an Independent--and Poroshenko has a deal with him. In particular, in Zakarpattya oblast, in 4 out of the 6 districts, a local oligarch Baloha is running with his 2 brothers and 1 cousin.

BPP's made a few arrangements with "The People's Front" (NF)--the party of the current PM yatseniuk and current Rada speaker Turchynov. Previously heads of "Batkivschyna", they found themselves uncomfortable once Tymoshenko was released from jail and tried to take leadership again 9culminating in her loss in the Pres. election in March where she came second with like 13% of the vote). On about 11 districts BPP is coordinating with NF, only putting a single candidate there. This mostly concerns Central UA, though, with little effort to coordinate in the southern regions, where the ex-PR influence is still strong.

Likewise BPP has agreed with "Svoboda", so that in the 12 districts where Svoboda people are running fro re-election, BPP will not oppose them.

BPP's already declared an intent to form coalition with NF in the new Parliament.

Overall, I don't like BPP. They will make it for sure, and I'm glad there will be a few new faces in there, but overall, despite their declarations, BPP will be a conservative, reactionary force that will block drastic reforms, because there will be too many entrenched interests weighing it down.

2) The most frequent second place part is the "Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko". They are promised somewhere arounr 12% by the polls. I've already written waht I think about these guys. Essentially, this is a "pocket party" of the junior oligarch Lyovochkin. Lyovochkin s the junior partner of Dmytro Firtash, the second largest UA oligarch, currently under house arrest in austria, while his extraditino to US is being appealed. Firtash's business empire encomapsses the entirety of UA's chemical industry, and he is also the big player behind all the money being laundered out of the UA-Russia gas deals, since his company serves as a buying/selling intermediary.

Lyovochkin was the head of Yanukovych's Administration prior to Maydan. After the "dispersal" of the students on December 1st, he resigned. He owns "Inter", which is the biggest Russian-speaking channel in UA. He uses it to promote both Lyashko (as a "patriotic" politician", as well as blatantly pro-Russian political forces". The rest of the time his channel spends mud-slinging the oligarch Kolomoyskyj, and other national-democratic parties.

Lyashko's party is a joke. his party list has very few positive faces (although the commander of "Aydar" volunteer battalion is running with him in his top 5--and I would like to see him there). I haven't heard anything good about his FPTP candidates--except perhaps the fact that he's got the head of Mykolayiv Self-Defence, (who punched the PR pres candidate Tsaryov in the face a few times during the latter's Pres. Campaign) running for him. That guy (Yantsen) is a positive character, and if he makes it, beating out whatever pro-Russian candidates might be running in Mykolayiv, that will be a positive development.

past the initial tendency that "BPP has the lead, Lyashko is second", the polls begin to vary. In order to make it to Rada, a party has to have over 5% of the popular vote, and everyone that follows is either howering a few percent over, or a few under, depending on the poll. Some polls laint pro-russians as hopeless outsiders with 1-2%, others paint them making it by the skin of their teeth. There's usually like 30% of respondents who haven't made up their mind yet. And pre-electoral sociology in UA, is such a fickle thing, and so prone to being used t manipulate voters, it's virtually impossible to trust it.

3) Batkivshyna (Fatherland), aka, "The party of the politically undying Yuliya Tymoshenko". This party has hit hard times. Tymoshenko's popularity is still in decline. After her misguided attempt to hijack the Maidan the day she was released from Kharkiv prison, Tymoshenko suffered a stunning defeat inher run for president, and then a solid chunk of her party deserted her to form the NF. During its long spell in opposition, the party also lost a big chunk of its financial backers.

Nevertheless, Tymoshenko's a tenacious fighter, and (in Western UA in particular) she still has her undying supporters since for a good decate she was the most charismatic polician on the Ukrainian political landscape. She's also still got the most well-developed party structure throughout the country, being at this time the one truly "national" party that encompasses the entire country.

Her party list includes a few young reformers. It would appear, "Batkivshyna" has launched an ambitious recruiting program, focusing on young Ukrainians with Western education, who decide to come back to UA and have the skills and the mindset to set up a true Western-style government. The party actually ran an open contest for young professionals to join party lists, and those chosen do have impressive resumes. I've watched a half-hour interview with one of them, and my general impression is "either they really ARE planning to reform (which is incredibly difficult to believe, since Tymoshenko and her party is as much a pillar of the oligarchate system as PR was), or they are spending an INCREDIBLE amount of effort to get the potential reformers and corrupt them before tey can become a force for actual change". I won't lie: though I realize the naivety of it, hearing about such supposed structural changes gave me a glimmer of hope. just a tiny one but it's there.

FPTP-wise, "Batkivshyna"'s got a solid shot in the West and Center--largely thanks due to the fact that following the Revolution, it was a nominally Batkivshyna-led majority that took power, which led to them taking power in most local councils in the Center, where trumped-up PR majorities collapsed. "Batkibshyna" in many districts has nominated local council heads or secretaries--people inherently respected and recognizable. In a number of districts, therey've got real chances against BPP. There's also a chunk of "Batkivschyna" MPs going for re-election (those who haven't left for the NF). What will make it harder, of course, is the fact that there is an alternative in NF, and NF and BPP have a number of "agreements" in many Western districts.

"Batkivschyna" is an institution in Uki politics. Tymoshenko is an institution. It's an open question as to who may be her allies, since her and Poroshenko are long-time rivals. I can't predict how she'll do. But I have very few doubts as to whether she'll make it or not.


4) "People's Front" or NF. As mentioned above, this is a splinter of "Batkivshyna". It's formed around the current Cabinet, a number of ex-Batkivschyna MPs, whose loyalties lie closer to the PM Yatseniuk (who had his own party, before merging with "Batkivschyna" prior to the 2012 election). The highlight of NF, is that it's a very war-oriented party. There's about half-dozen of ATO battalion commanders in the party lists, and when in doubt, the NF will stick an ATO officer in a FPTP district nomination (in particular, they did a lot of that in the liberated districts of Donbass).

NF openly positions itself as the PM's party. Their message is "if you like what the Cabinet is doing, vote us". Although the economy's in shambles, and reforms are slow, Yatseniuk is considered by most as "somehow keeping a sinking ship afloat", whereas Poroshenko, who makes the personnel decisions in Defence, as well as the National Bank is seen as "the cause of most screwups". Some polls have NF balancing just under 5%, others give them as much as 7-8%. I expect they'll make it, and I like a lot of the new faces they are bringing--a number of civil activists are in the first part of the party lists, and especially a lot of the ATO volunteer commanders. NF runs the so-called "war council", which encompasses all volunteer battalion commanders, regardless of who they run with, and they have real input on some decisions regarding supply. In essence, NF is far from perfect, but out of the 4 "leading government parties", I'd much rather see them in charge than BPP.


The above 2 were those of the "maybes" who were "much more likely to make it than not".

Next is "The Russian Block". These are parties which are the remains of PR, who represent the old regime, a pro-Russian, but mostly anti-Maydan sentiment. They are unanimous in condemning Maydan as "anti-government coup", denying Russian annexation of Crimea ("we lost Crimea"), and condemning the ATO as a "ruthless police action against its own citizens"(thus denying the fact that the whole thing is masterminded, supplied and in large part run by Russia). Needless to say, they are less than popular with patriots (in fact, one of the most frequent complaints about poroshenko is "Why the hell are these guys not locked up or dead yet?", but they fully intend to make a comeback into Rada, using their "core' electorate in the Russian-speaking part of the country, as well by using the FPTP methods as described above.

Roughly, there's 3 major parties:
5) "Strong Ukraine" (the party of Serhiy Tyhipko)--a middling oligarch, formerly of PR, who has made several attempts at running his own party. He was the best-placed "pro Russian" Pres candidate, coming in 5th overall, but second in most of the southern and Eastern oblasts. For the longest time he tried to play the role of a "seemingly Western-minded politician for the Russian-speakers". But in the last debates they burned that bridge when he refused to accept that Russian annexed Crimea. It reamins to be seen what that does to his popularity, but he's not genuinely well-liked in most of the country. of all the "pro-Russians" he may have the best chance of making it in the PR portion. unlikely to have much success in FPTP.

6) Opposition Block. The Party of Regions has rebranded itself. Cobbling together a few micro-parties to unite with, its functionaries have shed the name "Party of Regions" in favour of the much more "mainstream" Opposition Block". Same story- Russia good, Kyyiv junta bad, before the Maydan pensions were better, the dollar cost les,s and Crimea didn't "leave". Deny all responsibility for what happened, no remorse for their own actions, pretty anti-Western. Since former PR members still run most of the administration and councils in the south and East, there remains a chance of falsifications and other nasty surprises. Nevertheless, with Tyhipko and Communists both nipping at their core voters, and the Pres being (in principle opposed to them), good chance they may miss out. Recent news suggest that some big industrial magnates are ordering their workers to vote Opposition block "otherwise all factories will shut down and you'll all lose your jobs", but it remains to be seen how effective this will be

In FPTP, however, the Block, and especially former PR members running as "independents" have very good chances to be a sizeable force in the new Rada. in the 16 of the 34 districts of Donbass where voting "should happen" (about 12 are confirmed for sure, 4 remain under question), as well as most of Kharkiv Oblast, parts of Zaporizhzhya, and further South, former PRs have very good chances, since the "democrats" have almost entirely failed to present a "single opposing candidate", and have put up virtually no "effective" alternatives. The only ray of sunshine here is the fact that in Dnipropetrovsk oblast its Oligarch-governor Kolomoyskyj has taken up a staunch anti-Russian position, and he has a score to settle with the local PR "family". Which is good news, since the oblast is one of th elargest and has some 17-odd seats. And while most of them will probably end up being backed with "Kolomoyskyj's men", it's still a much better alternative than PR.

Although the FPTP situation looks pretty grim, on the PR front, thankfully, the percentage of those who still hasn't woken up and thinks Russia is our best friend is slowly growing smaller. and the 3 pro-Russian forces will have to fight each other for the shrinking number of voters. So (fingers crossed) there won't be too many of them in the next Rada. Hopefully. Please, God.


Lastly, I wanted to write about the parties that need to make it, but I'm afraid wont. Just like the 3 "pro-Russian" parties, these ones are also fighting for a small pool of voters--the "I-want-change-but-I-don't trust-anyone-in-the-mainstream" parties.

7) The most obvious of these, is, of course "Svoboda". Formerly considered an "ultra-nationalist", they enjoyed a surge in popularity in 2012, where they got about 10.5% of the popular vote, stunning just about everyone, as well as most of the local councils in Galicia and Volyn. It was very much a protest vote against Yanukovych, voting in the most radical party out there, in hopes of countering the very heavy-handed pro-Russian authoritative leanings. They also enjoyed the largest percent of support among the most educated sector of the population. They did decently well on the Maydan (though many grew dissapointed with their restrained manner, which partially explains the swell in Lyashko's "Radical Party"'s popularity--Lyashko was a much better "patriotic" demagogue, and he painted a pretty picture of himself getting stuff down in the ATO). Svoboda activists make up about a 5th of those killed as part of the Heavenly Hundred. Svoboda also organized, equipped and sent off its own battalion "Sich" into the ATO. They are hard-working, nose-to-the-ground nationalists. I'mve no doubts they'll get most of their 16 FPTP MPs re-elected, maybe even pick up a few more seats. But in PR, it's hard to say what their chances are. Their leader Tyahnybok pulled about 1.16% in the Pres. election. The have a really bad ipublic image along the Russian-speakers, and their rhetoric is still too-focused on Galician ethnic nationalism as opposed to the inclusive citizen nationalism. They have the right messages--but they deliver them in archaic manner that reinforces Soviet stereotypes. In that sense, they are obsolete and need to reform or fall by the wayside, as other old-school nationalist parties have before them. Really doubting they'll hit 5% in PR, and I hope they get a low result, because I want those vote to go to the 2 parties below. Esp since Svoboda was the only "Maydan party" that made no efforts to include some "young faces" as part of the party lists.

8) "Civic Position"-a party led by a former moD Hrytsenko--the man I still believe should've been voted in as President. Hrytsenko's own party is nothing special--they work with civil activists, they are one of the most transparent parties (earning them brownie points from the transparency watchdog "Chesno" ("Honestly"), but that's about all. MUCH more exciting is the fact that about a fifth of their party list has been given over to a young fledgling party "Democratic Alliance"--which is, in its entirety composed of civic activists and is one of the most reform-minded parties out there. Hrytsenko's a good guy, despite there being a corruption trail behind him from his time in Yuschenko's MoD, he is a type of expert we need to get the shambles of an army together. But the real focus here is DemAliance, because them making creates a core for a group of "reform-minded" MPs, around whom other "progressive MPs could gather.

regarding their FPTP-this is where I know nothing. this is where CVK site being down hampers analysis. I can't say anything, except "they lack brand recognition",, which is a minus.

8) "Samopomich" or "Self-help"--aka, "the party of the mayor of L'viv". This party made a splash when they ran for and made their way into the Kyyiv City council, concurrent to the Pres election. The party is stuffed with civil activists (including the head of the initiative "Reanimatiory Reform Package", which is the main blueprint of reforms that currently being (ever so slowly) being pushed through in Rada), the "Donbass" Battalion commander Semenchenko (though he's been the subject of the largest amount of "black PR", and in general I'd prefer he stayed less vocal for the remainder of the campaign), as well as the man behind the current "Lustration" legislature Yevhen Sobolev--a civil activist who was one of those "nominated by the Maydan into the new government", and made the head of the "Lustration committee", who managed, despite having no formal power, to make lobby through 2 laws (Lustration of the judiciary, and, recently, despite tremendous resistance, the Law on Lustration", which makes him probably the person to have achieved the most tangible results for the betterment of the country since the Revolution. The other big "selling point" to the public is that the nominal head of the party, the L'viv mayor Sadovyj has put himself number 50 on the party list--meaning, unless Samopomich gets smth like a quarter of the popular vote, he won't become an MP. In the brief look I've had at their FPTP candidates in the first few alphabetical oblasts', Samopomich tends to nominate either professionals (saw a disproportionate (compared to other parties) number of lawyers), or mid-size businessmen--which is also an encouraging sign in their strategy. Samopomich has small ambitions--their party list is only 60 person long--but they are the ones I hope make it the most. Just like "Cicil Platform, get top scores fro transparency of funding and candidates' bios

In FPTP, the above mentioned Sobolev, who has his own new-found party "Volya" ("Liberty") also has about 50 FPTP candidates running throughout the country. It's an outside chance, but anyone of those who makes it will be another vote for change.

As you may have been able to tell from my tone, Samopomich and Hrytsenko's parties are the ones I want to see do well. Unfortunately, I feel that they share the same electoral field, not to mention being out shined by the 4 major "brand" parties. My realistic prediction is that maybe one of them will make it. Pessimistic puts them both falling just short of 5%. Absolutely ideally--both make it with about 7-10% each, but that'll take an absolute miracle. and I won't even try to make any predictions about FPTP for these parties

and, lastly...

9) Right Sector. Their popularity is rising, as the media (grudgingly) covers their contribution to defense of Donetsk airport. Local actions, such vigilante raids on drug dealers and underground casinos that were "covered" by local police boost their popularity as "doers". And their fanatic patriotism is a big electoral asset since we're at war and all that. Every single mistake made by Poroshenko (and pretty much every time he says "peace plan", followed by another SecCouncil brief about a Russian shelling Uki positions, or more dead Uki soldiers would bea "mistake") swells the number of those who "just do what they have to"--since the Uki Govt refuses to recognize the Right Sector's Volunteer Ukrainian Corps as ATO participants, it puts them outside the chain of command, meaning they are free to act where regulars are constrained by the "ceasefire" order. The polls shows Right Sector at barely 1%, but there's been an increased info campaign by RS supporters that, allegedly, "true" poll results were leaked by insiders, which put RS @ 4.8%--with the resulting encouragement for everyone who's on the fence to vote for RS.

Given that I firmly believe that the polls and the media fabricated Poroshenko's rating through early polls at least (he went from being a near no-one to leader in potential pres race in a month), and that I KNOW that uki voters often vote "for the most likely" so that their vote isn't "wasted", and given that RS is the one true wildcard in the race--do I believe that it's possible there's a sociological cover-up to lower their true result? I won't deny i think there's a strong possibility--esp given Yanukovych's govt apparently did the same to "Svoboda" 2 years ago.

I don't expect RS to make it. I give their leader Yarosh a 55% chance to win a FPTP seat. I give about 35% of them picking up one to a few FPTP seats in some random district where the local RS activists made their presence known by doing good things in fighting local corruption.
I will be overjoyed if they break 5%. I will be pushing every Uki I know in Canada who can vote to vote RS. But I won't expect them to win.



Overall, best case scenario:
PR: "Pro-Russians" don't make it. BPP gets just over 10% NF + Lyashko + Batkivschyna barely make it. Samopomich and Civil position sweep with 15% each, RS limps in. joining up. s
FPTP: somehow, PR only gets re-elected in 20% of their seats. Local oligarchs lose out to young activists. Svoboda gets 30 seats. Volya + Samopomich sweep.

Coalition: Coalition is formed around Samopomich + Volya + Civil position, with all ATO officers + new faces + reform-minded MPS. Svoboda and RS join as well. "Bgnrand" parties are forced to join so as not to lose their "Maydan" cred, but there's a simple majority without them having the final say which is sufficient to pass reforms. Pro-Russian FPTP MPs form a skulking opposition.

Realistic scenario (aka the bad scenario):

PR: BPP gets 20% Lyashko gets 8, NF gets 12-14%. Batkivshyna limps in, so does Tyhipko--he gets 7%. one of Samopomich/Civil Position barely makes it by a hair. RS and Svoboda don't make it.Neither do CPU and Opposition Block.
FPTP: "Democrats" manage from a third to 45% of the seats--somehow. Lion's share of these is BPP. Local "princes" take about 10%, the rest are pro-Russian. Svoboda keep their 16, pick up a few more. RS might get 1-3 seats.

Coalition: BPP + NF + local "princes"-independents+ a bunch of 'turncoat" independents + some ex-PR. Batkivschyna is opposition, Samopomich/Civil position and RS don't join the coalition but vote with them on the few reforms that get pushed through. Svoboda MPs are a wild card.
The parliament is unstable, as it doesn't meet public demand fro qualitatively new government. But it obeys the Pres, so the system is reshuffled to give his "family" ascendance.

Abslutely worst-case scenario:

PR: BPP gets 30+ NF + Lyashko get 7-10% each. all 3 Pro-Russian parties limp in with 5-7% each.

FPTP: Svoboda gets 2/3s of their seats re-elected. BPP/NF/Batkivshyna together pull off 30%. local "princes" make it (anotehr 10% of the seats), Pro-Russian "independents" sweep the rest.

Coalition: "based on the political conditions", most of BPP + Strong Ukraine +most PR FPTP "independents" form a coalition. Lyashko speaks out against it, but most of his party votes when needed. Communists + OB are also "fake opposition". NF+bits of BPP + national-democratic FPTP MPs make up true opposition. Reaction wins. People in Kyyiv get ready to riot.


Really, it looks bad. I dunno how bad the realistic scenario will be--it'll depend on how big the "reform-minded" core group will be--If they can pull of at least 20 votes + get the support of the volunteer battalion commanders--then there's a chance that Poroshenko can be kept in line, and forced down the path of reforms. if the "new" National-democrats lose out to the "old" comprehensively--then I worry. I worry a lot.

This post took a few hours. I was gonna write about the supposed Russian sub off the Swedish coast + some more international stuff as well, but need to stop here for today. next Sunday I probably won't sleep.